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I. INTRODUCTION

In February 2010, John Stagliano, entrepreneur, producer, and director of
pornographic films, was the principal in two simultaneous litigations regarding
production and distribution of his Evil Angel films. The first was a seven-count
federal criminal indictment brought against him and his company, John
Stagliano, Inc. (JSI), for distribution of obscene materials and possession for
purposes of distribution of obscene materials, specifically, two films and one
movie trailer.' These charges were subsequently dismissed after a jury trial on
July 16, 2010.2 The second litigation was a civil action; specifically, a copyright
infringement claim filed by JSI on behalf of itself and Jules Jordan Video (JJV)
against Alain Elmaleh and his Montreal-based Kaytel Video Distribution
accused Elmaleh and Kaytel of producing and distributing knock-off DVD
copies of JSI and JJV copyrighted films.? Ironically, Stagliano may have been
targeted for criminal prosecution not because his films were "rough" or
characterized by demeaning treatment of women, which is a usual trigger for
federal action, but because of the presumption that court documents would be
available from his civil suit, which would save the prosecution the expense of
independent discovery. 4

I United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2010). The charges were precipitated by
an internet purchase by an FBI agent of the Obscenity Prosecution Task Force (OPTF) of two
DVD films which were delivered (possibly by United Parcel Service) on or about December 19,
2007, to a FBI-established post office box address in Washington, D.C. by btmmailorder.com, an
adult-oriented online store maintained by Baltimore-based Komar Company, an adult product
distribution center. Mark Kernes, Feds Lose Stagkano Obsceniiy Case-Firstin Over 30 Years, AVN (July
18, 2010, 9:31 AM), http://business.avn.com/articles/legal/Feds-Lose-Stagliano-Obscenity-CaseFirst-in-Over-30-Years-L/0391 1.html. The indictment did not include Komar. For the history of
obscenity prosecutions during this period, see generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Obscenity
Prosecutions and the Bush Administration: The Inside Perspective of the Adult Enterainment Industy & D ense
Attorney Iuis Sirkin, 14 VILL. SPoRTS & ENT. L.J. 233 (2007).
2 Kernes, supranote 1.
3 The initial suits were consolidated into Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d
1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010).
4 The signature prosecutions of the OPTF spanned from 2005-2010 and included United
States v. Five Star Video, Indictment, No. 2:06cr515 (D. Ariz. May 23, 2006) (indictment on
eighteen counts), withdrawn, Minute Enty, United States v. Five Star Video, No. 2:06cr515 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 16, 2007); United States v. Little, No. 8:07-cr-00170-T-24-MSS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45639
(M.D. Fla. June 10, 2008), affd in part and remanded in part, 365 F. App'x 159 (11th Cir. Feb. 2,
2010); United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005), all responding to films that
targeted smaller niche audiences interested in rough sex, domination themes, and excretion, fare
that juries in assumedly more conservative venues would be less willing to tolerate under
contemporary obscenity standards set by Miller v. Cakfornia, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Stagliano's
films, while also oriented to selected fetish audiences, contained no domination or violent themes
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Details of the Stagliano copyright infringement suit were fairly typical for
piracy of films in the pornography industry at that time. In early Spring 2005,
JSI and JJV began to experience an abnormally high return rate on their topselling videos with customers claiming inferior or defective quality.5 After
investigation, plaintiffs discovered that Kaytel was producing unauthorized
DVD glass masters of JSI and JJV videos in California, shipping them to
Canada for replication, then distributing the counterfeit copies through
intermediaries to retail stores throughout the United States and the world. 6
Such a case easily fit within the narrow scope of copyright protection usually
accorded sexually explicit material by involving exact copies and not raising any
question of whether sexual content was sufficiently original to warrant
protection.' After a two-week trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs on all
counts, awarding $11.2 million to JSI and $5.35 million to Gasper. 8
The absurdity revealed by the nexus of these legal and equitable judgments
is palpable. Is it possible that a person has a statutorily-protected proprietary
right to publish a work, grounded in the legislative assumption that such
protection advances knowledge and learning, and yet for doing so, he becomes
subject to criminal prosecution for distribution of that same work on the
legislative assumption that certain types of works in their nature and
consequence threaten the public welfare? Can it be that Congress vests him
with a right that he is then prohibited from enjoying-that he has been
accorded a proprietary right to sell that which is illegal to sell, and that when he
attempts to exercise his right, he becomes subject to criminal action? If so, the
absurdity becomes manifest, as one claims court protection for the right to

and were in fact considered "whimsical." They may have been targeted because of Stagliano's
own notoriety. The cases were prosecuted in the D.C. circuit-hardly known for its conservative
values-probably in hopes of a high-profile conviction that might influence federal lawmakers.
See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, The 2008 FederalObscenity Conviction of PaulLittle and What
It Reveals About Obscenity Law and Prosecutions,11 VAND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 592 (2009).
5 JulesJordanVideo, Inc., 617 F.3d at 1150.
6 Id.
7 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex Exaptionadsm in IntellectualPmpery, 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
119, 143-45 (2012) (identifying how plot devices, character types, or motifs of expression tend to
be stock rather than original features in commercial pornography and are therefore relatively nonprotectable). Tellingly, there is no record of Kaytel arguing that sexually explicit works were
ineligible for copyright protection, the rather standard affirmative defense that is the subject of
this Article.
8 Juks Jordan Video, Inc., 617 F.3d at 1151. The only point at which the criminal and civil
actions intersected was when the defense in the criminal action successfully blocked the
prosecution's attempt to introduce Stagliano's testimony and other documents from the civil
action to prove his connection to JSI. Immediately after the jury found for the plaintiffs in the
civil action, Stagliano settled with the defendants on December 20, 2007.
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engage in illegal activities. And how did this apparently untenable circumstance
arise-through legislative inattention, or worse, whimsy? Perhaps, as Mr.
Bumble so eloquently proclaimed it, "the law is a[n] ass." 9
Through the 1970s, this type of circumstance would not have arisenStagliano would have been convicted of distributing pornography by a jury trial
under Miller standards, 0 and his claim to copyright protection of his duly
registered films probably would have been denied under common law, based on
prevailing equitable principles that rendered such materials ineligible for
protection. These days, such criminal convictions are fairly rare and difficult to
obtain, as cultural barriers to sexual material under community standards have
relaxed," and such copyright infringement claims are now routinely supported
based on the reversal of the equitable principle in Mitchell Brothers v. Cinema Adult
Theater over thirty years ago.12 So, what changed? Has the nature of copyright

9 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST OR THE PARISH Boy's PROGRESS 389 (Nelson
Doubleday, Inc. 1960) (1846).
10 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In a modification of the initial obscenity
standards enunciated in dictum in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957), the Miller court
established a three-pronged threshold for obscenity based on whether the nature of the work (a)
appealed to prurient interest in sex, when taken as a whole and judged by contemporary
community standards of the average person, (b) was patently offensive in its display of sexual
conduct, and (c) lacked serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. However, given the
pervasiveness and escalating frankness of sexual depictions in print media, television, and film
over time, what was considered patently offensive by the average person had become
marginalized to that which might still considered shocking to most audiences by contemporary
standards, e.g., sexual violence, demeaning treatment of women, torture, etc. More recent
prosecutions tended to focus mainly on the most graphic and violent depictions, for which most
juries would have little tolerance. Richards & Calvert, supra note 4, at 233-43.
11 OPTF obscenity prosecutions targeted "low-hanging fruit," such as so-called gonzo films
(non-stop action, no storyline or theme) that emphasized physical and verbal abuse of women.
Extreme Associates specialized in "horror porn," in which women were graphically bound,
tortured, raped and killed, but was only prosecuted after a 2002 PBS documentary, AMERICAN
PORN, which included violent clips from its "Forced Entry" (1970) had made the nature of its
films more visible. Richards & Calvert, supra note 1, at 235-38, 254-55. Paul Little was
prosecuted not for distribution of his domestic "domination" films but rather for the
unauthorized distribution of his rougher European versions in the domestic market. His
prosecution was made even easier by the fact that he was the principal actor in his own films,
making it difficult for a jury to discriminate between his actions on film and his intent as a
producer/distributor. Richards & Calvert, supranote 4, at 547-60.
12 Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979) (enforcing
the copyright of a pornographic film conceded to be obscene); Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d
403 (9th Cir. 1982) (confirming the holding of Mitchell Brothers). In 1972, Artie and Jim
Mitchell produced and directed the movie Behind the Green Door under the production labels
Jartech and Cinema 7 Film Group. The film was then copyrighted. Its distribution rights were
exercised by their own Mitchell Brothers Film Group. When Cinema Adult Theatre in Dallas
began showing pirated copies of the film and refused to desist when notified, Mitchell Brothers
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protection been substantively broadened in a manner that now directly
contradicts the objectives of existing criminal law?' 3 Or conversely, has the
potential criminality of exercising one's copyright been substantively expanded
to the point of negating one's proprietary right?14 The answer, in the long view,
may be neither.
Prior to Mitchell Brothers and extending back over two centuries in English
law, it was commonplace for defendants in copyright infringement cases
relating to literary works of questionable or illicit nature to argue what became
known and accepted as the obscenity defense. 5 Based on a broader doctrine
established in contract law by the eighteenth century, the argument was that a
plaintiff was precluded from seeking equitable relief if his own behavior related
to the defendant had been tainted by inequity. In colloquial terms, eligibility for
equitable consideration required a plaintiff to approach the court with "clean
hands" and not to ask the court to support his claimed right to property that he
had actually gained by illicit or illegal means. By the early nineteenth century,
this argument had been accepted in property, contract, and marital property law
as the Clean Hands Doctrine and then awkwardly adapted to cases of copyright
sued for injunctive relief, which was denied based on the nature of the work copyrighted in
Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
13 Obviously, the commercial pornography market has changed due to the distribution of
copyrighted material on the internet, which makes its products almost completely intangible.
A recurrence of circumstances such as in Mitchell Brothers is unlikely because of the virtual
disappearance of public movie theaters showing pornographic fare. Home consumption via
videos and DVDs purchased through distributors may have shrunk the theater market. But
those products too have come to represent a shrinking share of the commercial pornography
market because of internet competition-especially via "free" tube sites-and perhaps making
infringement claims like Stagliano's less likely in the future. What has not changed is the
degree to which criminal prosecution of pornographic remains dogged by the vagaries of
obscenity law, particularly regarding the scope and relevancy of "community standards" under
Miller, as discussed in Clay Calvert, The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? The
Ramfications of the Ninth Circuit's GroundbreakingUnderstandingof Community Standardsin Cberspace,
89 NEB. L. REv. 47 (2010-2011). While the standard copyright infringement case involving
piracy and sale of pornographic content in a tangible product market (such as DVDs) has
become quite rare indeed, the current focus of infringement now has shifted to the
unauthorized capture and distribution of copyrighted material via internet peer-to-peer file
sharing (or BitTorrent) programs in mass John Doe lawsuits. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Walters,
Shooting the Messenger An Analysis of Theoies of CriminalIlability UsedAgainst Adult-Themed Online
Service Providers, 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 171 (2012) (examining recent trends in defining
criminal liability for online service providers regarding advertising of prostitution services or
pornographic content uploaded by third-party users).
14 The parallel to the free speech conundrum is obvious. A broadly protected right of free
expression, assumed to produce public benefit, can be used simultaneously to undermine the
public order, which obviates that benefit obviated, but that is beyond the scope of this inquiry.
15 See infra Part III.
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infringement when the literary property at issue was of questionable content, or
more specifically, if its public distribution might tend to undermine public
morality and jeopardize social stability.
While admitting infringement on the plaintiffs legitimate claim of property
in a literary work, the defendant would argue that the plaintiff was nonetheless
ineligible for equitable relief since the purpose of the work, as revealed by its
content, its manner of distribution, or both, was to cause harm to the public.
The plaintiff had, in effect, "unclean hands." In so doing, the defendant
effectively shifted the focus of equitable consideration onto the plaintiffs own
purposes and behavior, which would have remained irrelevant if the literary
work at issue had been duly registered under the formal procedures established
by statute.
In practice, this shift placed equity courts in a conundrum-the apparent
absurdity mentioned above. If it protected a plaintiffs literary property by
providing injunctive relief, on its face a routine matter if the plaintiff could
document his proprietary right, the court would appear to be publicly
countenancing and even supporting the distribution of illicit works, the
consequence of which would appear to be an injustice to society as a whole.
If, on the other hand, the court wished to address that broader level of
injustice, it would have had to admit that the public was not only a third party
to the proceeding but also perhaps the principal party with substantive interests
perhaps superior to those of the individual parties involved. To avoid the onus
of extending its authority to protect distributors of illicit works, the court could
then deny relief on public policy grounds despite the plaintiffs legitimate claim
of appropriate copyright registration. Yet while denying justice to an individual
plaintiff may have served the public good in the larger sense, this strategy also
raised the specter of arbitrariness and begged for clarification of the standard by
which a court could legitimately deny what would seem to be legislativelywarranted protection. More to the point, this strategy laid the court open to
charges of judicial bias along ideological, sectarian, or partisan lines, since the
court thereby appeared to superimpose its own values on a case-by-case basis
regarding the types of works the legislature intended to protect.
Obviously, equity courts were trapped in a no-win scenario. To follow the
strictures of copyright law would mechanically provide statutory protection to
all duly registered literary works regardless of content, unless the legislature
made exclusionary provisions enumerating the types of works it explicitly did
not intend to protect. In consequence, distributors of works of questionable
tendency might then become emboldened and flood the market with more such
works, in effect contaminating the literary marketplace and encouraging
immorality. On the other hand, to suspend formalized protection and impose a
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judicially-determined ineligibility on certain types of works, albeit with good
intent, could be politically challenged as arbitrary and biased, perhaps
compromising the court's integrity as the source of justice. Ironically, to deny
copyright protection on works of questionable nature would produce an
unintended consequence that had been anticipated very early on: that literary
pirates would then be free to copy and distribute such works at will, leading to
proliferation in the marketplace. No matter how a court addressed such claims,
the proliferation of morally corrupting materials would continue unabated.
The adaptation of the Clean Hands Doctrine to equitable claims of
copyright infringement was in fact an entirely reasonable judicial response to
the earliest statutory provision of copyright protection in early eighteenth
century England and its application to different forms of literary property-in
particular, to works suspected of having seditious, blasphemous, and immoral
tendencies. Inevitably, questions arose regarding the forms and types of
content of literary property that could or should be appropriately accorded
copyright protection under common and statutory law. No early copyright
statutes clearly addressed these questions, leading to periodic waves of "moral
panic" regarding potential evil consequences of works of illicit tendency.
Complicating the issue further was the debate over the discrete proprietary
rights of authors, opposed to booksellers to whom authors traditionally
consigned their rights. This question struck at the core of the stated purpose of
copyright protection: the promotion of creativity and free expression of ideas.
Equally contentious was the debate throughout the eighteenth century whether
judges or juries had authority to determine the potentially harmful tendency of
literary works. These were the basic elements of legal contention regarding the
intent and consequences of copyright protection that marked the period
between the first explicit copyright statute in England in 1710 and the doctrinal
acceptance of its clean hands manifestation-the obscenity defense-a century
later.
With no statutory restrictions on which forms of literary property could be
accorded copyright protection, and generally hesitant to rule arbitrarily to
exclude certain works, equity courts in England retreated to the more familiar
ground of basing copyright infringement decisions on already established
equitable maxims. The courts thereby developed an ersatz structure of
precedent akin to the doctrinal structure of the law courts. This contained but
did not resolve many of the core issues at play, particularly whether the
legislature intended copyright protection to extend to all literary works eligible
for copyright protection.
American jurisprudence absorbed this unsettled English copyright structure
in the early nineteenth century with little scrutiny of its weaknesses, which
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resulted in awkward comingling with the fairly obtuse language of the copyright
clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Congress initially attempted to restrict
eligibility to those works that were both original and informative and that were
implicitly consistent with prevailing cultural norms. However, by the midnineteenth century, subsequent American copyright statutes markedly avoided
restrictive language on the nature of works to be protected and instead focused
on the formalities of the registration process. This noticeable shift in legislative
emphasis resurfaced decidedly, if sporadically, in subsequent American
copyright infringement rulings.
With a few lingering exceptions, this
undermined judicial efforts to consider, much less enforce, public policy-based
substantive restrictions in copyright infringement cases long before Mitchell
Brothers.
This Article attempts to trace the origins of the obscenity defense as a
manifestation of the Clean Hands Doctrine, which, by the eighteenth century,
had become routine in cases involving works of questionable tendency. This
includes a description of the evolution of equitable maxims as they came to be
applied to copyright litigation in the doctrinal insistence that plaintiffs must
approach equity with "clean hands." This Article then reviews the initial
awkward adaptation of the Clean Hands Doctrine to issues of copyright in Dr.
Priestly's Case, a damages case on the equity side of Exchequer in 1792
involving, if not explicitly litigating, the degree to which common law copyright
protection could extend to unpublished materials of questionable tendency.
While Priestley was not a case of copyright infringement, its ruling contained the
oft-quoted dictum that equitable principles deny that property could exist in
illicit works since they were harmful to the public. In effect, the Clean Hands
Doctrine required not only equitable behavior toward the defendant but also
equitable intent toward the public.
With Priestley as the foundation of the Clean Hands Doctrine in copyright
and ultimately the obscenity defense, this Article also attempts to reconstruct
how the principle underlying that ruling became accepted as doctrinal authority
during the early nineteenth century chancellorship of Lord Eldon, which
indelibly, but perhaps inaccurately, associated him with the application of the
obscenity defense by his practice of deferring issues of questionable property to
law. Among the several copyright-related rulings at law and equity during that
period, this Article specifically examines Walcot v. Walker16 and Southey v.
Sherwood.17 These two Eldon rulings are traditionally considered governing
under the doctrine in both English and American law, and in each, the plaintiff
16(1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch.).
1 (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.).
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was denied consideration of equitable relief until he could establish his property
interest in the literary work at issue by first successfully petitioning for damages
at law. This led to the spurious conclusion that equitable relief could not be
extended to literary works of a questionable works, routinely cited in court
rulings and legal treatises for the next century.
It was during the Eldon period that copyright practice began to subtly
differentiate among types of literary content, shifting its concern over illicit
nature from works considered seditious or blasphemous and toward those
considered more fundamentally immoral and unacceptably challenging of
accepted social mores. This trend would also produce the first English
obscenity statute and precipitate the development of subsequent judicial tests
for determining whether specific literary or artistic works were of illicit tendency
and threatening to public morals.
Against this backdrop, this Article then initiates a reconsideration of the
legacy of Lord Eldon's rulings in establishing how the Clean Hands Doctrine
was applied to copyright and which of the aspects of that doctrine were critical
to its adaptation in American jurisprudence. This adaptation is examined by
tracing doctrinal elements from the Eldon period first in English and then in
American legal treatises and other texts during the nineteenth century.
American law adopted these elements with little hesitancy until the early
twentieth century, when courts began to acknowledge that literary works
containing immoral narratives or passages might still, on balance, contribute
value to society. At that point, American jurisprudence began to differentiate
more specifically between the substantive and procedural elements of copyright
protection, the former surviving only as an uneasy application of the obscenity
doctrine as reflected in Miller, yet still unreferenced as a statutory exception in
copyright law.
Finally, this Article attempts to interpret how these trend lines inevitably
produced the ruling in Mitchell Brothers. Despite consequentialist angst regarding
the proliferation of pornographic materials in our society, this decision reflected
the unsustainability of the obscenity defense, which was borne of a cultural era
over two hundred years ago, became immediately arcane in English law as
reflected in the rulings of Eldon and then proved subsequently ill-adapted to
American law.
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II. UNCOVERING THE MAXIMS OF EQUITY

According to the first litigations under the Statute of Anne, 8 the first
English copyright law, property rights in literary works would ordinarily be
protected if duly registered. However, if the works at issue were considered of
libelous, seditious, blasphemous, immoral, or otherwise culturally transgressive
tendency for public policy reasons, they were routinely denied damages or
equitable relief. One could establish a property right in a work of questionable
nature by successfully claiming damages at law under the Statute of Anne.
Works of illicit nature were ineligible for such damages, and successful pleading
would indicate a finding of fact that the work was not in any fashion criminal.
However, such a strategy might have proven risky should the work be ruled
ineligible for damages on public policy grounds related to its illicit or illegal
content. In that instance, the plaintiff would have been potentially vulnerable
to criminal prosecution initiated by the government or private parties.
The earliest such denial of protection at equity appears to have been Burnett
v. Chetwood,19 in which Lord Chancellor Macclesfield granted an injunction
preventing the defendant from publishing an English translation of a previously
published Latin treatise ARCHAEOLOGIA PHILOSOPHICA because it "contained
strange notions, intended by the author to be concealed from the vulgar in the
Latin language, in which language it could not do much hurt, the learned being
better able to judge of it."20 Macclesfield's judgment implied that if a work were
published in English, it could be misunderstood by a less educated public.
While the author's executor still held property in the Latin version of the
treatise under the Statute of Anne, he would have been unable to claim a
property right in a subsequent English translation, as translations were generally
considered original works under the Statute of Anne.21 So while Burnett held
18 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The statute was first litigated in Tonson v. Baker (1710) C9/371/41
(Ch.). Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, The Untold Stog of the First CopjngbtSuit Under the Statute ofAnne in
1710, 25 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1247 (2010). The Statute of Anne was preceded by a number of Crown
charters, patents, and parliamentary licensing acts by which publishing was regulated, but the 1710
statute was the first by parliamentary action to identify and protect proprietary rights of authors. See
genera#4 RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF
COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775) (2004)
[hereinafter DEAZLEY,
ORIGIN]; RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE (2006)
[hereinafter DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT]; ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010).
19 (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.).
20 Id. at 1009.
21 Id. ("[A] translation might not be the same with the
reprinting of the original, on account
that the translator has bestowed is care and pains upon it, and so not within the prohibition [of

the Statute of Anne].").
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statutory copyright to the Latin version published in 1692, Chetwood appeared
to be within statutory authority to publish a translation, and the court in routine
fashion might have been expected to deny Burnett's petition for an injunction
to prevent this.
However, Macclesfield granted the injunction not based on Burnett's claim
to a proprietary right but instead on an obiter dictum that the chancery court
"had a superintendency over all books, and might in a summary way restrain the
printing or publishing any that contained reflections on religion or morality."2
Macclesfield's ruling was thus based purely on a public policy consideration
rather than on any established legal authority or equitable principle, clearly
contradicting not only the formal dictates of the Statute of Anne but also the
doctrinal jurisdiction of the legal court over such findings of fact. It was
perhaps the first and only instance in which equity court claimed jurisdictional
authority over the content of works subject to copyright law, particularly libels.
Tellingly, Burnett was infrequently cited and rarely considered authority in
subsequent equity rulings and on occasion was pointedly derided as overtly
arbitrary and beyond the court's jurisdiction.3
By the early nineteenth century, the common practice in the English
Chancery Court was to deny copyright protection to such works until their
morality could be reviewed at law as a question of fact. Associated with a series
of rulings by Lord Eldon,24 this practice was grounded on the accepted legal
22Id. In the same ruling, Macclesfield enjoined publication of a second Burnett title, DE
STATU MORUORUM ET RESURGENTIUM, for which Burnett could only claim common law
copyright. Unpublished works were treated differently, not only because the Statute of Anne did
not recognize them but also because they had not yet been publicly distributed and therefore had
no public consequence, intuited or otherwise. Macclesfield, nonetheless, included that title in the
sweep of his ruling.
2 Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctionsfor Defamation,Juries, and the Claifing Lens of 1868, 56 BUFFALO
L. REv. 655, 684-87 (2008) (clarifying that the Chancellor's claim that equity may restrain libels
was unfounded and actually doctrinally opposite to that established during the Hardwicke era).
Less than two decades later, the dictum in Burnett was authoritatively ignored in Roach v. Garvan
(or The St. James's Evening Post Case), (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch.), Lord Hardwicke ruling
that it was a matter of settled practice that such substantive judgments were the province of law
rather than equity, and that equity ought not act, one way or the other, until the law had spoken
on the matter of whether legally-recognizable property existed in the work at issue. Id. at 683
('Whether a libel be publick, or private, the only method is to proceed at law...."). In fact,
published notice of Burnett did not appear for almost a century until it was appended as an
editorial aside by Merivale in his nominate report of Southey v. Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006
(Ch.), long after it had become doctrinally accepted that equity had no jurisdiction over libel, and
subsequent case rulings responded to it in a largely dismissive manner. See id. (detailing the legal
reporting on Burnett and how subsequent courts responded to its precedent value).
24James Scott (Lord Eldon) was one of the dominant figures in English jurisprudence at the
time, having had significant experience in the legislative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative (both law
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maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands," the
precursor of the Clean Hands Doctrine. As initially found in early contract and
later tort law, this "clean hands maxim" was thought to have been derived from
the broader maxim "no action arises out of an illegal transaction (or immoral
consideration)" or ex turpi causa non oritur actio.25 The second of fourteen
maxims deduced from published abstracts of seventeenth century equity court
rulings, the concept was published by English barrister Richard Francis in his
seminal treatise Maxims of Equity as reflecting underlying equitable principles in
the common law.26 However, neither Francis nor any of the cases he
referenced actually used the phrase "clean hands." Instead, it appears the
maxim was most directly derived from a Chancery ruling in 1679 denying
injunctive relief to a plaintiff in a child support case in which he, though
warranted in his own claim for relief, had himself behaved in a reprehensible
manner toward the mother of the child.27 The editor's heading for the
abridgement of that case-"Inequity takes away equity"-subsequently became
recognized as "the principle of plaintiff's fault" 28 and later more colloquially as
"He that hath committed inequity shall not have equity." 29
The more colloquial "He that hath committed inequity shall not have
equity" was often in subsequent rulings and legal treatises companioned with
several other similar maxims from contract law, principally ex dolo malo non oritur
actio.30 This concept reflected the broad unacceptability of illegal or immoral
behavior of a plaintiff toward a defendant as a basis of his action and from
and equity) realms at the highest levels.
He served five years as Solicitor General in
parliamentary, executive, and prosecutorial roles, then as Attorney General, and served a short
stint as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, until his appointment as Lord Chancellor in
1801. His tenure as Lord Chancellor was interrupted for a period of six months during a cabinet
shuffle in 1806, then continued until his retirement in 1826. ROSE A. MELIKAN, JOHN Scorr,
LORD ELDON, 1751-1838: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 77-81, 163-65 (1999).
25Latin: "from a dishonorable cause an action does not arise." HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION
OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED 350,352 (1845).

26RICHARD FRANCIs, MAXIMS OF EQUITY (1727). While maxims were often promulgated as
reflecting principles that revealed the underlying reason of law, Francis derived his maxims from
principles he deduced from selected court rulings, allowing his maxims to be used as a source of
authority grounded in case law generally, and in no specific case individually. See A.W.B.
Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: LegalPciniples and the Forms ofLegal Literature,48 U.
CHI. L. REv. 632, 641-51 (1981) (describing the origins of Francis's and Broom's contribution to
the search for general principles in law).
27Bodly v. Bodly, (1679) 22 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch.).
28See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REv.
1065, 1092
(1949) [hereinafter Chafee II]; see also Zecharia Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equia
mith Clean Hand, 47
MICH. L. REv. 877 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee 1].
29 BROOM, supra note 25 (Broom never specifically used the phrase "clean hands").
30 Id. (translating the Latin phrase to mean: "a right of action cannot arise out
of a fraud").
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which he might be seeking court assistance for his ill-gotten advantage, which
was most famously proscribed by Lord Mansfield:
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between
plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth
of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of
policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the
real justice, as between him and the plaintiff, by accident, if I may
so say. The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non
oritur actio. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his
cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the
plaintiffs own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to
arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this
31
country, there the Court says he has no right to be assisted.
It was also companioned with the maxim that "[h]e that will have equity done
to him must do it to the same person," which effectively stipulated that a
plaintiffs equitable treatment of the defendant was a precondition for the
plaintiffs equity claim.32 Together with these and several other nominally
related maxims, the clean hands maxim over time became a fixed rule for
33
rendering equitable judgments in copyright infringement cases. It also led to
the gradual acceptance of an affirmative defense argument that a defendant,
while admitting his own culpability regarding infringement of the plaintiffs
claimed property right, could counter that the plaintiff was disqualified from
consideration for relief because he was claiming property in an illegal or
immoral work, which meant he was not approaching the court with "clean
hands."
It is unclear what type or level of equitable behavior the early case law
required. If it were implied that the nature and effect of the disputed work had
to be consistent with the legislative purpose of encouraging learning and the

31 Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.) 1121.
32 See FRANcIs, supra note 26, at maxim 1. This precondition, commonly referenced as "he
who seeks equity must first do equity," was an adaptation during and after the sixteenth century
to include moral duties in equitable actions.
33 See Davis v. Marlborough, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 555 (Ch.) 568 (holding that "the principle of
this Court is not to give relief to those who will not do equity... ."). Spence interpreted this
statement as "a doctrine nearly allied to, and a descendant of the above, namely 'that a person
must come into court with clean hands.' ", 1 GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT OF CHANCERY 422-23 (1846).
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advancement of knowledge as a substantive precondition equitable relief, then
his behavior and his intent were conjoined. If, on the other hand, the work was
deemed illicit in nature, publication of the work would be considered
inequitable due to its effect on the public welfare, and he would be denied
consideration altogether. In doing so, the court would acknowledge that the
plaintiff had a property interest in the literary work and was due court
consideration but would reason that the plaintiffs behavior toward the public at
large, in the form of distributing works calculated to harm public morality,
would outweigh any culpability on the part of the defendant toward the plaintiff
and would taint the proceeding in such a manner as to make it impossible for
the court to grant relief on public policy grounds.
Both approaches required a finding of fact regarding the nature of the work,
which was doctrinally the province of the law courts and juries. However,
whether an equity court entertained evidence on such an issue itself or deferred
this to the law courts varied from case to case. Consequently, in each instance
that an equity court denied injunctive relief based on the questionable nature of
the work at issue, it is difficult to determine whether the denial was considered
an interim ruling pending a determination of fact at law or whether it was a
summary finding of fact that the work was of criminal tendency. Deferral of
such questions to the law courts was the established practice. It also left open
the prospect that should a law court accept the plaintiffs claim, he could then
petition for equitable relief with demonstrably "clean hands," and as equity
rulings of the period consistently remind us, equity could only grant relief in
cases in which a recognized property right was at issue. It seemed to be a
simple matter of jurisdiction-without documentable property in a literary
work, equity courts had no remedy to offer.
In practice, an equity ruling to direct or defer consideration of property to
the law courts most often caused plaintiffs simply to abandon their copyright
infringement claims altogether, as their only recourse was to first establish a
property right in a successful damage claim at law, which was a costly and
lengthy process. Over time, this trend reinforced at least the appearance that
equitable denial of relief in the first instance, when property in the literary work
was still in doubt, was based on a governing principle that works of doubtful
property were automatically disqualified from equitable consideration. While
such works were not actually disqualified, the practice may have sent that
message. As a result, the denial or dissolution of a temporary injunction in early
copyright infringement cases, especially those decided by Lord Eldon, had the
appearance, if not the effect, of final decrees based on a substantive finding of
fact, whereas those rulings may have instead been motivated by a rule of
procedure and jurisdiction. It is no small wonder that Eldon became identified
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with a doctrine that had in fact not been established-that publication of works
of questionable nature (as to their content or effect) was prima facie evidence
that the plaintiff had "unclean hands."
What became known as the "unclean hands" or obscenity defense entailed
arguing that a literary work at issue, though perhaps duly registered for
copyright under statutory provisions, was nonetheless contrary to the public
interest, which in turn precluded (or alternatively "debarred," "disbarred" or
"disentitled") the plaintiff from court protection on public policy grounds. This
34
defense became as accepted as the broader maxim from which it was derived.
Inevitably, the obscenity defense became clustered in later legal treatises with a
number of other affirmative defenses for a plaintiff seeking equitable relief
"with unclean hands," i.e., in which the relief sought, if granted, would create or
continue inequity or injustice, or would contaminate the judicial proceedings in
a way that may jeopardize the public confidence in the court.
Portrayed by Chafee as "a picturesque phrase applied by equity judges to a
general principle running through damage actions as well as suits for specific
relief," 35 metaphorical reference to "clean hands," immediately created two
levels of ambiguity. The first was a matter of clear labeling-as a rule, the
doctrine held that a plaintiff must approach the court with clean hands,
implying that there was a legal precondition for equitable consideration.
Awkwardly, this caused the court to consider not only the substance of a
plaintiffs claim in order to conclude whether he had met the precondition but
also whether his behavior directly related to the inequity from which he was
claiming relief.36 Identified as a "clean hands" precondition (or, perhaps more

34 The modem label of the affirmative "unclean hands" defense as the "obscenity defense" is
clearly under-inclusive nomenclature. Criminal or illicit publications were not confined to works
considered obscene (or obscene libels) even in the word's earlier, broader, immoral, and
irreligious meaning rather than in its later, more narrow focus on sexuality. Fundamentally, the
defense rests on the argument that the plaintiff's work constitutes a criminal libel that injures the
public rather than any specific person, a view of libel established in The Case De Libelis Famosis, or
ofScandalous Libels, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (KB.) 251 (distinguishing personal libel involving damage to
individual proprietary interests from more serious public libels that threatened public order); see
also Dominus Rex v. Curl, (1727) 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B.) (extending the doctrine specifically
libelous publications as encompassing considered seditious, blasphemous, and later obscene, with
the concept of obscenity having absorbed many elements of crimes of immorality, including
blasphemy, by the mid-nineteenth century). See Pat Rogers & Paul Baines, The Prosecutions of
Edmund Cur/1, 1725-28, 5 LIBR. 176 (7th ser. 2004) (detailing how prosecutions of Curll for
blasphemy and immorality intimated charges of seditious libel were warranted as well). See
generally Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37
STAN. L. REV. 661 (1984-1985) (describing the early development of the law of seditious libel).
3 Chafee II, supra note 28, at 1091-92.
36 As per Justice Eyre's dictum on the equity side of Exchequer in Dering v. Earlof Winchelsea,
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accurately, that a plaintiffs claim to equitable relief must be "clean" of related
illicit behavior or intent), the metaphor belies an absolute legal distinction
regarding plaintiffs behavior-that it is either clean or unclean. In practice, this
dichotomy forced the court to sort out to degrees of cleanliness and degrees of
relatedness on a case-by-case basis. The nature of the resulting dilemma was
obvious and would beleaguer any ruling that attempted such discrimination
without seeming to be totally arbitrary.
A second, more complex ambiguity emerged when the equity court was
asked to balance the judicial integrity of disqualifying a plaintiffs claim, albeit an
equitable result for society as a whole, with the inequitable countenance of clear
civil culpability of the defendant-a choice the court did not relish since,
whether it decided for or against the plaintiff, it appeared to attach its authority
to some consequent level of injustice. In order to be consistent and at the same
time protect its judicial integrity in turning away a plaintiff who had a legitimate
legal claim, the court might have felt compelled to invoke the Clean Hands
Doctrine as a matter of public policy rather than as a legal principle. Remember
that at equity, the court was bound to consider the interests of all possible
parties to the behavior, including consequent harm to third parties not present
and the public at large. In certain circumstances, then, the court may have been
pressed to refuse a possibly deserving plaintiff consideration of remedy because
of the court's inability to do full justice to the third party.
The identification of a "clean hands maxim" with an underlying legal
principle emerged in the 1780s from a range of cases at law, most often
associated with Lord Chief Justice Mansfield,37 and cases at equity, associated
with Baron James Eyre.38 In the court of Chancery, the maxim was most often
associated with the rulings of Lord Eldon over two decades later. Still, this
concept was not identified as a discrete "clean hands" equity maxim by most
treatises commenting on the underlying principle until the late nineteenth

(1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1184 (Ex.) 1185, that the precondition did not relate to the plaintiffs general
behavior or demeanor ("it does not mean a general depravity; it must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the equity sued for"). Id. See, e.g., The Meaning of "Clean Hands" in Equiy, 35
HARv. L. REv. 754, 755 (1922) (noting that "immorality and degraded character have long been
held to not make a plaintiff's hands unclean," as established in Denng).
37Mansfield's earliest use of the maxim may have been in Fitzroy v. Gwillim, (1786) 99 Eng.
Rep. 1025 (K.B.) 1026 ("[Plaintiffj must come therefore with clean hands, according to the
principle laid down in the case of Bosanquet and Dashwood(b), that those who seek equity must do
equity.").
38 See Dering, 29 Eng. Rep. at 1185 (stating in dictum that "[I]t is not laying down any principle
to say that [plaintiffs] ill conduct disables him from having any relief in this Court. If this can be
founded on any principle, it must be, that a man must come into a Court of Equity with clean
hands.").
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century.39 However, contrary to the implication that the "clean hands maxim"
had been established by the mid-nineteenth century, there was some question as
to exactly what had been established. Later, legal scholars referred to the
maxim rather disparagingly as "a collection of mottoes in which aspects of
conscience become pickled and to a degree trivialised," or "commonly
misleading," or purposed "merely to justify or explain or confirm a decision
which has already been reached on other grounds."40 By the early twentieth
century, courts considered the maxim to govern in equity claims and recorded it
in legal literature as the Clean Hands Doctrine, extending to all civil actions in
which the plaintiffs prior or current behavior threatened to involve the court in
illegal, immoral, or unjust consideration or consequence. 41
In subsequent legal treatises and other texts, equitable claims that fell under
the Clean Hands Doctrine were classified and sub-classified based on the
assumption that the doctrine applied uniformly to each. Included were cases in
which the plaintiff asked relief for inequity of his own doing and the court
deferred consideration of relief until the plaintiff had first "done equity," i.e.,
somehow corrected the artificial imbalance created by his contractual
relationship with the defendant. Also included were claims in which the
plaintiff asked relief for inequity in fact due to his own related prior action, but
the court had refused to consider equitable relief under any circumstances
because this behavior had been illicitly designed to give the plaintiff unfair
advantage.
Similarly included were cases in which the plaintiffs claim of a property
interest was tainted by illicit (or criminal) behavior by both plaintiff and
defendant, resulting in the court's refusal to assist either party.42 The treatises
Chafee I, supra note 28, at 884.
4 Paul Jackson, The Maxims of Equity Revisited, in EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS 72, 73 (Stephen Goldstein ed., 1992).
41 See Roscoe Pound, On Certain Maxims of Equity, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYs 259, 263-64
(G.G. Alexander et al. eds., 1926); Chafee I, supra note 28, at 882; Howard Oleck, Maxims of
Equity Reappraised,6 RUTGERs L. REv. 528 (1951-1952). Both Pound and Chafee located the first
equitable use of the "clean hands" phraseology in Dering "This form seems to begin in a remark
Pound, supra note 36, at 263-64. According to Chafee, "In
by Lord Chief Baron Eyre .....
1787 ... the maxim as we know it was born," a conclusion that can be debated regardless of
whether the phrase is considered a general maxim, a distinct maxim, or a governing principle.
Chafee I, supra note 28, at 882. See also Jennifer Payne, "Clean Hands" in Derivative Actions, 61
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 76, 76 n.4 (2002).
42 See, e.g., Merryweather v. Nixan, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B.) 1337 (sustaining a ruling
at Assizes that the plaintiff could not claim equitable contribution against his fellow tortmalfeasor: "the learned Judge being of opinion that no contribution could by law be claimed as
between joint wrong-doers," effectively the same principle derived from Everet v. Williams (Ex.
1725), belatedly reported in Note, The Highwayman's Case, 9 L.Q.R. 197, 198 (1893), in which a
3
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also included the type of cases most germane to this discussion: those in which
the plaintiff based his claim on literary property considered immoral in nature
or effect and, by implication, calculated to harm the public. In those
circumstances, the court refused to recognize property in the work for purposes
of equitable relief until a jury had deemed the work not harmful. Regardless of
whether there had been illicit or criminal behavior on the part of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, the literary work generated its own consequence
when publicly distributed-it produced a tendency toward illicit behavior
among the public at large which could only be gauged by a jury at law.
The authority of the venerable Clean Hands Doctrine in copyright law
appeared to be summarily eviscerated by Mitchell Brothers,43 a ruling that
interestingly evoked relatively little comment or criticism. Most critics lamented
its possible adverse consequences, focusing on the long-standing but little
evidenced presumption that extending copyright protection to allegedly obscene
works would increase the economic incentive to publish and distribute more
such works, leading to even wider accessibility and inevitable societal harm.44
Lord Eldon voiced on several occasions the presumption that the market for
such works would inevitably expand if not censored or regulated. He
recognized that if his court refused to enjoin unauthorized publication of such
works, literary pirates would rush to republish them in greater numbers at
cheaper prices that would make the works more immediately accessible to a
broader range of reading public, especially those of lower income and education

plea by one highwayman for equitable distribution of stolen proceeds was dismissed "for scandal
and impertinence.").
43 MitchellBrothers,604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
44 See, e.g., Karl Schmalz, Problems in Giving Obscenity Copyrght Protection:DidJartech and Mitchell
Brothers Go Too Far?,36 VAND. L. REv. 403 (1983) (arguing that insistence on uniformity in
national copyright protection frustrates explicit federal, state and local public policies against
obscenity); Note, Can IntellectualProperyj Law Regulate Behavior?A 'Modest Proposal"for Weakening
Unclean Hands, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1503 (2000) (arguing for compliance conditions on copyright
registration for works that may have been produced by criminal actions, such as using actors in
films without their legal consent, marking the creator as having "unclean hands"); Ann Bartow,
Pornography, Coercion, and Copynght Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 799 (2008) (advocating
that copyright protection be structured to insure performer consent); Ann Bartow, Copjrzght Law
and Pomography: ReconsideringIncentives to Createand DistributePornography, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 75 (2008)
(encouraging a public debate on the morality of expanding the economic incentives associated
with copyright protection of pornography); Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside
ofIntellectualProperty'sDownside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921 (2010) (arguing that the economic incentive
for commercial pornographers to aggressively assert their property rights has diminished due to
the more significant dilution of market demand from the widespread distribution of free
pornography on the internet).
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whose moral constitution was considered more vulnerable to challenge. 45 He
concluded, however, that the danger was greater if equity overstepped its
jurisdictional bounds and that protection against such criminal consequences
must be left to the law courts. While affirmative defenses are commonly
accepted in many areas of law today, most are based on claims of
misrepresentation and fraud in contractual agreements. 46 An obscenity (or ex
turpi causa) defense against plaintiffs seeking copyright protection for works of
questionable nature, routinely held to be compelling in English and American
courts for over two hundred years, has now become extremely rare and is not
considered compelling.47
So, how venerable was the Clean Hands Doctrine, really? One can easily
argue that, in practice, the assumptions underlying its application to copyright
infringement had been progressively abandoned in American jurisprudence
since the early twentieth century and that Mitchell Brothers was in fact simply a
long-awaited coup de grace. And yet, that such a longstanding legal doctrine
should be seemingly swept aside so easily bespeaks a doctrinal transition that
calls upon us to perhaps focus less on the nuances of the Mitchell Brothers
rulings and more on the doctrine as it initially evolved in cases of literary
property. That begs us to reconsider the formative early nineteenth century
period in chancery, in which the doctrine was imperfectly constructed, how its

45 Southey v. Sherwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.) 1008 ("It is very true that, in some cases, it
may operate so as to multiply copies of mischievous publications by the refusal of the Court to
interfere by restraining them . . . .").
46 See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Pocess-BasedTheory of Unclean Hands, 47 AM. Bus.
L.J. 509 (2010) (comparing unclean hands as an equitable defense to estoppel and legal doctrines
of in paridelicto and fraud).
47 One constantly mentioned exception has been Devils Films v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d
174 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), in which the court refused preliminary injunctive relief for a plaintiff seeking
copyright protection of what the judge considered to be obscene films. The court found that
there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was violating federal law by shipping
obscene material in interstate commerce and that it "should invoke the doctrine of unclean hands
and leave the parties where it finds them," akin to an Eldon ruling. Id. at 175. Subsequently, the
parties attempted to settle, with the defendant agreeing to accept a permanent injunction, but the
court refused to sign the proposed consent order, stating "[t]he 'unclean' hands doctrine 'closes
the door of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter
in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant."
Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, No. 99 Civ. 8016, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12116, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2000) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 814 (1945)). While critics have considered Devils Films convincing evidence that the
issue remains "unsettled" at the appellate level, Mitchell Brothers was nonetheless almost
immediately accepted by prominent legal treatises as governing. See, e.g., 1 MELVILLE NIMIMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.17 (2012); 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT §§ 3.41-.42 (2007).
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ancillary "obscenity defense" became further adulterated when roughly adapted
first to American constitutional language, then to subsequent copyright
legislation, and finally to First Amendment strictures that required a
demonstrated evil tendency. We may be inclined to think that balancing the
social value of literary works, which may contain transgressive ideas or images,
against their potential harms to mainstream behavioral values is a legal
development peculiar to the twentieth century. However, in retrospect, such
balancing characterized rulings in both copyright and obscenity law in the more
formative nineteenth century period in English law.
This Article also examines the viability of the traditional interpretation of
how the Clean Hands Doctrine was adapted to copyright and, if found lacking,
whether that changes our view of the doctrinal import of Mitchell Brothers. The
next section traces the origin of the Clean Hands Doctrine to a set of equitable
principles underlying English case rulings in the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries that related mostly to property in contracts, marital
agreements, and wills. Since the notion of literary property was established but
fundamentally undefined by the Statute of Anne, it was inevitable that equitable
consideration in cases of copyright infringement would rely initially on the
common law regarding proprietary rights. This reliance, however, was
challenged to its core by increased wealth and literacy, not to mention by
revolutionary sentiments. This volatility was exacerbated by the free-wheeling
nature of literary publication, which included books, newspapers, journals,
weeklies, and pamphlets that proliferated wildly during the period and which
had, until that time, been effectively controlled by government licensing,
taxation, and censorship.
III. EXTENDING PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY TO COPYRIGHT

How legal jurisprudence would regard literary property was a question
pressed by the burgeoning commercial dynamics of the new print culture and
its almost immediate impact on politics and culture England in late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, 48 a period marked by rising literacy, the
emergence of dynamics of mass consumption, and easy access to wide range of
publications. 49 The initial application of the still relatively unsettled laws of
property to the newly-conceived notion of authorial rights springing from the
Statute of Anne was an awkward fit at best, most noticeably as copyright law

See, e.g.,MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993).
49 See generally DAVID VINCENT, LITERACY AND POPULAR CULTURE: ENGIAND 1750-1914
(1989); WILLIAM ST CLAIR, THE READING NATION IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD (2004).
48
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was then obligated to accommodate its objectives to the apparently contrary
purposes served by criminal libel laws applied to literary works considered
seditious, blasphemous, or immoral. The authors of the Statute of Anne
wanted to establish statutory protection of proprietary rights, primarily for
publishers who had been consigned common law publishing rights by authors.
Their approach was akin to the system that had evolved under the Licensing
Acts of 1662, 1692, 1694, and 1696 but which the expiration of the Licensing
Act of 1696 had left unregulated. The Statute, however, was prefaced by
language that encouraged learning by monopolistic practices enabled by the
Stationers' company charter.50 In no sense did the drafters of the Statute
envision regulating content or considering a work's impact on the public
welfare, other than the presumption that broader access to publication would
widen the public's access to knowledge and learning. The Statute's focus was
thus narrow and procedural, only later in application raising issues related to the
content of protected works-especially whether works of potentially libelous
content might nonetheless contribute to learning or tend to undermine social
order.51
Further complicating the search for direction after the Statute of Anne took
effect was the often incomplete juxtaposition of statutory and common law
copyright and criminal libel law, especially when statutory law was inadequately
defined and common law practice seemed to dictate directions contrary to it.52
Authority over these issues was fragmented by the jurisdictional separation
between English courts of law and courts of equity, which resulted in cases of
literary property that were or could have been claimed at law, of equity, or
both.53 This in turn raised the vexing questions of whether equitable rulings
50 JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING (2d ed. 2006) (describing the evolution

of the book publishing trade and the legal distinctions between authors and publishers).
51 See general# GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, OBSCENITY: AN ACCOUNT OF CENSORSHIP LAWS AND
THEIR ENFORCEMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1979) (considering obscenity's definition and
the development of obscenity law); NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAw
(1956); Joss MARSH, WORD CRIMES: BLASPHEMY, CULTURE, AND LITERATURE IN NINETEENTH-

CENTURY ENGLAND (1998) (discussing the evolution of laws of blasphemy); S.M. WADDAMS,
SEXUAL SLANDER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: DEFAMATION IN THE ECCLESIASTICAL

COURTS, 1815-1855 (2000) (discussing how questions of morality were absorbed into the
jurisdiction of the civil courts).
52 See Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 215, 230-36 (1987) (discussing the degree to which case law becomes directive in areas of
unsettled law). See generaly NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT (2008)

(describing the evolution of the doctrine of precedent in common law).
s3 For example, the juxtaposition of crimes of public nuisance and immorality reflected in Le
Roy v. Sr. Charles Sidle, (1663) 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (KB.), where the defendants' engagement in
public blasphemy and lewd behavior from the balcony of a public inn did not merely cause a
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regarding potentially illicit works could be considered authority in criminal
proceedings, and vice versa,54 and, more tangentially, the degree to which juries
in criminal cases could render judgments on or even consider questions
of law,
such as the intent behind and consequence of illicit content.55
In effect, issues regarding illicit content under copyright law intersected with
doctrines of criminal libel long before the passage of the Obscene Publications
Act of 1857, the first English statutory attempt to codify common law regarding
obscene libel.5 6 By that time, fixed rules regarding equitable applications of the
Clean Hands Doctrine to copyright infringement cases had already been
established in a series of rulings by Lord Eldon during his tenure as Lord

public nuisance but more disruptively precipitated violent behavior by onlookers who stormed
the inn seeking retribution. Id. This led to the doctrinal amalgamation of those two crimes into a
crime of public libel, the injured party being the public, in Dominus Rex v. Curl, (1727) 93 Eng.
Rep. 849 (K.B.). James R. Alexander, Roth at Ffty: Reconsidering the Common Law Antecedents of
American Obscenity Doctrine, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 393, 398-405 (2008).
5 ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 74. The expanding use of precedent in court hearings
before
and during this period was facilitated by its documentation initially in published nominate reports
in whole or abridged fashion, and the later legal treaties compiled and classified prior rulings and
their underlying legal reasoning. See, e.g., MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH
JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850 (1991) (discussing the increasing common law reliance on legal
treatises).
55 See JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 229-35
(2004)
(discussing the expanding role of jury trials and the context and impact of the passage of the Fox
Libel Act). In most cases, Lord Eldon acknowledged that courts at equity had the authority to
determine questions of fact, but he followed what he portrayed as common practice of referring
any reasonable doubt regarding facts to a legal court and jury, as in O'Connor v. Cook, (1802) 31
Eng. Rep. 1247 (Ch.) 1250-51 ("[I]f any reasonable doubt has been raised
upon it in the evidence,
it has been of late thought wise and discreet to send the question of fact to a Jury."). Eldon later
qualified this in Hampson v. Hampson, (1814) 35 Eng. Rep. 395 (Ch.) 395, arguing that verdicts in
the law courts were advisory and not compelling: "Courts of Equity have an original
Jurisdiction,
which, I agree, must be exercised according to a sound Discretion; to try Questions of Fact
without the Intervention of a Jury; and which Aid is sought, according to the common
Expression, for the purposes of informing the Conscience of the Court." See also
John Langbein,
Fact Finding in the Engsh Court of Chancey: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 1620 (1974) (arguing that
equity courts exercised fact-finding authority in cases in which they shared subject matter
jurisdiction with law courts, and by accepted practice, verdicts regarding factual disputes delegated
to law were considered advisory and non-binding).
56 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83. For background on the passage of the
Act, see in particular Colin
Manchester, A Histoy of the Crime of Obscene Libel, 12 J. LEGAL HIsT. 36 (1991) (following the
development of the crime of obscene libel leading up to the Act); Colin Manchester, Lord
Campbells Act: England's First Obscenity Statute, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 223 (1998) [hereinafter
Manchester, Lrd Campbelfs Act] (discussing the opposition to the Act based on concerns of its
overbreadth); Jeremy Phillips, Copyrght in Obscene Works: Some British and American Problems, 6
ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 138 (1977) (discussing the intersection of civil and criminal treatment of
obscene materials).
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Chancellor (1801-1826), indelibly identifying him with adopting the principles
57
of the Clean Hands Doctrine into copyright law. However, Eldon grounded
th'ose decisions on the authority of a previous ruling by Justice James Eyre in
Dr.Piestly'sCase, a damages claim heard by Eyre as Chief Commissioner of the
Great Seal that remained unpublished in nominate form until reported
58
Joseph Priestley, a
arguendo in Southey v. Sherwood twenty-five years later.
when a mob
caused
damages
noted scientist and republican activist, sued for
in 1791.59
riots
burned his house, library, and laboratory during the Birmingham
Eyre is reported to have admitted evidence that Priestley's previously published
60
writings often criticized the government and had been seditious in nature. He
counseled the jury that if the unpublished manuscripts Priestley had lost in the
riots were of the same nature and could be considered seditious libel, a criminal
6
offense at law, Priestley could not claim property in them. ' Thus instructed,
the jury awarded Priestley damages for the physical property lost but no value
62
for the unpublished manuscripts.
The underlying issue was whether Priestley could claim property in his
unpublished manuscripts, the precondition in any such claim under common
law. As the manuscripts had not yet been published and were therefore beyond
criminal prosecution as a seditious libel, the manuscripts would have been

s7 See Pound, supra note 41, at 275-76; Chafee II, supra note 28, at 1067-1070; Edward S.
Rogers, Copyight and Morals, 18 MICH. L. REV. 390, 392 n.4 (1920); ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at
74-79; Paul M. Zall, Lord E/don's Censorship, 68 PMLA 436 (1953); Phillips, supra note 56, at 14044; Bonnie Wilkinson, Recent Development, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1037, 1038-41 (1978). Story
accepted that public policy precluded copyright protection for illicit works, and that equity courts
would not interfere to aid a plaintiff if real doubt existed and would instead leave him to remedies
at law. However, Story also found that Eldon exceeded appropriate discretion by denying
equitable relief to works that raised any level of doubt, in effect challenging plaintiff's title on a
small pretense: "there is great difficulty in adopting this doctrine, denying the protection of an
injunction in matters of property upon mere doubts." II JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTS ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 936, p. 213, n.1 (1836).
58 There is no published nominate report for Dr. Piestly's Case, merely its mention in Lord
Eldon's ruling in Southey. The hearings on the Birmingham riots damages that were held in the
Assize at Warwick in April 1792 were reported in THE (LONDON) MORNING CHRONICLE, no.
7125, April 9, 1792, and summarized in ROBERT SCHOFIELD, THE ENLIGHTENED JOSEPH
PRIESTLEY 298-99 (2004). Records of the Warwick Assize prior to 1860 were destroyed, and
whether manuscript notes on the Priestley hearing exist is unknown.
s9 T.E. THORPE, JOSEPH PRIESTLEY 120-44 (1906); R.B. Rose, The Priestley Riots of 1791, PAST &
PRESENT, Nov. 1960, at 68.
60 Art. /I. - Cases ofWalcot v. Walker; Southey v. Sherwood; Murray v. Benbow, and Lawrence
v. Smith, 27 L. Q. REv. 123, 125-26 (1822) [hereinafter Art. V1]. While the author of Art. VI is
not identified, it is widely assumed to have been Nassau William Senior, an Eldon critic.
61 IL
62 Id.
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considered under common law to be the exclusive property of the author or his
consignee until published, after which any proprietary interest would have been
governed by the Statute of Anne.63 Whether the manuscripts had specific (and
recoverable) literary value at law was a different issue. Eyre arguably prejudiced
its consideration by directing the jury on the nature of some of Priestley's
previous writings and by declaring in dictum that there could be no property in
such writings.
Eyre's dictum left unanswered why such writings should be considered
ineligible for recognition as property. One possible explanation was that certain
literary works, based on the nature of their content, were ineligible for
consideration as literary property altogether. Clearly, the language of the Statute
of Anne did not preclude any types of works from eligibility for copyright
protection as long as the formal requirements for registration were met. While
the preface to the Statute identified its purpose as "the Encouragement of
Learning,"64 the Statute contained no language to indicate that was an intended
restriction or precondition. Regardless, Priestley claimed literary property, not
copyright protection, and as the manuscripts were unpublished, the only issue
was whether they had legally recognizable literary value. Save a finding of
criminality, which still may not preclude recognition of property under common
law, Eyre's dictum seemed simply arbitrary, perhaps reflecting a personal bias
against challenges to the government.
Alternatively, Eyre's dictum could have been based on the assumption that,
even if the manuscripts were considered literary property under common law,
they could not be accorded recoverable value without compromising the court's
own integrity as a source of not only individual but also societal justice. The
issue would then be whether the plaintiff had property in his unpublished work
63There was always some question as to whether criminal libel attached to the
mere intention
to publish. See, e.g.,Wilkes v. R., (1769) 2 Eng. Rep. 244 (K.B.) (holding that the simple act of
placing a work in the hands of a publisher indicated an intent to render it into a published
form,
regardless of intent to distribute to the public). In a number of common law copyright cases
regarding private correspondence either published by the recipient or by a third party attempting
to capitalize on the author's notoriety or scandalous content, the court held that the author
retained property in the letters and had not explicitly consigned his publication right to another
simply by sending them. See Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.); Thompson v.
Stanhope, (1774) 27 Eng. Rep. 476 (Ch.); and Gee v. Pritchard & Anderson, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep.
670 (Ch.) 678 (recipient's possession of an author's letters does not confer the author's common
law proprietary right to publish them). Other cases involving performance of theatrical work that
had not yet been formally published raised the issue of the point at which a work "becomes
public." See Macklin v. Richardson, (1770) 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.); Coleman v. Wathen, (1793)
101 Eng. Rep. 137 (KB.) (holding performance of a play was not publication and the author
retained property in it under common law).
64 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng).
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under common law and, if so, whether the court would extend protection to
that property. The former is a procedural issue regarding standing to sue, and
the latter is a policy issue debating the balance to denying a plaintiffs (rightful)
claim based on the inequity that may result against the damage such a decision
might inflict on the court's integrity. Fundamentally, this became a policy
debate over whether works of illicit nature could enjoy copyright protection at
all and, if not, whether equity courts could even hear cases involving such
65
works because, as Hardwicke and Eldon stated, the court in such cases had no
remedy for the plaintiff.66 In this sense, Eyre anticipated that Priestley's
manuscripts would constitute criminal behavior (as seditious libel) but could not
67
have been prosecuted as such until published. Yet, for the court to award
damages for that type of literary property would have appeared to countenance
criminal writings and their authors' right to publish them, an arguably
inequitable (or more broadly anti-social) result, in direct violation of the Clean
Hands Doctrine.
Priestley's property claim revealed the range of elements involved in the
protection of literary property, specifically whether the plaintiffs property was
65 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
66 The case law tended to address this issue depending on the court's view of whether legal
doctrine was more consistent with a more rigid or moderated view of property. The former held
that one cannot "have (copyright) property in (like obscenity) in which the law will not allow one
to have property." Dan W. Schneider, Authority of the Register of Copyrghts to Deny Registration of a
Claim to Copynght on the Ground of Obscenity, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 691, 702 n.65 (1975). The latter
held that while the obscene nature of one's property does not abrogate one's property interest in
it, it does nonetheless prohibit the court from enforcing it by discretionary judgment regarding
the balance among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the public interest. See Phillips, supra note 56,
at 141-43. The moderated "public policy" view was in fact introduced arguendo by the defense
in its petition for retrial in Stockdale v. Onwhyn, (1826), 7 Dowl. & R. 625 (K.B.) 626 [hereinafter
Stockdale II-RD] ("The property in the work is the same, whether the work itself is good or
bad ... the question here, however, is, whether such a work is wholly unentitled to protection in a
court of law . .. no such decision has even yet been come to."). While this issue was scarcely
broached until Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co., (1915) 1 Ch. 261, the moderated view obviously
governed, as reflected in the tendency of the English equity courts to defer question of property
to the law courts, effectively precluding equity courts from administrative authority to deny
obscene materials copyright registration.
67 Ironically, for Priestley to claim damages, he would have had to argue that the manuscripts
would have an estimable market value if subsequently published-value lost when they were
destroyed. He could only do this by demonstrating a market value comparable to that of other
works he had published, the nature of which would then be ascertainable as a matter of fact by a
jury, a risky business if the works' content were of republican sentiment similar to those read in
Eyre's court. While Priestley could have argued that the manuscripts had value to him personally,
it was far too early in the evolution of copyright law to advance a "personhood" argument in
valuing literary works. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Pmpery and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957
(1982).
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fixed in a physical manifestation (and therefore granted a right based on
possession of a tangible item); the ideas contained in it (the authorial right); the
exclusive disposition of it (the copyright); and its market value if lost, stolen, or
interrupted (the proprietary right). The intimation that Priestley's writings were
criminal spoke only to the proprietary right, presuming he could not sell them
because of their criminality such that they could have no market value. Only if
Priestley published the writings or publicly gave indication he intended to do so
would the nature of the writings become subject to criminal prosecution as
threatening third parties, i.e., the public at large. Had Priestley's writings been
pirated, regardless of whether or not he claimed a copyright in them, the
publisher himself would have become subject to criminal action. 68
If based on public policy concerns, the Eyre dictum in Piestly was arguably
the first application of the broader clean hands maxim to literary property, 69 in
that the plaintiff sued for damages caused by the loss of the proprietary value in
his unpublished manuscripts. The first published reference to Eyre's dictum
was an implicit statement by Eldon of its underlying principle in Walcot v.
Walker70 ten years later, probably the first overt acceptance of what evolved into
the Clean Hands Doctrine as applied to copyright.71 In what became an iconic
statement of this application, Eldon held:

68 As was the case in R. v. Clark (K.B. 1821), as reported in TMEs (London),
no. 11426, Dec.
11, 1821, at 2; see infra note 216. In this sense, the OPTF could have more easily prosecuted
Kaytel Video Distribution rather than John Stagliano for distributing Stagliano's Evil Angel
videos, which perhaps it should have done, as the criminal charges against Stagliano inevitably
collapsed when the OPTF was unable to link him to the distribution of the videos and the
presumed public harm caused thereby. United States v. Stagliano, 729 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217 n.2
(D.D.C. 2010).
69 While Pound and Chafee seem to trace the first application of the maxim on
the equity side
to Eyre's ruling on a surety as Baron at Exchequer in Dering, see supra note 41, only Priestley
involved issues related to literary property, however implicitly.
70 (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1. (Ch.).
71 Arguably Burnett was the first case that reflected
the principle behind the doctrine,
maintaining that the effect of allowing works of such an illicit nature to be distributed publicly
would harm the public welfare. Burnett v. Chetwood, (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.). In the
process, the right of the author, clearly established under the Statute of Anne, was ruled
subordinate to the court's obligation, in its "superintendency of all books ... to restrain the
printing and publishing of any that contained reflections on religion or morality." Id. at 1009.
While largely ignored as precedent because it assumed a jurisdiction beyond equity's traditional
role, Burnett at least implicitly raised the issue of whether the public itself had an equitable interest
that the court had an obligation to consider. See also Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1 (embodying the
first equity ruling to explicitly deny that an author had the legal right to assert property in a work
based on its nature, albeit as an intermediary step in the proceeding).
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If the doctrine of Lord Chief Justice Eyre (Dr.Priesty's Case, see 2
Mer. 437) is right, and I think it is, that publications may be of
such a nature, that the author can maintain no action at law, it is
not the business of this Court, even upon the submission in the
answer,. . . that the author can maintain no action at law for the
invasion of that, which he calls his property, but which the policy
72
of the law will not permit him to consider his property.
Eyre's dictum in Priestley, also cited as authority by Eldon in Southey v.
Shenood,73 was arguably a simple matter of applying a maxim of contract law to
a tort recovery of damages; the Birmingham Committee of One Hundred had
been negligent in protecting Dr. Priestley's property and was thus liable for its
loss. At issue was the calculation of the value of what was lost-his house,
scientific lab, instruments, books, and papers-and specifically whether the
unpublished manuscripts among his papers had any equitably recoverable value
beyond the expense involved in their production (paper, ink, etc.). If these
were to be considered within the value of his lost property, Priestley would have
had to claim that his manuscripts had value in the labor he had invested in them
and perhaps commodity value in which he held property ("literary property")
74
under common law.
72 Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1. That Eldon was familiar with Eyre's ruling in Priestley despite the
absence of a published report is hardly surprising, as the small coterie of judges at law and equity
continuously collected and studied manuscript reports and debated points of law socially amongst
themselves and with the restricted number of barristers authorized to argue before them. See John
P. Dawson, The Grvwth and Deckne of English Case Law, in THE ORACLES OF THE LAw 1-99 (1968)
(describing the early development of the legal profusion and court reporting). Moreover, Eyre had
presided over the famous treason trials of 1794, in which Eldon had, as attorney general, served as
prosecutor. See also Thomas Pfau, ParanoiaHistomized- Legal Fantasy, Sodal Change, and Satiic MetaCommentary in the 1794 Treason Trial, in ROMANTICISM, RADICALISM, AND THE PREsS 30, 36-42
(Stephen Behrendt ed., 1997) (describing the roles played by Edon and Eyre in the 1794 treason
trials). Eldon succeeded Eyre as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas in 1799. It is
unknown whether Eldon had mentioned Priestly explicitly in his Walcot ruling or whether court
reporter Francis Vesey Jr. had added the parenthetical notation to Priestleyin his published nominate
report over twenty years later as a clarification of Eldon's oral reference to Eyre.
73 Southey v. Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.) 1008 ("[A] distinction has been taken,
to which a considerable weight of authority attaches, supported, as it is, by the opinion of Lord
Chief Justice Eyre, who has expressly laid it down that a person cannot recover in damages for a
work which is, in its nature, calculated to do injury to the public. Upon the same principle, this
Court refused an Injunction, in the case of Walcot v. Walker. . . .").
74 This would have made Priestley the first case of literary property under the Clean Hands
Doctrine, at least by implication. With no published record or unpublished manuscript report of
the hearing, however, we cannot know whether Priestley explicitly made such a claim at Assize.
Presumably, Priestley's property in his unpublished manuscripts or journals, had they been of
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Eyre's intimation that there might not be property in Priestley's unpublished
manuscripts did not deny that their literary value could be recovered by an
action for damages at law. Instead, he suggested that the nature of his
previously published writings, lauding republican values and hence considered
to be of seditious tendency in the tumultuous 1790s, probably would have
disqualified those writings from being considered property.75 In this, Eyre was
stating a principle implicitly derived from previous holdings at law: the law does
not protect literary works that threaten the public welfare. That Priestley may
have been disqualified from relief because the property at issue may have been
of a criminal nature involved several rather obvious interpretive leaps. On the
most superficial level, it assumed that the lost writings may have been seditious,
similar to some of his published writings that were read in court, and therefore
potentially criminal.76 This was of course supposition, as the court had not yet
reached a finding of law regarding the seditious nature of the manuscripts (nor
was this even possible, as they had been destroyed). Notwithstanding, those
writings could just as easily have been of a scientific nature and hence not
libelous. On a more general level, it assumed that if those writings were found
seditious as a matter of law, they would have been disqualified from
consideration as property for reasons of public policy, a somewhat strained
extension of the Clean Hands Doctrine to literary property.77

illicit tendency, could have had no legally recognizable market value because it was illegal to sell
such materials, rendering the only recoverable value to be the tangible material cost of the paper
and ink. Clearly, the only way for Priestley to counter the charge that his writings would have
been considered illegal was to place them in the marketplace and to see if criminal charges could
be successfully maintained against them. Short of that, the value of his writings could only be
estimated by establishing a market value for similar published writings, assuming he could specify
their subject matter to the satisfaction of the court.
7s Art. I/7,supra note 62, at 125 ("Unhappily that court is sometimes
obliged to refuse its
interference, and in the cases in which that interference appears to us to be peculiarly needed.
The ground of its refusal is, that the jurisdiction of the court is confined to the protection of
property, and that there can be no property in what is publicly injurious.").
76 The definition of seditious works broadened or narrowed depending
on political winds of
the time. In periods of political unrest, such as the 1790s which saw the publication of Paine'sAge
of Reason through the first two decades of the nineteenth century, especially after the Peterloo
massacre in 1819, publishers were prosecuted not only for works that were critical of the Church
or Crown but also for works that were more generally sympathetic to republican virtues or open
to a broad debate over the meaning of scripture.
77 At the time, not all scientific writings were considered wholly innocent.
Those that implicitly
or explicitly challenged biblical authority, notably those based on the theories
of Charles Darwin,
easily could have been within the reach of criminal charges of blasphemous libel, as was the case of
Thomas Burnett's controversial Arcbaeoogia Philosophica. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying
text (describing ARCHAEOLOGIA PHILOSOPHICA, in which the author attempted to reconcile his view
of the geological evolution of the earth with the account of the Great Flood in the Book
of Genesis,
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Parallel to this, Eyre's ruling in Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea has been
interpreted as qualifying the underlying equitable principle enunciated in his
78
The plaintiffs
dictum from Priestley several years earlier, again by dictum.
Edward,
brother,
his
with
bonds
into
entered
had
brother, Thomas Deering,
with the
Edward,
plaintiff,
the
saddled
insolvency,
his
and two others and upon
equitable
their
force
to
others
obligations, causing him, in turn, to sue the
contribution.79 In response, they argued that Edward was complicitous in his
brother's insolvency and that such behavior precluded his ability to seek
equitable relief.so He sought relief, in effect, with "unclean hands." While the
case had little to do with literary property, much less property of any kind, Eyre
took the opportunity to restate the broader clean hands maxim already
81
established in cases of this type. Moreover, he also stated that the plaintiffs
disqualifying immoral behavior must be directly related to the claimed
inequitable circumstance from which he was seeking relief or, more heinously,
had interfered with, disrupted, or had by other means tainted the court's
consideration of that relief, likely producing an inequitable or immoral
consequence eventuating from the court's ruling, which would compromise its
82
integrity as a court of conscience.
intimating that Biblical stories were allegorical). Posthumous publication of the work in English was
enjoined because it contained "strange notions." Burnett's writings were already controversial with
the publication in English of his The Sacred Theoy of the Earth, in which he attempted to explain the
Biblical Flood in strictly scientific terms, and to which ArchaelogidaPhilosophica could be considered a
philosophical extension, as detailed by Luciano Malusa, Thomas Burnet (c. 1635-1715): Archaeologia
philosophica, in 1 MODELS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, FROM ITS ORIGINS IN THE
RENAISSANCE TO THE 'HISTORICA PHILOSOPHICA' 330-69 (C.W.T. Blackwell & Philip Weller eds.,

1993). See generally Ronan Deazley, Commentar on Burnet v. Chetwood' (1721), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON
COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), at http://copy.law.cam.ac.uk/ca
72
m/commentary/uk1721/uk 1 1 c om_97200714442.html; David Saunders, Copyriht, Obscenity
HIST. 431, 434-35 (1990).
LIT.
ENG.
57
and Literay Histog,
78 (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1182 (Exch.). Chafee initially identified the "clean hands maxim" as a
reflection of an established general principle, Chafee I, supra note 28, at 880-81, but then later in
his discussion of Priestley referred to Eyre as "the coiner of the clean hands maxim," Chafee II,
supra note 28, at 1067, and the maxim as "exactly as old as the United States Constitution,"
Chafee I, supra note 28, at 880, dating it to Dering. While the general maxim obviously predates
Eyre's rulings, the condition that one's inequitable behavior must be directly related to an injury
done to the defendant is doctrinally traced to Dering. The rulings in both Dering and Priestley
reflect Eyre's presumption that the maxim itself had already been established as an equitable
principle.
79 Dering, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. at 1184.
80 Id.
81 Id

82 See Phillips, supra note 56, at 143 (identifying this "tainting theory" as distinct from the Clean
Hands Doctrine, the former a refusal to "delve into areas in which exercise of [the courts]
equitable jurisdiction will bring about a miscarriage of public policy" and the latter a condition on
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The copyright implication of Eyre's dictum in Dering,83 though considered
significant to affirmative defenses, is actually less clear since in most cases, a
plaintiffs complicity in inequitable behavior would be automatically manifest in
the evil tendency of the wdrk at issue. In Piestly, however, Eyre did not follow
the logic of that dictum when he directed the jury that property in illicit works,
such as ones that Priestley had penned in the past, could not be legally
recognized. In effect, Priestley's inequitable behavior was not related to his
unpublished manuscripts of undetermined content but rather to his general
pattern of publishing assumedly seditious works, revealing an illicit motive.
The issue of whether the content of literary property disqualified it from
protection as property was also argued in two oft-cited contemporaneous cases
at law. In Fores v. Johnes, the plaintiff sought recovery of payment for print
caricatures he had delivered on consignment." The defendant had refused both
to accept them and to pay, maintaining that the caricatures were, unbeknownst
to him previously, obscene and immoral (by which he meant satirical and
libelous, as caricatures of that period were inclined to be).85 In language the
tenor of which would become relatively standard throughout the Eldon period,
Justice Lawrence ruled nisi that the value of the caricatures could not be
recovered until the plaintiff established that he had property in them and was
owed their value pursuant to an agreement, which would have been
unsupportable if they were found to be illegal. 86 The dilemma was, of course,
that if a court at law denied a plaintiff damages because it judged the plaintiffs
work to be obscene and immoral as a matter of fact, the plaintiff might then
become subject to subsequent criminal prosecution, as the prevailing standard
for obscene and immoral works was far from clear and would cause an
unpredictable jury trial.87
the plaintiffs standing to make a claim).
83 Denng, 29 Eng. Rep. at 1184 (holding that a plaintiffs inequitable and thus compromising
behavior must be directly related to publication of the work at issue rather than simply a
reflection of his previous published writings or his general comportment).
8 (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654 (K.B.).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 655 ("For prints, whose objects are general satire or ridicule of prevailing
fashions or

manners, I think the plaintiff may recover; but I cannot permit him to do so for such whose
tendency is immoral or obscene; nor for such as are libels on individuals, and for which the
plaintiff might have been rendered criminally answerable for a libel."). Justice Lawrence was
reported to have continued: "For publishing such, Mr. Fores might be standing there as a
criminal, and the law would never allow him to recover their value as Plaintiff in a civil action,"
MORNING CHRON. (London), no. 10217, Feb. 17, 1802. Arguably, the plaintiff could have been
criminally prosecuted even if he merely showed a work to a potential client prior to sale and
delivery, indicating an intent to distribute. See Wilks v. R., (1769) 2 Eng. Rep. 244 (K.B).
8 See Fores v. Johnes, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654 (K.B.). One could argue that Fores was simply
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Similarly, in Dubost v. Beresford,88 an artist sued for damages resulting from the
defendant's destruction of his painting, which was being displayed in a public
exhibition and which the defendant considered libelous and affronting to his
sister and brother-in-law. 89 Following Fores and consistent with Walcot and, in
turn, with Eyre's dictum in Piestey, Lord Ellenborough, C.J., ruled nisi that
there could be no value in libelous works.90 He advised the jury that the
painting could not be considered a work of art (for which a market value could
arguably be estimated) and to award the plaintiff only the value of the lost
canvas and paint.91 As in Piestley, the Court made a supposition regarding the
a matter of an illegal and thus unenforceable contract, the product having illicit content unknown
to the plaintiff. Similarly, in Gale and Fenner v. Leckie, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 588 (K.B.), plaintiffs
were printers suing for non-performance of a contract to deliver the remaining parts of a
manuscript, the publication of which the defendant unsuccessfully argued would have made him
subject to prosecution for seditious or blasphemous libel since it criticized both the government
and the Pope, an eventuality for which he provided no documentary evidence. Also, in Poplett v.
Stockdak, (1825) 171 Eng. Rep. 1041 (C.P.), plaintiff sued to recover expenses from his printing of
the salacious Memoirs of Harriette Wilson, to which publisher Stockdale counter-argued that
assistance at law could not be sought because the work itself was pernicious, and the plaintiff was
nonsuited nisi. Ironically, in a separate action, Stockdale had sought damages at law for copyright
infringement of the same work under the Statute of Anne, a claim easily rebutted by the
defendant using the same "obscenity defense" ('This is a work that the law will not
protect . .. Every one who comes to seek protection of the law for his property, must shew that
property to be worthy of that protection [however] this work is professedly bad, and cannot be
defended in any way," Stockdale II-RD, supra note 66, at 76. When Stockdale moved for retrial, his
argument was summarily rejected by Lord Abbott. Id. at 78 ("If the plaintiff had no right to sell,
how can he maintain an action. Every party concerned with ushering such a book into the world,
has committed an offense against decency.").
88 (1810) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B.).
89 Id. Antoine Dubost, a French neo-classical painter of mythological motifs, was
commissioned by art patron Thomas Hope to paint a portrait of his wife and son. During its
rendering, Hope was constantly dissatisfied with the work, precipitating very public criticism of
Dubost's talent by Hope's friends in the Royal Academy. In apparent retaliation, Dubost painted
and publicly displayed a satirical caricature "La Belle et La Bete" (The Beauty and the Beast),
bearing the clear likenesses of Hope and his wife as the principals, and causing Mrs. Hope's
brother to attack and mutilate it, an arguably expected response to a public libel. See Sayre
MacNeil, Some Pictures Come to Court, reprintedin HARVARD LEGAL EssAYs 247-71, 250-56 (1934);
Richard E. Spear, Antoine Dubost's 'Sword of Damocks' and Thomas Hope: An Anglo-French Skirmish,
BURLINGTON MAG., Vol. 148, Aug. 2006, at 520-27.
9 Dubost, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1235.
91 Obviously, Ellenborough was not rendering an aesthetic judgment about the painting but
rather dismissing its capacity for artistic value in damages based on its libelous content, albeit
having never seen it himself. "If it was a libel upon the persons introduced into it, the law cannot
consider it valuable as a picture." Id. at 1235. In other words, the value of the work, a
combination of labor invested and creativity embodied, was lost because the result was
considered libelous. Dubost claimed that his painting should be valued comparable to the current
market value of his other artistic works, each averaging in excess of [800. In this case, as in
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libelous nature of the work, which in this case was based on testimony of those
who saw it and on the actions of the defendant in destroying it.92
It is clear, then, that the broader notion of the clean hands maxim easily
predated the Eyre dicta in Piestley and Dering, and perhaps even the range of law
and equity cases that were to become clustered under one or more of Francis's
Maxims of Equity under the rubric of "clean hands."9 3 In fact, several of

Priestley, the creative value of the work was discounted by its imputed libelous nature, established
by testimony of those who saw the work as displayed, rather than from its direct scrutiny by the
jury. Consequently, Ellenborough directed the jury to award the plaintiff [5, the value of the
materials which had to be estimated since it was destroyed and its reuse value indeterminable. See
TN~fEs (London), no. 8160, Dec. 7, 1810, at 3.
92 To lend authority to his presumption that the painting was libelous, Ellenborough
took the
extraordinary (and extra-legal) step of asserting that Lord Chancellor Eldon would most assuredly
have declared the painting a libel had the defendant instead raised a complaint at equity ("Upon
an application to the Lord Chancellor, he would have granted an injunction against its exhibition,
and the plaintiff was both civilly and criminally liable for having exhibited it."). DuBost v.
Beresford, (1810) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B.). He thus implied (incorrectly) that Eldon would
have been inclined to render a decision based on content prior to a hearing at law. In fact, Eldon
was purposefully careful in Gee to confine himself to "facts of which the Court can take notice, as
a case of civil property, which it is bound to protect," and to specify his jurisdiction "to be, if not
entirely, mainly, relative to the question, whether the plaintiff has or has not, property," Gee v.
Pritchard,(1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch.) 674, 677, a position that explicitly followed Hardwicke's
ruling seventy years earlier in Roach v. Garvan,(1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch.) 683: "[flor whether it
is a libel against the publick or private persons, the only method is to proceed at law." Eldon also
thereby followed his own ruling in ExparteJones, (1805) 34 Eng. Rep. 1121 (Ch.) 1121 ("[lIt was
agreed, that a court of equity has no cognisance of a libellous publication, unless it amounts to a
contempt of the court," which was subsequently affirmed in rehearing by Erskine, L.C., in Ex
parteJones,(1806) 33 Eng. Rep. 283 (Ch.)). On the substantive issue, however, Eldon grudgingly
followed Hardwicke's ruling in Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.), finding sufficient
property in the plaintiffs private letters to maintain an injunction:
I should have found it difficult to satisfy my mind that there is property in the
letter; but it is my duty to submit my judgment to the authority of those who
have gone before me ... The doctrine of this Court ought to be as well settled
and made as uniform almost as those of the common law, laying down fixed
principles, but taking care that they are to be applied according to the
circumstances in each case.
However, while the principle that questions of fact should be deferred to the law courts was
established in Hardwicke's time and held as authority consistently by Eldon, it later became
subject to broader interpretation regarding privacy and defamation. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound,
Equitabe RekefAgainst Defamation andInjuries to Personakty, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 641-48 (1916).
93 FRANcis, supra note 26. None of the reported cases which Francis cited
as precedent
contained phraseology akin to that found in his maxims, and in many cases the connection
between the underlying principles of those rulings was at best obtusely related to the broad
notion that "no action arises out of an illegal transaction." Other Francis maxims, such as "he
who seeks equity must do equity," may seem inconsistent with the dean hands maxim, which
refers to plaintiff behavior prior to a claim, whereas the "do equity" admonition appears to refer
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Francis's maxims were often used interchangeably in later references to the
Clean Hands Doctrine. However, Eyre's dictum in Priestley precipitated, albeit
tenuously, a connection between the doctrine and issues of copyright
infringement under both common law and the Statute of Anne. While Eyre's
direction to the jury was generally in keeping with a line of previous rulings of
law and equity, it was hardly a sufficient bedrock for the application of the
Clean Hands Doctrine to the statutory protection of literary property under
copyright. For that, we must turn directly to the rulings of Lord Eldon.
IV. THE ORIGINS OF THE OBSCENITY DEFENSE
It is commonly assumed that the establishment of the Clean Hands
Doctrine in equity and the affirmative "unclean hands" (or obscenity) defense it
94
spawned are attributable to the chancery rulings of Lord Eldon, particularly

to subsequent behavior. Yet, this is not as problematic as it seems, if the maxims collectively
reflect a continuum of inequitable and/or illegal behavior subject to injunction. Chafee II, supra
note 28, at 1095-96. Whether these maxims add up to a doctrine, or rather to what Chafee
referred as "loose bundle[s] of separate defenses which somewhat resemble each other," id. at
1092, further complicates our consideration of the precedent value of Mitchell Brothers. Chafee
himself presented a categorization of types of suits that arise under the Clean Hands Doctrine (in
effect, eighteen "bundles"), with one cluster involvinng plaintiffs seeking injunctions against torts,
such as in suits to protect literary property and copyright. Chafee II, supra note 28, at 1065--70.
While he identified a cluster of five types of suits that arise under the exclusive jurisdiction of
equity, virtually all commonly-cited precedents in clean hands cases come from areas of
concurrent jurisdiction, specifically clustered as those regarding specific performance of contracts,
Chafee I, supra note 28, at 893-904, and those seeking injunctions against torts, Chafee II, supra
note 28, at 1060-91.
94 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 68 ("Lord Eldon established the principle that no
copyright would subsist in immoral, libelous or blasphemous works."). We must be duly cautious
about interpreting Eldon's rulings, as nominate reports were selective, third-party accounts
regarding counsel arguments and the judge's oral decree, which may or may not have offered
insight into the judge's reasoning or sources he took into consideration. Often completely devoid
of contextual specification, reports frequently focused on procedural matters, the explication of
which may have been editorial. Interpretation of a ruling was better facilitated if a case was
covered by more than one nominate reporter, which occurred in several of Eldon's later cases.
See John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447 (2001). Also helpful
would be letters, case manuscripts or copies, or journal notations reflecting on cases heard, but
unlike Hardwicke before him, Eldon was not prolific in this regard. While his Judicial Notes,
1801-1821 (11 vols.) contain detailed case notes on proceedings-mostly fact information and
arguments offered by each counsel regarding cases mostly between 1802 and 1813-the only
copyright infringement case mentioned is O'Connerv. Cook, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1247 (Ch.) 125051, which references numerous nominate reports before concluding, "Where there is a reasonable
doubt before you [arrow] to the prejudices of a jury and a judge of a jury" (Vol. II, p. 220). There
is no mention of other copyright infringement cases, most notably Wakot, heard that same year.
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his embrace of Eyre's statement that the general principle in Priestley governed
in Walcot.95 Plaintiff John Walcot, 96 author of highly popular satirical verse and
lyric odes under the pen name of Peter Pindar, sought permanent injunctive
relief against his former publisher, who admitted unauthorized publication of
Pindar's works but argued that the satirical nature of the works tendered them
libelous and ineligible for equity relief.9 7 Walcot's notoriety for vivid caricatures
in scurrilous allegories successfully skirted criminal prosecution for seditious
libel by focusing on the personal lives of notable people (such as the Royal
Family or Prime Minister William Pitt) rather than criticizing their policies or
their public behavior.98 The period of Walcot's highest popularity was the
decade following 1785, during which even the King and the Prince of Wales
were said to be avid followers, and his works were rampantly pirated, with legal
action brought against several who quickly settled.99 As the piquancy of his
work inevitably waned, Walcot reached an agreement with his publishers for the
rights to his collected works in return for an annuity. He unsuccessfully
attempted to litigate the terms of this agreement in Walcot, after which their
agreement was reworked. 00
Citing Eyre in Priestley, Eldon declared that he was unable to issue an
injunction against Walker because it was unclear whether Walcot had property
in his works. 0 1 Eldon agreed with the general principle he attributed to Eyrethat one could not have property in libelous works-and admitted to having no
knowledge of the content of the works at issue, ruling procedurally that his
court had no jurisdiction to make a factual ruling on their nature, which he then

Walcot v. Walker, (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch.).
John Walcot (1738-1819) was listed as the plaintiff in the bill of complaint; however,
Vesey's published nominate report misspelled his name as Walcot and that spelling endured.
97 See Noah Heringman, 'Manlius to Peter Pindar".Saire, Patriotism, and Masculinity in the 1790s,
RoMANTIc CIRCLEs PRAXIs SERIES (May 2006) (describing Walcot's evolution as a political satirist
and his careful avoidance of the boundaries of libel law).
98 Donald Kerr, 'SatireIs Bad Trade': Dr.John Walcot and his Publishers and Printers in EighteenthCentury England, 12 CARDIFF CORVEY: READING THE ROMANTIC TEXT (Summer 2004), available at
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/encap/corvey/articles/ccl2_nO2.htnl; H.J. Jackson, England's Populist
Pindars, ELECTRONIC BRIT. LIB. J. no. 4 (2002), available at http://www.bl.uk/ebl;/2002articles/p
df/article4.pdf; Bridget Ikin, PeterPindarand the Pirates, 9 FACTOTUM 27, 29 (1980).
99 Kerr, supra note 98.
1o Id
101 Walcot, (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. at 1. Similarly, two months before his ruling in Walcot, regarding
whether the defendant had concurrent authority with the King's Printer to publish Bibles and
prayer books in England and Scotland, Eldon maintained "in cases of this sort the universal rule
is, that, if the title is not clear at law, the Court will not grant or sustain an injunction, until it is
made clear at law." Univs. of Oxford & Cambridge v. Richardson, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1260
(Ch.) 1268.
5

96
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deferred to the courts at law. 0 2 This set a basic pattern of fact-finding which
Eldon was to follow in all copyright infringement cases, not merely in those
involving literary works of questionable tendency.103 Wa/cot, however, involved
two separate works that had to be treated differently, as one had not yet been
published.104 Defendant Walker had in fact already published one unauthorized
volume of Pindar's work, was planning the next volume, and had advertised the
availability of both. 05 Referring to Walker's published octavo edition of
volume 4 of Peter Pindar'r Collected Works, Eldon ruled it was not possible to
grant an injunction until after Walcot's rights had been tried, as "facts may alter
the effect of the agreement at law." 06 Eldon also held that "the Court ought
not to give an account of the unhallowed profits of libelous publications" and
granted Walcot "liberty to apply for an injunction" if he succeeded in proving
his property interest.107

102 Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1. See also Atty. Gen. v. Cleaver, (1811) 34 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ch.) 300;
Crowder v. Tinkler, (1816) 34 Eng. Rep. 645 (Ch.) 647 (in which Eldon refused even a temporary
injunction in cases of public nuisances lacking the prospect of imminent or irreparable harm,
instead directing the issue of nuisance as a question of fact to law); Thomas R. Lee, Preliminay
Injundtions and the StatusQuo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109 (2001) (describing the Chancery Court's
efforts to enjoin only "irreparable injury" while freezing the interests at stake until they could be
sorted out at law); John Leubsdorf, The Standardfor Preliminary Injuntions, 91 HARv. L. REV. 525,
530-34 (1978) (describing the dilemma faced by equity courts considering legal rights and the
emergence of standard formulae for the granting of preliminary injunctions in situations where
irreparable injury required review of merits and the "balancing of convenience"); Langbein, supra
note 55 (clarifying that equity had and exercised fact-finding authority at the discretion of the
Chancellor).
103 Alternatively, if a property right had previously been found in a case of like circumstances,
Eldon tended to defer to that precedent. See Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch.) 677
(plaintiff argued that unauthorized publication of her private letters would "wound" her feelings,
a tacit plea for equity to protect her against the potential of personal libel, which Eldon deftly
reduced to a procedural question of whether she had property in her letters under common law:
"with reference to the charges of wounding feelings, looking at the jurisdiction of the Court to be,
if not entirely, mainly, relative to the question, whether the Plaintiff has or has not,
property... ."). Though Eldon had misgivings about the potential consequences of his ruling in
Gee, he nonetheless accepted the authority of Hardwicke's ruling in Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng.
Rep. 608 (Ch.), an opinion he found compelling, principally because it adhered to the general
maxim and "ha[d] been acquiesced in without application to a higher court," Gee, 36 Eng. Rep. at
677, with the caveat that the plaintiff "has a sufficient property in the original letters to authorize
an injunction, unless she has by some act deprived herself of it." Id. at 678. See Note and
Comment, A Re-interpretationof Gee v. Prichard, 25 MICH. L. REV. 889 (1927).
104 Kerr, supra note 98.
105 Id
106 Wacot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1.
107 Id
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With respect to the planned but yet unpublished duodecimo edition of
volume five of the Collected Works, arguably Walcot's property under common
law rather than under the Statute of Anne, Eldon reported that he would review
its nature, and "[i]f upon inspection the work appears innocent, I will act upon
that submission; if criminal, I will not act at all; and, if doubtful, I will send that
question to law." 08 While Eldon implied that he had authority to render a
finding of fact on the moral nature of the work, he readily admitted that his
conclusion had no authority at law but rather allowed him in principle to decide
whether equity can appropriately afford relief. Still, he maintained that it was
within his province to scrutinize the nature of the contested work for the
purpose of determining its innocence of illicit inclination, which would confirm
the plaintiffs eligibility for injunctive relief.'09 Beyond that, the issue must be
deferred to law.1 0 The critical point was that Eldon did not argue that Walcot
was not legally entitled to property in the work but rather that his property right
had yet to be established, rendering it a matter of jurisdiction as to how the
sequence of actions should proceed."'
That Walcot was a procedural ruling consistent with equity practices at the
time was reinforced by the reporter Vesey's own supplemental referencell 2 to a
copyright infringement claim heard in chancery three years earlier." 3 In that

108 Id. In effect, Eldon ruled procedurally on the unauthorized publication
of volume four,
directing the plaintiff to file a damage claim at law before requesting equitable relief. He did not
rule at all on the planned but yet unpublished piracy of volume five, reserving judgment on its
potential illicit tendency until he could read it for himself.
109 Id. ("I will see these publications, and determine upon the nature of them. . .
110 Id.
111 Id. ("[I will decide] whether this is question enough to send to law as to the property in those
copies .... If upon inspection the work appears innocent, I will act .. .; if criminal, I will not act
at all; and if doubtful, I will send that question to law.").
112 In his published supplemental notes on Valcot, Vesey noted "[a]s to the grounds upon
which, and upon which alone, a court of equity will interfere in cases of literary property, see ante,
note 1, to Cag v. Faden, 5 V. 24." Walcot v. Walker, (1802) 34 Eng. Rep. 971 (Ch.).
113 Cary v. Faden, (1799) 31 Eng. Rep. 453 (Ch.). In 1798, John Cary had published and
registered Cay's New Iineray, a road book that included material from Cary's own surveying
structured after Paterson's Briish Iinerag, for which Francis Newbery held the rights. While
Newbery complained publicly that Cary had plagiarized his work, he took no legal action but
instead issued a twelfth edition of Paterson's Briish Itinerag, published by Faden, Longman and
Rees, which added new material and copied parts of Cary's issue. Cary filed for an injunction at
chancery under the Statute of Anne. While it appeared that each had borrowed from the other, it
was clear that the nature of the material was such that any updating would appear similar in
structure and graphics to previous issues with some modification. Id. The only questions were
whether the modifications were significant enough to warrant classification as a "new work," at
that time a matter of unsettled law, see ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 182-89; and whether the
defendant used plaintiffs material without animus furandi (larcenous or exploitive intention), a
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case, Cagy v. Faden, Eldon's predecessor, Lord Loughborough, found that the
works of both plaintiff and defendant were in some measure products of
piracy"14 and refused the plaintiffs request for an injunction. Having only the
options of either requesting a rehearing at equity or filing a damage suit at law
to establish his rightful claim to property in the work, Cary opted for the latter,
which sorted out the issue of consignment of authorial right and awarded Cary
nominal damages." 5 Both parties then retreated to publish updated versions of
their works. Vesey's notation of Faden in his report on Walcot was revealing in
that it referenced eleven cases that raised issues regarding proprietary rights to
literary works, most of which had been re-directed by Lord Eldon to courts at
law for resolution.16

concept introduced by Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in Cay v. Kearsly, 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) 680
[hereinafter Keardy], which mirrored Lord Hardwicke's ruling in Gyles P. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng.
Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490, and Mansfield's ruling in Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B.) 140.
Defendant Faden was put in the position of arguing that while Cary's work was duly registered,
the court could not provide Cary relief because he had, in essence, "unclean hands" by having
pirated much of the contents himself from another source.
114Cay, 31 Eng. Rep. at 454. After reviewing both works, Loughborough concluded that
PATERSON'S was the original and CARY'S "[took] a different line," thereby denying the injunction
and admonishing both parties:
If I was to do strict justice, I should order the Defendants to take out of their
book all they have taken from the Plaintiff, and reciprocally the Plaintiff to take
out of his all that he has taken from Patterson [sic]. I think, the Plaintiff may be
contented, that a bill is not filed against him.
Id.
115 Id. This was one of very few circumstances in which a plaintiff was directed by chancery to
law to establish legal property in a literary work and actually filed an action for damages.
However, Lord Kenyon avoided the issue of whether Cary had property in his work based on its
registration (and the subsequent dilemma of whether the Court could deny relief to a duly
registered work) by accepting his claim to property based on the surveying consignment, a pyrrhic
victory at best because Cary was awarded damages of one shilling. Id. at 614.
116 Those cases included Cary, 31 Eng. Rep. at 453 (plaintiffs claim to property upheld at law
based on his consignment of the labor on which the literary work was based); Southy v. Sherwood,
(1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.) (Eldon ruling that whether property can be held in a possibly
illicit work should be determined by a court at law); Hogg v. Kirby, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (Ch.)
(Eldon citing difficulties in determining authorship when the author is nominally fictitious could
only be ascertained at law); Matthewson v. Stockdak, (1806) 33 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch.) (Erskine, L.C.,
ruling that in absence of a response by the defendant, property in a work was determined by
documentation of the labor invested in its production); Longman v. Winchester, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep.
987 (Ch.) (Eldon ruling that whether a plaintiff could claim a property interest in lists was a
matter of law); Wilkins v. Aiken, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.) (Eldon continuing a temporary
injunction until the plaintiff filed an action at law); Platt v. Button, (1815) 34 Eng. Rep. 583 (Ch.)
(Eldon ruling that property in dance music must be established at law before the plaintiff could
apply for an injunction); Wyatt v. Barnard, (1814) 35 Eng. Rep. 408 (Ch.) (Eldon deferring the
question of whether a translation can be considered an original work to a court of law);
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In fact, Eldon's ruling in Wacot had guided decisions in all eleven of those
cases as well as others regarding copyright infringement, in effect solidifying his
reputation as the judicial source of the Clean Hands Doctrine as applied to
copyright. 17 The most noteworthy of those was surely Southy v. Sherwood, in
which Robert Southey, then poet laureate and pro-government essayist, pleaded
for a chancery injunction against unauthorized publication of his heretofore
unpublished three-act play Wat Tyer."8 Composed over twenty years earlier
when he was twenty-one in concert with his friend William Coleridge, Wat Ter
presented a sympathetic, romanticized view of the Peasant Revolt of 1381 and
was considered Jacobin and perhaps even seditious in tendency. Whether the
piece would have been subject to criminal prosecution if it had been published
in the turbulent 1790s, when the publishers of far more notable republican
tracts, primarily the works of Thomas Paine, were tried for treason and sedition,
is still doubtful, as the play was considered in hindsight a "ridiculously juvenile"
and dismissible minor piece." 9 It was not, however, published in the 1790s,
when the prosecution of seditious publications was rampant and when Southey
had achieved some notoriety as a radical poet of long epic works in the decade
prior to his appointment as poet laureate in 1813. By 1817, he was known
primarily for his political essays and commentary and for his reputation as de
facto chief spokesman of the Tory government.120 That Sherwood and others
chose to publish Wat Tyler in 1817 clearly demonstrates their intent to expose
Whilingham v. Wooler, (1817) 36 Eng. Rep. 679 (Ch.) (Eldon directing the works to the Master of
Rolls for comparison to save expense of extra proceedings.); Barfield v. Nicolson, (1824) 57 Eng.
Rep. 245 (Ch.) 248 (Leach, V.C. continuing an injunction until a court at law conducted a hearing
on whether property exists in copied materials); and Rundell v. Murray, (1821) 37 Eng. Rep. 868
(Ch.) 870 (Eldon ruling that "strict law only ought to govern" whether property existed in a
work).
117 See, e.g., Shelley v. Westbrooke, (1817) 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch.).
See also infra note 206
(discussing Eldon's ruling utilizing the Clean Hands defense during Percy Shelley's child custody
petition).
118 Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1006.
119 Hoadley, supra note 77, at 95-96. This argument was extended by Coleridge in a series of
letters to COURIER (London), arguing in effect that the author was young and naive
or,
alternatively, was presenting the work as a literary rather than political piece, easily dissected and
dismissed by William Hazlitt's commentary The Courerand the Wat Tyler, in EXAMINER (London),
no. 483, Mar. 30, 1817, at 194-97.
120 The political rhetoric of the period was savage and intensely partisan,
with Tory and Whig
publications accusing writers on either side of Satanic and conspiratorial motivations. In this,
Southey was a prime Tory contributor, singularly obsessed with the capacity of the radical press
to stir the masses to revolt and portraying each piece of radical writing as the harbinger of
imminent crisis. See Kim Wheatley, ParanoidPoitics: The Quarter#and Edinburgh Reviews, 15 PROSE
STUDIEs 319 (1992) (describing how the intensity of paranoia was fueled by a presumption that
the radical press would rally the masses to revolution).
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Southey as a political hypocrite and to embarrass the sitting government in
general. 121
In Southey, Eldon followed Wacot (and, by extension, Eyre's statement of
principle in Priestley) by repeating that there could be no property in works of
injurious nature,122 but that any consideration of the nature of the work was
unnecessary since Southey had not yet established his property in the work by
23
successfully pursuing a damages claim at law.1 Eldon argued that his primary
consideration was confined to the plaintiffs interest in the property, rather than
24
to the nature of the property itself or to the conduct of the parties involved.1
121Id. Southey's lengthy and controversial essay on parliamentary reform in XVI Q. REV. 225
(Oct. 1816), was actually published in February 1817 and may have precipitated Sherwood's
unauthorized publication of Wat Tyler shortly thereafter. See ROBERT LAPP, THE CONTEST FOR
CULTURAL AUTHORITY: HAzLTT, COLERIDGE, AND THE DISTRESSES OF THE REGENCY 113-30

(1999) (describing the convergence of literary and political discourse as Southey's Wat Tyler
became satirical fodder for parliamentary debate, and dueling newspaper editorials); Mahoney,
supra note 77.
122 Soutby, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1008 ("[B]y the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Eyre, who has
expressly laid it down that a person cannot recover in damages for a work which is, in its nature,
calculated to do injury to the public."). Whether Eldon's reasoning in Southey was a direct
extension of his earlier ruling in Walcot or had been mitigated by Chief Justice Ellenborough's nisi
ruling at law in Hime v. Dale, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 1070 (K.B.) 1070(b), is a matter of
interpretation as to why obscene materials may be disqualified from equity protection. While
Wacot seemed to refuse the plaintiff any property in a libelous work, Hime, while still adhering to
the sentiment in Walcot (portraying the work at issue as a libel "so gross as to affect the public
morals"), moderated that position by according a hearing at common law and implying that works
of questionable nature could still be considered property and damages could be tempered
according to their degree of illicitness. Id. at 1071. See Phillips, supra note 56, at 140-42
(describing the moderation of the more definitive Walcot ruling-that there could be no property
in illegal works-to Abbott's more temperate ruling in Stockdale twenty years later-that such
works could still be property yet "incapable of legal assertion"). Even if property were granted in
the questionable works, a refusal to award damages at law would have indicated no injury to the
property at issue, obviating any subsequent equitable jurisdiction. See ALEXANDER, supra note 18,
at 70-74 (examining whether a refusal of damages at law indicated the absence of property or the
absence of a remedy of law).
123 Soutby, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1008 ("I cannot grant this [i]njunction after Mr. Southey shall have
established his right to the property by an action"), referencing the editor's inclusion of a note on
Burnett that accompanied the published nominate report on Southey because the plaintiff in Burnett
had similarly not established his property right in a translation of the text at issue. Burnett v.
Chetwood, (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.). Southey's claim to property would have been under
common law because the work was legally an unpublished manuscript, albeit one that Southey
intended to publish in 1794.
124 Soutby, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1008 ("[S]itting here as a Judge upon a mere question of property, I
have nothing to do with the nature of the property, nor with the conduct of the parties except as
it relates to their civil interests."). Procedurally narrow or not, Eldon's ruling in Southey was
sufficient to convince Shelley of the futility of filing a copyright infringement claim against
William Clark for selling copies from his privately printed.QueenMab.
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Yet, Eldon was aware that by refusing the requested injunction, he was likely
guaranteeing the proliferation of pirated copies and the spread of a work that
could, by its distribution, injure the public. 125

In this manner, Eldon recognized that fixing rules of equity could cause
entrapment and, in particular, that equity could not sustain copyright protection
for works of questionable tendency. In effect, the court faced the dilemma of
either protecting works of questionable tendency, thereby becoming associated
with the inequitable treatment of the plaintiff, or denying injunctive relief to the
plaintiff, which would cause broader harm to public morality when an influx of
pirated copies reached those of weaker education and moral constitution. 126 At
the same time, Eldon sidestepped the two basic elements of the Clean Hands
Doctrine-whether, as a finding of fact, the work was one of an illicit nature
and whether its tendency, if distributed in society, was likely to harm the public
interest. Eldon's use of the Clean Hands Doctrine was now carefully confined
to issues of procedure, of substantiating the legal authority of the courts at law
to render findings of fact, and of sequence, insisting that a plaintiff must first
succeed in a damages claim at law before attempting to supplement that relief
with an injunction.127
Likewise in Murray v. Benbow,128 Eldon continued to adhere to the principle
that the question of a work's tendency had to be adjudged at law.129 Yet he
125 Southy, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1008. In fact, Wat Tyler was immediately pirated by six London
publishers, starting with Sherwood's production of three editions within days of the Southey
decree. Together, the publishers sold an estimated 60,000 copies at a shilling each (one-tenth the
normal price for such a publication), establishing a pattern that when a reputedly illicit work was
denied copyright protection, its notoriety produced soaring demand and immediate piracy at far
cheaper prices, snowballing into massive sales and far greater dissemination than could have been
imagined. The Sherwood piracy was subsequently portrayed as "[t]he most decisive single event
in shaping the reading of the romantic period." See ST CLAIR, supra note 49, at 316.
126 Southy, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1008 ("It is very true that, in some cases, it may operate so as to
multiply copies of mischievous publications by the refusal of the court to interfere by restraining
them."). See infra note 169 (discussing the popularity of Byron's, Shelley's, and Southey's works
because of the proliferation of pirated copies).
127 By this time, the Clean Hands Doctrine had become a fixed rule in copyright
infringement
cases to the degree that defendants assumed that any questionable tendency of a literary work
might practically (if not legally) disqualify it from protection, which would defer the issue to a
court of law, an option most plaintiffs declined immediately. Cf Cary v. Longman, (1801) 170
Eng. Rep. 613 (KB.). It is perhaps noteworthy that this doctrinal position leaves open the
prospect that works of illicit nature could still be ruled "property" at law, hence changing the
issue to whether equitable relief should be denied on public policy grounds.
128 C13/1743/26 (Feb. 1822). This case was published in nominate form
only as a reference in
Lawrence v. Smith, (1822) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.) 929 n.1 and later in greater detail in 6 CHARLEs
PETERSDORFF, A PRACTICAL AND ELEMENTARY ABRIDGMENT OF THE CASES 558 (1830)

[hereinafter PETERSD.]. It was also chronicled in the Times (London), on Feb.
8, 11, 12, and 13,
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simultaneously acknowledged that an illicit work had no property value and that
his refusal to enjoin the unauthorized publication of an arguably blasphemous
work (in this case Byron's Cain, A Mystery) would more likely proliferate than
prevent its circulation.130 Eldon repeated this argument barely a month later in
Lawrence v. Smith,131 when the defendant moved to dissolve an injunction on his
unauthorized publication of the plaintiffs lectures on physiology because their
"nature and tendency" were "hostile to natural and revealed religion, and
impugned the doctrines of immateriality and immortality of the soul."132
Consistent with his practice of relegating issues of literary tendency to factfinding at law, Eldon walked the fine line between judging the criminality of
publishing blasphemous statements and simply denying equitable relief to such
works until the claim of their criminality or illicitness could be assessed at law.
Eldon concluded that his court only dealt with issues of civil right to property
33
in a manner "only ancillary to the law."
In so doing, Eldon implied but fell short of rendering a finding of fact when
he offered that "considering that the law does not give protection to those who
contradict the Scriptures," he was prohibited from using the interlocutory
injunction in the first place because he had "a rational doubt, whether this book
does not violate the law."l34 This position reflected Eldon's tendency to base
rulings regarding works of questionable tendency on the inherent jurisdiction at
35
common law or, more specifically, as an issue of appropriate jurisdiction.'
1822, and summarized in Q. REV. in April 1822. Art. I/, supra note 62. See also Leslie Katz, Lord
Byron, Copyrightand the Demons ofthe Law, at 16-21 (Nov. 5, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856
490 (describing legal background to Byron's dealings with Benbow regarding Cain).
129 PETERSD., supra note 128, at 558 ("This question I have no right to try, because it has been
settled, after great difference of opinion among the learned, that it is for a jury to determine that
point').
130 Id. ("Now this publication, if it is one intended to vilify and bring into discredit that portion
of scripture history to which it relates, is a publication, with reference to which, if the principles
on which that case at Warwick (Dr. Priestly's case) was decided b[y] just principles of law, the
party could not recover any damages in respect [to] a piracy of it ... I cannot grant the injunction
until you show me that you can maintain an action for it ... If the character of the work is such
that the publication of it amounts to a temporal offence, there is another way of proceeding, and
the publication of it should be proceeded against directly as an offence.... ").
131 37 Eng. Rep. at 929 (attributing the intent of the work to be the denial of the truth of
scripture, which the law does not protect).
132 Id. at 928; see also PETERSD., sapranote 128, at 599-60.
133 Lawrence, 37 Eng. Rep. at 929.
134 Id
135 See DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT, supra note 18, at 116 ("More typically, the courts
have tended to exercise this inherent jurisdiction by refusing a claimant relief on the grounds that
the content of the claimant's work is obscene or sexually immoral, defamatory, blasphemous or
irreligious.").
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This undoubtedly contributed to the view that Eldon had elevated the clean
hands maxim to doctrinal status. It arbitrarily reflected his own political
discontent with the "mischievous" consequence of equity's non-aggressive
role,
while also freeing pirates to widely disseminate works of questionable content at
cheaper prices, bringing them within the purview of those less likely to discern
the works' broader cultural impact. 136 This was the immediate conclusion
drawn by the TIMES (London) in its editorial reaction to Eldon's reasoning:
[These] writs of injunction were refused, upon collateral grounds.
The doctrine which has been since established was then only
insinuated. It derives its origin from no statute, decision, or legal
authority whatever, but was founded on a single passing
observation which fell from Lord Chief Justice Eyre (in DR.
PRIESTLEY'S action against the hundred) but which was neither
applied nor acted on. It has, however, revolutionized the state
and condition of literary property ... This annihilation of the
vital principle of literary property, is supposed to bear analogy to
some principle of the common law . . Judges have decided,
properly perhaps, that there can be no property in a seditious,
defamatory, or immoral libel ... [and yet, the wrong-doer should
be estopped] from setting up his criminality towards the public as
an excuse for his villainy towards the author ... [ifJ both are
libellous ... let both

be prosecuted

in a court of criminal

law ... [here] he has grown rich by cheating the original author,
whether the work be harmless or injurious . .. [and] in a shorter
time and in a more effectual manner ... [has] polluted the mind

136 Art. VI, supra note 62, at 128. Almost lost in the editorial reactions
to Eldon's jurisdictional
rulings was the alternative prospect of a "chilling effect" on authors of works now subjected to
the highly volatile winds of changing moral standards; see ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 74-75
(describing press criticism of Eldon's refusal to grant injunctive relief as arbitrary, causing authors
to anticipate Eldon's predisposition before publishing). See generaly WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL
PANICS AND COPYRIGHT WARS (2009) (arguing that copyright owners need to create conflict with
infringers to establish and maintain their property interests, and that they should do so by
generating moral panics regarding the consequences of non-protection); Tom Lewis, Legislating
Morality: Victorian and Modern Legal Reiponses to Pornography, in BEHAVING BADLY: SOCIAL PANIC
AND MORAL OUTRAGE - VICTORIAN AND MODERN PARALLELS 143-58 (Judith Rowbotham
&
Kim Stevenson eds., 2003) (discussing legal responses in Victorian England to the proliferation of
obscene publications).
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of the whole rising generation with a deluge of impiety and
vice.' 37

In effect, the court's denial of injunctive relief had become doctrinally
conjoined with the principle that "the law gives no protection to works
calculated to harm the public," notwithstanding a plaintiffs right to establish at
law a legitimate claim of property in works that may have been initially
38
considered potentially harmful in a preliminary hearing at equity.'
Criticisms of Eldon's position conflated the doctrinal principle with the
anticipation of an adverse cultural consequence, as do contemporaneous
39
criticisms of MitchellBrothers.1 Eldon's doctrinal objective, however, was more
broadly reflective, attempting to create a structure of uniformity in how the
moral nature of literary property would be adjudged and leaving any assessment
of criminal consequence to the law courts. To do that, he had to draw a careful
distinction between preliminary consideration of the nature of the work and a
final legal finding of fact regarding its nature, which he achieved by introducing
a tripartite classification scheme of how copyright infringement cases should be
addressed at equity.140 Until that time, the standard practice was for the court
to review the content of the work at issue and perhaps take testimony on its
potential harmful consequences. Afterward, if the court declared that the work
was clearly innocent of possible harmful effect on the public, the court could
immediately adjudicate the plaintiffs claim. If the work was clearly illicit and
potentially criminal in its nature, its effect on public morality, or both, the claim
stood outside equity's jurisdiction. This forced the court to draw hard-and-fast
legal distinctions based on its own review of the work and raised the prospect
that the court might harbor a personal prejudice against works of a certain type
of content. This would probably dissuade any plaintiff referred to law from
pursuing such an action, since the court's refusal to accept the claim as
legitimately within its jurisdiction would have seemed predicated on at least a
tacit finding that the work's tendency was illicit.

137 TiMEs (London), Aug. 12, 1823, at 2.

This was also clearly reflected in nisi rulings by Vice Chancellor John Leach in Byron v.
Hodgson, (1823) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.) 929 n.1, and Byron v. Dugdale, (1823) 1 L.J. Ch. 239 (Ch.),
the latter reported in some detail in TIMEs (London), Aug. 9, 1823, TIMEs (London), Aug. 11,
1823, and MORNING CHRON. (London), Aug. 9, 1823, in which he denied injunctions against
unauthorized publication of Byron's DON JUAN, CANTOS VI-VIII, directing them to law first
despite counsel's plea that "passages cited as impure were impure only to the impure mind."
139 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
138
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Yet, by consistently directing works of even questionable tendency to action
at law, Eldon created a "holding-tank"-a third category for works whose
nature raised a "rational doubt" regarding their potential for harmful effect and
which should be reviewed and resolved at law first, before a jury, with only a
secondary recourse to equity.141 While it may have been argued that the
parameters of this third category were yet undefined and residual and that its
use as a category of works actually expanded. rather than reduced the court's
arbitrary discretion in reviewing works of questionable nature, a
counterargument could also be made. When Eldon was confronted with works
of questionable tendency, he deferred them to law based on his uncertainty,
rather than allowing any subsequent action at law to be prejudiced by the
implicit assumption that only illicit works were directed to law for judgment. In
this manner and by fixed rule, he precluded the court from rendering even a
well-reasoned judgment regarding a work's nature, as it had so willfully (and
prejudicially) done in Burnett, a ruling from which the court progressively
recoiled as beyond its prerogative.142
These issues had already been raised at law in both Fores and Du Bost, cases
commonly cited in the legal discourse regarding the authority of the Clean
Hands Doctrine in equity. A third ruling at law, Stockdale v. Onwhyn,143 has
141 Lawrence v. Smith, (1822) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.)
929 ("If the action could not be
maintained, nothing can be done in this Court, which is only ancillary to the law, and,
therefore,
will not give relief, except when the law gives damages."). In the Petersdorff report of
the case,
Eldon is said to have prefaced his ruling by stating that
the jurisdiction of this court was founded on this principle, that where the law
will not afford a complete remedy to literary property when invaded, this court
may lend its assistance ... But then this court will only interfere, where [the
plaintiff] can by law sustain an action for damages, equal to the injury he has
sustained. He might then come here to make his legal remedy more effectual.
But if the case be one which it is not clear will sustain an action at law, then this
court will not give him the relief he seeks.
PETERSD., supra note 128, at 592. Eldon concluded that, despite the wider dissemination that may
result, "entertaining a rational doubt upon some parts of the work as to their being directed
against the truth of scripture, he would not continue this injunction, but the plaintiff might apply
for another after he had cleared away that doubt in a court of law." Id. at 560. That account then
detailed extant case authorities on this subject, admitting that anticipated wider dissemination of
the harmful works was an acceptable cost of maintaining an established principle of law "that
there can be no property in what is injurious" and that a publisher always had the option of
issuing editions at more competitive prices. Id. at 561.
142 Roach v. Garran, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep.
683 (Ch.).
143 (1826) 172 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.). The Stockdale
case was actually comprised of two hearings,
the initial one in which the plaintiff requested an injunction and was nonsuited nisi by
Abbott,
C.J. in Stockdak v. Onwhyn, (1826) 172 Eng. Rep. 75 (KB.) and a second (Stockdale I), in which
plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing and was denied nisi prius en banc. There were three published
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likewise been bracketed with Eldon's chancery rulings as important in
establishing the Clean Hands Doctrine in equity, if only because it seemed a
straightforward application of the broader principle that copyright protection
could not be accorded to works of illicit tendency. Bookseller Joseph Onwhyn
and others were accused of pirating Stockdale's salacious serialization of The
Memoirs of Harriette Wilson, for which Stockdale claimed copyright under the
Statute of Anne and, unlike the plaintiffs of the Eldon cases, sued directly for
damages at law.144 In the initial hearing, Chief Justice Abbott, citing the
authority of Priestley, Walcot, Southey, Fores, and Hime, ruled nisi that the plaintiff
had no legal right to sell literary work in which he claimed copyright if it were
criminal in nature, effectively denying it any market value upon which damages
could be claimed.' 45 However, unlike Priestley, in which Eyre had only intimated
the potential criminality of the works at issue, Abbott declared Stockdale's work
ineligible for protection and refused his motion for a retrial, stating that the law
does not protect works calculated to harm the public and finding the works
illicit in nature.146 Court rulings, he concluded, must be:
taken with one object, with a view to enforce the common law of
the land, which altogether prohibits the publication of such
infamous works ... [and] . . . independent of all authority and all

precedent, it is our duty to declare, that the infamous work, for

reports of the retrial hearing, the first reproduced at (1826) 172 Eng. Rep. 76 (K.B.), dated
January 28, 1826, including extensive editor's notes citing the text of the Statute of Anne and
interpretive vignettes of Pnestley, Walcot, Southey, and Bell v. Walker, (1785) 28 Eng. Rep. 1235
(Ch.). The retrial hearing was also reported in somewhat greater length by Barnewall and
Cresswell, reprinted in (1826) 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B.) [hereafter Stockdale II-BC], and even most
elaborately by Dowling and Ryland, published independently and not reprinted in the ENGLISH
REPORTS, cited as 7 DoWL. & R. 625 (1826) [hereafter Stockdale II-RD].
144 Stockdale I-RD, supra note 66, at 75. Memoirs was a journalistic account of a courtesan in the
higher circles of London society and was initially published by Stockdale in thirty installments
between February and late August 1825, during which the author blackmailed noted persons for
the privilege of not being mentioned in future issues. It was arguably both immoral in narrative
and libelous in its identification of the courtesan's liaisons, but despite publication in numerous
installments, Stockdale was never prosecuted for publication of an obscene libel, perhaps because
of the range of notables involved.
145 Id
14 Id. at 76 ("This is a work that the law will not protect ... Every one who comes to seek the
protection of the law for his property, must shew that property to be worthy of that
protection ... [unlike works that have objectionable passages but a good general tendency] this
work is professedly bad, and cannot be defended in any way.").
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the base profits of which the plaintiff in this case has brought his
action, is entitled to no protection in a court of law.147
Whether Abbott intended to thereby disqualify all copyright in the work on
general principle or to more narrowly deny damages because a market value
could not be ascertained and remained an open and critical question.
In his petition for a rehearing, Stockdale's barrister pressed straight to that
central point: whether copyright protection under statute or common law was
intended to be content-neutral. He argued that "it is one thing to refuse the
special protection of an injunction, and another to say that there can be no
property in such a book."48 With respect to Priestley specifically, he argued that
evidence related to the contents of that plaintiff's lost manuscripts was clearly
inadmissible and that Eyre's dictum was not entitled to doctrinal weight.149 The
barrister concluded that the equity cases cited as authority only reflected
consideration of the relative propriety of granting an injunction on a case-bycase basis.1s0 Abbott, however, held firm, ruling that the plaintiff could not
have property in the work at hand, but he seemingly retreated to the
precondition that plaintiff must first have the right to sell it.1st Only Justice
147 Stockdale II-RD, supra note 66, at 632. In this manner, Abbott summarily dismissed the
authority of all prior rulings that may have qualified the principle that the court will not support
works of illicit nature, saying "The decisions of the courts of Equity are no authorities either to
lead or restrain us in forming our own judgment on a question like this," id. at 631, a statement
not included in the two published nominate reports, which had edited out Abbott's conclusion
and his statement that the action cannot be maintained. Ironically, in a related damages suit
argued in Common Pleas, Stockdale's printer, seeking payment for installments of Memoirs already
printed, was also nonsuited based on Stockdale's argument that the printer could not recover
because of "the pernicious tendency of the work," on Best, C.J.'s ruling that "no person who has
contributed his assistance to the publication of such a work, can recover in a Court of Justice any
compensation for labour so bestowed. . . No man can doubt the double object of this work, the
corruption of youth .. . and the extortion of money from exalted individuals." Poplett v.
Stockdale, (1825) 171 Eng. Rep. 1041 (C.P.) 1041.
148 Stockdale II-BC, supra note 66.
In the Dowling and Ryland report of the rehearing,
Brougham's argument was recorded with perhaps more precision: "[t]he property in the work is
the same, whether the work itself is good or bad ... the question here, however, is, whether such
a work is wholly unentitled to protection in a court of law ... no such decision has even yet been
come to." Stockdale lf-DR, supranote 66, at 626.
149 Stockdale II-BC, supra note 66, at 65 ("[flt is plain that the dictum of Eyre,
C.J. was not well
founded in law.").
150 Stockdale II-DR, supra note 66, at 630 ("They only shew that
the granting or refusing an
injunction in cases of this kind, was never considered as deciding the legal question of copyright
one way or the other; but merely as the exercise of a discretionary equitable power, leaving the
question of right and property at common law untouched. That question, at common law, has
never yet been decided.").
151 Id. ("Before he can maintain such an action, he must establish
his right to sell such a work;
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Littledale addressed the issue forthrightly, perhaps for the first time in a
copyright ruling based on the Statute of Anne. While agreeing to the portrayal
of the work as unfit, he alluded directly to the intent of the Statute of Anne to
encourage learning and concluded that Memoirs not only defeated but also
disgraced that purpose.152 In that manner, Littledale overcame the sheer
arbitrariness of the Burnett ruling and opened consideration of whether a literary
work, to be accorded copyright protection under the Statute of Anne, had to
first demonstrate that it did in fact contribute to the encouragement of learning
and, by implication, whether the Statute intended protection for all duly
registered works.
That took the issue to an entirely different level. As the defense correctly
maintained, the record was decidedly mixed in the weight of authority that
might be accorded to prior cases at equity; the admissibility of evidence
regarding the nature of works at issue; the shades of immorality found in very
similar works; and the propriety of awarding injunctions in cases that would
53
Some works were
surely result in a proliferation of copies of the works.
denied copyright protection based on a careful inspection of their content,
while others were granted protection without inspection based on counsel's
54
It was clearly an area of unsettled
assurances that the works were innocent.
been uneasily juxtaposed upon
had
maxims
and
principles
equitable
as
law,
that were unfit for public
works
of
types
about
summary conclusions
for if he cannot be allowed to sue for the sale of that, which he has by law no right to sell
himself."). In effect, this substantiated Eldon's approach, leaving open the prospect that
Stockdale could establish market value by selling the work, but doing so would expose Stockdale
himself to criminal prosecution. However, the point was moot, as Memoirs had already been
issued in multiple installments, in effect had an established market value, and had not been
prosecuted, if only because of public sensitivity regarding those notables who would be publicly
exposed when Memoirs was inevitably read in court and excerpted at length in the daily
newspapers.

IAIN McCALmAN, RADICAL UNDERWORLD: PROPHETS, REVOLUTIONARIES AND

PORNOGRAPHERS IN LONDON, 1795-1840, at 222-23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (describing
the use of yet unpublished Harriette Wilson material to blackmail important public figures)
152 Stockdale II-DR, supranote 66, at 632-33.
153 Stockdale II-BC, supra note 66, at 65. Note that at the time, the presumption was that
proliferation would result in either case fueled by the publicity of the trial.
154 Unlike the Chancery court rulings in Walcot v. Walker (1802) and Murry v. Benbow (1822), in
which injunctive relieve was refused after a first-hand reading of the works at issue, ex parte
injunctions were granted in Murray v. Dugdale (1823) regarding Byron's Beppo and Byrn v. Hodgson
(1823) regarding Byron's Don Juan I/I-TVII without a review of the works, based on assurances
that there was nothing objectionable in them and that injunctive relief had not been denied
previously. In virtually every case during the Eldon tenure, the court made it clear that when
there was reasonable doubt, a law court would grant damages; injunctive relief could be
considered only after a ruling by the law court that property existed in the works, as reported in
27 L.Q.R. 123, 128-30 (1822).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol20/iss2/2

48

Alexander: Evil Angel Eulogy: Reflections on the Passing of the Obscenity De

2013]

EVILANGEL EULOGY

257

distribution. Could this all be swept away if the Statute of Anne were
interpreted as a broad, content-neutral incentive to all authors?
In a general sense, attributing to Lord Eldon the seminal role in establishing
the Clean Hands Doctrine as a fixed principle in equity, or more specifically in
cases of copyright infringement, is perhaps overly generous (or condemning,
depending on one's point of view). During his tenure in the chancellorship and
immediately preceding it, a wide range of rulings in equity and law, other than
Priestley and not relying upon it explicitly, questioned whether a plaintiff could
claim property in materials obtained in an illegal fashion or involving libelous
content. 55 If we single out cases in which the works at issue were considered
immoral, libelous, or otherwise suspect and were potentially disqualified for
copyright protection, a number of much earlier chancery rulings come to the
fore as suitably illustrative of the principle, though they were not yet considered
authorities at the time.156 In fact, it can be argued that the broad principles of

1ss See, e.g.,Cary v. Faden, (1799) 1 Eng. Rep. 453 (Ch.);
Cary v. Longman, (1801) 170 Eng. Rep.
613 (K.B.); Fores v. Johnes, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654 (K.B.); Hime v. Dale, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep.
1070 (K.B.) (in which the defense argued that song lyrics claiming copyright had "mischievous
tendency" that denied them legal protection and the court agreed to retry); Cary v. Kearsley,
(1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.) (establishing the "animus furandi" or "good faith" standard for
measuring the intent of the publisher of questionable works); Cadman v. Homer, (1810) 34 Eng.
Rep. 221 (Ch.) (in which "misrepresentation [in an agreement] disqualifies [the plaintiff] from
calling for the aid of a Court of Equity; where he must come, as it is said, with clean hands.");
Dubost v. Beresford, (1810) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Ch.) (in which the court accepted the portrayal
of plaintiff's destroyed painting as libelous as cause to rule that the plaintiff had no artistic
property in it other than the canvas and the paints); Gale v. Leckie, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 588
(K.B.) (in which the defendant argued his contracted performance, producing a manuscript that
criticized both the government and the Pope, would have made him criminally liable if published,
an argument that was dismissed when he failed to provide documentary evidence of his liability);
Byron v. Dugdale, (1823) 1 L.J. Ch. 239 (Ch.); Poplett v. Stockdale, (1825) 171 Eng. Rep. 1041
(C.P.) (in which the plaintiff sought to recover expenses from publisher Stockdale related to the
printing of a salacious work, which the publisher himself successfully argued was pernicious;
therefore, the plaintiff could not seek assistance at law).
156 Burnett v. Chetwood, (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.). See Bailer
v. Watson, cl1/1739/34
(Ch. 1737) (regarding a play that had been banned from the stage as immoral but registered under
Anne and subsequently protected by chancery injunction); James R. Alexander, Richardson and
Copyright, 59 NoTEs & QUERIES 219 (2012) (describing the piracies of Richardson's novel
PAMELA); Roach v. Garvan, (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch.) 684 (regarding the publication of
libelous letters casting aspersions upon affidavits filed in court, for which the court found the
publisher in contempt: "[nlothing is more incumbent upon courts of justice, than to preserve
their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there any thing of more pernicious
consequence, than to prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in
causes . . . ."); see also Trusler v. Murray, (1789) 102 Eng. Rep. 140 (KB.) (defense argued that as
defendant and plaintiff had engaged in unauthorized publication of the same work, obviating the
plaintiff's claim to infringement was obviated).
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the Doctrine were in fact laid out by Hardwicke in the eighteenth century and
57
were simply declared governing by Eldon sixty years later.
This understanding would imply that the rulings from the Eldon period
were, in effect, the capstone in the doctrinal evolution of clean hands. Yet the
jurisprudential trend lines had already begun shifting away from prosecuting
those who published works containing seditious or blasphemous sentiments.
58
By the early nineteenth century, more and more such prosecutions failed,
which perhaps suggests that the Eldon rulings instead marked the swan song of
the doctrine. Until that time, writings embracing cultural freedom and political
reform were considered legally conjoined, equally transgressive, and threatening,
and yet juries progressively balked when asked to convict publishers based on
59
the presumption that the very nature of their words caused harm to society.'
After Peterloo, radicals pressing for political reform branched off from written
tracts into more overt tactics, initially organizing mass rallies, which were
heavily suppressed by the government, then retreating to smaller factional

groups.1 60 At that point, the rulings in Priestley, Walcot, and even Southey would

157 See Clyde Croft, Lord Hardnicke's Use of Precedent in Equiy, in LEGAL RECORD AND
HISTORICAL REALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE

CARDIFF 1987, at 121-55 (Thomas Watkin ed., 1987). Like Eldon, Hardwicke was also suspected
of having a bias against publishers of illicit works, manifest in his apparent desire to broaden the
scope of obscenity prosecutions beyond those traditionally referred to the ecclesiastical courts.
This was traced back to his prosecution of Edmund Curll as Attorney General Philip Yorke.
However, Curll's most egregious offense may have been the seditious nature of his publication of
the Memoirs of John Ker, rather than the more notoriously immoral Venus in the Cloister. The
prosecution of the latter was instigated by the Secretary of State rather than by Yorke. That
Yorke focused his prosecution on Venus and other publications probably reflected his own
calculation of the greater likelihood of gaining a conviction rather than a moral crusade. See
Rogers & Baines, supra note 34, at 190-91.
158 See Philip Harling, The Law of Libel and the Limits of Repression, 1790-1832, 44 HIST. J. 107
(2001).
1s9 Michael Lobban, From Sedious libel to Unlawful Assembly: Peterloo and the Changing Face of
82 0
, 10 OxFORD J. LEG. STUD. 307, 330-32 (1990) (describing the
Political Crime c1770-1
difficulties in determining a "seditious effect" from highly interpretive materials, often reduced to
questions of how the materials were distributed and at what cost, and the degree to which either
brought them within the reach of the lower cases).
160See id. at 310-27 (describing the erosion of prosecutions for seditious libel and the passage of
the Fox Liberal Act); Robert Poole, The March to Peterloo: Politics and Festivity in Late GeoTian
England, 192 PAST & PRESENT 109 (2006) (describing the fragmentation of the reformist
movement after government repression, escalating prosecutions for sedition rather than seditious
libel). "Peterloo" was a popular reference to the mass assembly of over 60,000 at St. Peter's
Fields in Manchester on August 16, 1819, at which the reformist speakers were arrested and local
militia on horseback attacked the crowd with sabers drawn, resulting in seventeen killed and over
600 injured. The attack signaled a radicalization of political protest, from the reformist pleadings
of individual writers like Paine or even Byron to mass gatherings that precipitated rash
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have seemed to reflect a doctrinal backwater, in many ways similar to Burnett,
destined for obscurity and only vaguely illustrative of equitable principles.
Perhaps Eldon sensed this when he deferred issues of content, intent, and
effect to the courts at law.
What remained unclear was the jurisprudential path the Doctrine would take
regarding writings of an immoral-rather than political or irreligious-nature.
That path would inevitably lead to an intersection with criminal prosecution for
obscene libel and the question of whether such writings warranted copyright
protection. This was likewise an area of shifting legal ground, as the court
struggled to balance the commercial popularity of such works with the clearly
transgressive quality of their passages or underlying narratives. While many
allegedly immoral tracts were naked commercial attempts to titillate public
curiosity, 161 some authors calculatingly adapted their works to more
conventional literary styles-classical narratives, imaginative debates among
mythological figures, fantasy motifs, general commentary, satire, parody-with
which juries were familiar and might have been reticent to find immediately
threatening to social values.162 This shift of doctrinal focus away from
politically sensitive tracts and toward culturally immoral narratives was most
graphically illustrated in Eldon's time by the legal travails of two of the
nineteenth century's most famous romantic poets-Lord Byron and Percy
Bysshe Shelley.
V. STRUGGLING WITH THE AMBIGUITIES OF LITERARY CONTENT AND FORM

Reformists commonly claimed that Lord Eldon prejudicially followed his
personal biases when considering copyright claims regarding works, the nature
and tendency of which were to entice abandonment of mainstream political,
religious, or cultural values. After all, he had been and still was a chief
government spokesman, had drafted and presented legislation suppressing
dissident opinions, publications and gatherings, and had served as prosecutor in
the famous 1794 treasons trials (in which Eyre had served as Chief Justice).163

governmental reprisals and the outlawing of reformist meetings and parades. Ironically, the rally
had outfitted itself in the traditional cultural tapestry and music of the season and region,
seemingly sufficient to avoid suspicion of revolutionary tendencies, but the sheer size and
spontaneity of the gathering spooked local authorities into overreacting to its potential danger.
161See MCCALMAN, supra note 151 (describing the growth of the underground press and its
gradual shift in content from revolutionary sedition to outright pornography).
162See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
163 See Pfau, supra note 72 (describing the role Eldon played in prosecuting sedition trials in the
early 1790s).
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So, the question arises whether Eldon's referral of questionable works to the
court of law was following the authority of procedural rules established in
Hardwicke's time or was simply prejudicial against certain types of works.
Given that most copyright claims regarding such works were subsequently
abandoned if directed by chancery to law, law courts thereafter followed the
presumption that Eldon was, in effect, rendering a final decree rather than a
referral. This rendered his rulings substantive, rather than procedural, in
authority and supported the axiom that he himself had often voiced: that works
of such tendency could not be accorded equitable support. This was evidenced
by his reputed prejudice in equity claims regarding the literary works of Byron
and Shelley, assumedly based on his antipathy toward the amoral nature of their
poetic narratives and their scandalous personal lives. In many ways, this
reflected more the anti-establishment sentiments of Byron and Shelley
themselves, rather than any public pronouncements by Eldon regarding their
In retrospect, Eldon's consideration of their works at equity was
writings.'1
more nuanced, reflecting more the ways the unclean hands defense had become
doctrinally accepted in such a counter-intuitive and incomplete fashion.
The earlier works of Byron and Shelley were popular in large measure
because of their clever amoral flirtation with the boundaries of blasphemous
(and immoral) libel and their veiled but obvious criticism of suppressive
legislation and pro-government criminal prosecutions.165 Byron's earlier works
were also published anonymously, a clear indication that the author feared
government or private prosecution, which made his works a little "dangerous"
and thereby more alluring to the reading public. 166 On the other hand, most of
Shelley's works were not commercially published during his lifetime but instead
164 Shelley made his view known publicly in a letter to EXAMINER (London). See infra note 215
and accompanying text. However, Byron's antipathy toward Eldon, only privately expressed until
revealed in posthumous publication of his private letters, was evidenced not only in his antigovernment narratives but also in his privately expressed anticipation that any litigation, at law or
equity, that raised concerns about the seditious or blasphemous tendencies of his works might
compromise any further claim for paternal rights to his daughter. Byron's daughter had become a
ward in chancery in April 1817 as a result of Byron's legal separation from his wife in a hearing
before Lord Eldon, arising from the same reasons why Shelley had lost custody of his children
that same year: an immoral lifestyle. See Peregrine Simon, Lord Eldon and the Poets, 10 KEATSSHELLEY REV. 243, 262-64 (1996).
165 See Hugh J. Luke, Jr., The Pubkshing of Bymns Don Juan, 80 PMLA 199 (1965) (chronicling

the publication and piracies of DON JUAN and the various copyright infringement claims pressed
by Byron's publishers from 1819 through 1823); lain McCalman, Unrespectable Radicalism: Infidels
and Pornographyin Ear#Nineteenth-Centug London, 104 PAST & PRESENT 74 (1984) (describing the
litigation history against the most prolific pirate booksellers of the period, including Benbow and
Dugdale).
166 See ST CLAIR, supra note 49.
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were available largely through private distribution of self-published pieces or
compilations, leaving the satisfaction of growing market demand entirely to
unauthorized issues.' 67 Authorial anonymity left both without standing to sue
for copyright infringement unless they wished to establish their property in a
work at law before claiming copyright infringement. Thus, the works of both
Byron and Shelley were widely pirated and distributed at radically cheaper
prices, making them accessible to the broader reading public far beyond the
literary rich and flooding the market with a range of different editions.168 This,
in turn, increased the works' exposure and popularity, creating even more
demand for pirates to satisfy.' 69 While both had ample grounds to file
copyright infringement claims under common law, both balked, fearful that a
finding at law (or even at equity) that their works would legally compromise
their claims of paternity rights.170
The question of whether a work's illicit nature rendered it ineligible for
copyright protection would have been an easy matter with regard to the bulk of
cheap radical or pornographic fare available in the marketplace.' 7' But the
works of Byron and Shelley were different, cast in a sophisticated and
conventional literary motif more akin to classic poetic works and appealing to
different reading publics-the literary aristocracy as well as those with radical
political or cultural inclinations. In chancery, this raised the prospect that a
work of classical literary style, which would present a prima facie claim of
copyright infringement, might nonetheless be considered ineligible for relief
because it might be subject to prosecution for immoral tendencies. Such a
work was then both literary and unconventional in underlying narrative, if not
text. If directed to law on the issue of property value, a jury would be asked to
consider the literary value of the works, which, if conventionally classical in
style and form, would be assumed to advance learning, as long as its text was
duly deferential to institutional values and was confined in its distribution to the
more learned classes. The jury would then be asked to weigh that against a
claim of imminent danger portended by extending access of such works to the
167 Id. at 317-20.
168

Id.

169 Id. at 307-38 & App'x 11.

For Byron's works, the discounted price of the pirated
"common" issues was from a quarter to a tenth of the price of the elegant first official edition.
For Shelley's works, it is more difficult to establish a level of discount since most of his works
were, published privately rather than commercially, and virtually all of the copies on the market
were pirated issues. Similarly, Southey's Wat Tyler was never commercially published by the
author but was widely pirated from an unpublished manuscript and was reputed to have sold
60,000 copies in its first year of distribution. Id. at 318.
170 See supranote 117 and accompanying text; see also infra note 206 and accompanying
text.
171 See supra note 161 (describing the proliferation of cheap pornographic
materials).
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lower classes that were more susceptible to narrative challenges to bedrock
Piracies compounded the dilemma by feeding and
values of society.
manipulating the emerging demand from the less well-heeled readership.
A. BYRON'S CAIN AND DON JUAN

Of the literary figures of his day, Byron had perhaps the longest and most
varied record at chancery, in large measure due to his prolific production and
immediate commercial success over a decade 72 that made his works highly
attractive for literary piracy.'73 Their popularity was rooted in his satire of the
rigidness of prevailing cultural values and the insensitivity of government to the
interests of the people, an almost blatantly populist appeal, and yet they were
also appreciated for their sophisticated literary style. That combination of
radical satire and classical literary style rendered them neither fish nor fowl.
These works were couched in complex lyrical and often creative verse,
mainstream, if obscure, and restrictive within discursive circles.174 Yet these
works contained an underlying narrative, if not phraseology, that danced
perilously close to private and sometimes government prosecution. 75
172Byron's celebrity rode the wave of popularity of oriental tales and foreign travelogues of the
time, from which he was often accused of plagiarizing and which he countered by arguing his
tales were semi-autobiographical. See Peter W. Graham, Byron and the Business of Publishing,in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BYRON 27-43 (Drummond Bone ed., 2004) (describing the
marketing of Byron's works to take advantage of the public's expanding appetite for romantic
narratives in exotic places); Dan Albergotti, Playing the Audience; or, How Byron and Murray Sold The
Corsair, in XIII POsTSCRIPT 57-66 (1996) (describing how publisher Murray marketed THE
CORSAIR). Nonetheless, there is no doubt that he was perhaps the most widely read author of the
romantic period, in large measure due to the saturation of the market with cheap pirated issues.
ST CLAIR, supranote 49, at 133-34.
173 As stated above, Byron insisted on author anonymity for his earlier works, making it unlikely
he would file any claims for copyright infringement. During this period, the term "piracy" was
used to refer to any unauthorized publication of a work for which the legal copyright could be
claimed under common law, including unpublished works such as manuscripts, journals, or
private correspondence, or works covered under the Statute of Anne. Arguably, one could not
"pirate" (or steal the value of) a literary work for which damages could not be claimed at law, e.g.,
works which were illegal to publish and distribute/sell. Stockdale II-DR, supra note 143. For this
reason, chancery courts typically required a plaintiff to first establish his property in a literary
work at law since injunctive relief might subsequently implicate the court in the work's illicitness
and compromise the legitimacy of the judicial process. In all of the copyright infringement cases
discussed in this Article, criminality, while often intimated or assumed, had not yet been
established before a jury, so the term "piracy" remains broadly appropriate.
174 See general# GARY DYER, BRITISH SATIRE AND THE POLITICS OF STYLE, 1789-1832, at 39-66

(1997) (discussing how Byron's writings were encrypted in discursive language to address selected
audiences without becoming overtly libelous).
175 Id. While Byron's works were widely considered libelous, blasphemous, and/or borderline
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Complicating any consideration of infringement claims at chancery was Byron's
early practice of consigning his publication rights to others, notably John
Murray and later John Hunt.176 It fell to these men, rather than Byron, to argue
the property right against the initial waves of literary piracy. As a result, the
copyright record on Byron's works is scattered, with several infringement claims
bearing Murray's name as plaintiff.'77 Those claims identifying Byron as the

seditious, criminal prosecution was only once aimed at a piece by Byron-Hunt's publication of
Byron's essay The Vision of ugement. Hunt published this burlesque of Southey's eulogy of King
George III in his new radical magazine, THE LIBERAL in 1822, gave rise to R. v. Hunt, (1824) 2 St.
Tr. (N.S. 100) (K.B.), reported in the TIMEs (London), no. 12085, Jan. 16, 1824, at 2. Hunt's
indictment for seditious libel was filed by a private society with connections to the government
and was considered frivolous from the outset. In a raucous trial in which the entire piece was
read into the record and inevitably published in the local newspapers, thereby expanding its
scandalous effect, Abbott, C.J. declared "the whole being read, he [Abbott] should be wanting in
his duty if he did not declare his abhorrence at the tone of impiety which pervaded it." Id. at 3.
In the process, Abbott so conflated the issues of personal and seditious libel that Hunt was
convicted for casting personal disgrace upon the dead King, which was ruled a libel against his
successor and hence criminally seditious. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and after a lengthy
delay in sentencing, Hunt paid a fine dwarfed by the profits gained from the sale of the issue.
176 Graham, supra note 172, at 33-34 (describing the nine-year relationship
between Byron and
publisher John Murray, which ended when the moralistic tastes of the English reading public
turned against Byron's anti-establishment writings and Murray declined his option to publish Don
Juan VI-VII). Financially well-off, Byron had consigned the copyrights to several of his earlier
works to friend and advisor Robert Charles Dallas. However, when Byron learned that Dallas
was simply selling the consigned rights to Murray, Byron began to sell his own consignments, first
to Murray and later to John Hunt. Id. Given Byron's popularity, the consignments were not
small-Murray was said to have paid Byron almost C20,000 over the nine-year period in which he
served as Byron's publisher. See ST CLAIR, supra note 49, at 162.
177 In Murray v. Elliston, (1821) 106 Eng. Rep. 1331 (Ch.) 1331, Eldon
had granted a temporary
injunction against a play based on Byron's Marnino Faiero, Doge of Venice, as reported in 79 EUR.
MAG. & LONDON REV. 437 (May 1821). After a full hearing, he dissolved the injunction and
referred the question of property to the law court, where Abbott ruled without explanation that
Murray had no right to relief, after which Murray abandoned the complaint. Murray, 106 Eng.
Rep. at 1331. In Murray v. Benbow, C13/1743/26 (Feb. 1822), regarding unauthorized publication
of Byron's Cain, A Mysteg, Eldon had initially observed "that although he had not read
the work,
he had reason to believe, from what he had heard, that it was of a nature to preclude his
interference. . ." TIMES (London), no. 11475, Feb. 8, 1822, at 4. While apparently declining to
grant an injunction "until [he] should know something more about the work," Eldon nonetheless
served notice on the defendant, who then chose not to appear or provide documentation. TIMES
(London), no. 11477, Feb. 11, 1822, at 4. In the end, Eldon had apparently read the work in the
interim and refused to grant the injunction, acknowledging that while the refusal could cause
wider dissemination of the questionable work, the remedy for that rested elsewhere (the law
courts). TIMEs (London), no. 11479, Feb. 13, 1822, at 3. In Murray v. Dugdak, C13/1754/36 (Ch.
1823), as reported in TIME-s (London), no. 11931, July 23, 1823, pg. 3 and EXA1NER
(London),
no. 809, July 27, 1823, at 492, Eldon granted an injunction against the piracy of Byron's Beppo
based upon assurances of the text's innocence, assumedly with respect to Byron's other works of
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plaintiff after he abandoned authorial anonymity that characterized his earlier
78
One of these
works were argued on his behalf while he was living abroad.'
179
Finally, there was an
was not a case of copyright infringement at all.
inestimable number of infringement claims that may have been feigned and that
never reached a hearing, while others were filed but subsequently not
challenged.' 80
While many of Byron's works contained harshly satirical and possibly
libelous' 81or scandalously unconventional (homo)erotic passages, his notoriety
more notoriety. At the same time, Murray sought legal advice on the prospect of initiating a
claim against Joseph Onwhyn for unauthorized publication of Byron's Don Juan, Cantos I-II but
ultimately did not when, to document his property in the work, he would have had to divulge
Byron's reputed, but not publicly acknowledged, authorship. See Katz, supra note 128, at 11-13.
178Byron v. Hodgson, (1823) 37 Eng. Rep. 929 (Ch.) n.1, Byron v. Dugdale, 1823 I.L.J. Ch. 239
(Ch.), Byron v. Cawthom, C13/1684/2 (Ch. 1816), and Byron v. Sherwin, C13/1722/9 (Ch. 1820) all
involved claims regarding works in which the literary content was not at issue. In Cawthorn,
Murray gained an uncontested injunction against the publisher of the first four editions of
Byron's satirical Engish Bards and Scotch Reiewers, who had proceeded with an unauthorized fifth
edition, which Byron wished to suppress because he considered its satirical references too harsh,
perhaps libelous, and a possible threat to his guardianship of his daughter. Simon, supra note 164,
at 261-62. When the injunction against a fifth edition was granted, prices on remaining copies of
the third and fourth editions soared, and Cawthorn proceeded to reprint backdated copies of
those, as many as 20,000 over his consignment. Ironically, Cawthorn himself had gained an
injunction against an Irish publisher who had issued a pirated edition of the earlier issue. See ST
CIAIR, supra note 49, at 164. In Sherwin, Byron's counsel argued that while Sherwin was
authorized to republish a first edition of Byron's Hours of Idleness, he had published a second
edition without authorization, and an affidavit to that effect was sufficient to gain an ex parte
injunction, which Sherwin did not contest. Katz, supra note 128, at 15-16.
179 Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch.); 2 Mer. 28, in which Murray successfully gained
an uncontested injunction against the publication of poems misleadingly advertised as authored
by Byron. Murray argued, in effect, that the poet's name and reputation alone constituted
property subject to court protection.
180 It was not unusual for an author or publisher with consigned rights to give notice of an
intention to file an infringement claim, hoping the accused pirate would simply withdraw his issue
without contest, saving the author the expense of even filing the claim. Even when a claim was
filed and a temporary injunction granted with notice, a pirate would often simply not respond,
leaving the injunction in place in perpetuity. In some cases, Byron was reticent to make claims,
still wary that public examination of the content of the works would adversely affect his
guardianship rights. For example, two of Byron's unpublished (but privately printed) poems
associated with his scandalous marital separation were published in THE CHAMPION on April 14,
1816, and in the EXAMINER (London) on April 21, 1816, yet he sought no copyright protection
under common law. Lord Byron's Poems on His Own Domestic Circumstances, THE CHAMPION, no.
171, April 14, 1816, at 113, 117-18, microformed on Early English Newspapers, Unit 31, The
Champion, 1816-17 (Research Publications); Distressing Circumstances in High Life, EXAMINER
(London), no. 434, April 21, 1816, at 241, 247-50, microformed on 7E Examiner nos. 419-522,
1816-17 (Univ. Microfilms).
181 Byron's earlier hesitancy regarding potential suits for libel, exhibited in his desire to suppress

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol20/iss2/2

56

Alexander: Evil Angel Eulogy: Reflections on the Passing of the Obscenity De

2013]

EVIL ANGEL EULOGY

265

among the reading public was principally established by the publication of Cain,
A Mystery in 1821, the serialization of Don Juan, Cantos I-II (starting in July
1819), and Cantos III-V (December 1821). The latter two contained graphic
(for the period) images of libertine behavior in a Turkish harem.182 With an eye
toward marketability, Byron became somewhat more temperate in his later
works and yet, regardless of their lesser measure of controversial narrative or
verse, the public simply expected the writings to be similarly provocative, which
made them more marketable and, at the same time, equally suspect.183
a fifth edition of Engsh Bards and Scottish Reviewers, did not extend to his running sardonic feud
with Robert Southey. The two authors taunted each other mercilessly over the quality of each
other's works and Byron's allegedly immoral lifestyle in Pisa with Coleridge, Shelley, and others.
In 1821, in his A Vision offudgement, a eulogy to George III written as poet laureate, Southey was
not only effusive in his praise of the monarch, whom he depicted standing in judgment before St.
Peter, but also took the occasion in his preface once again to chastise those "men of diseased
hearts and depraved imaginations," to which Byron responded by challenging those qualities and
continuing his practice of referring to Southey as "the author of Wat Tyler." Introducaion to the
Vision ofJudgement, in 4 THE WORKS OF LORD BYRON 476-79 (John Murray 1901). Byron's piece
was eventually sent to John Hunt for anonymous publication in THE LIBERAL but without
corrections or the intended explanatory preface. Hunt was subsequently prosecuted for libeling
the late King and "disquieting the mind" of his successor George IV in R. v. Hunt, (1824) 2 St. Tr.
(N.S. 100) (K.B.).
182 See Colette Colligan, The Unruly Copies of Byron's Don Juan: Harems, Undetground Pnnt Culture,
and the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 59 NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERATURE 433 (2005)
(describing the emergence of "carnal poetry" and Byron's attempts to suppress unauthorized
publication of his "harem cantos" at issue in Byron v. Dugdale); RUTH BERNARD YEAZELL, HAREMS
OF THE MIND: PASSAGES OF WESTERN ART AND LITERATURE 244-48 (2000) (describing how

literary adaptations of occidental and particularly harem motifs challenged the boundaries of
acceptable publication).
183 For example, Murray filed a copyright infringement claim against a piracy of Byron's
frivolous Beppo a year following his claim regarding piracy of Byron's decidedly more outrageous
Cain. While Beppo might have been seen as exalting adultery at the expense of the sanctity of
marriage, Murray preemptively argued that it was "a work perfectly innoxious, and consists of
mere irony and fun, not containing any of that obnoxious matter that has been attributed (I do
not say how deservedly) to the greater portion of Lord Byron's works ... I assure your Lordship
[that] it is perfectly inoffensive." Murray v. Dugdale, C13/1684/2 (Ch. 1816). At that point, Eldon
seemed satisfied with that assurance, probably because Beppo had been published in eight editions
since 1818 and had not been subject to any content-based challenge at law. Robert
Mortenson,
The Copyright ofByron's 'Cain,'63PAPERS OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOc'Y OF AM. 5, 11 n.4 (1969).
Mindful of the controversial nature of Byron's other works, Eldon nevertheless granted an
injunction and pressed for immediate notice so the defendant could petition for its dissolution by
questioning the works' property value. Eldon, citing Priestley, cautioned that the law could give no
relief to publications of a particular nature-"that where the common law will not award
damages, this Court can give no injunction." Id. Eldon anticipated the criticism that by not
granting the injunction, he "open[ed] the door to a mischief much more extended in
nature ... [by] giving considerable publicity to the offensive matter," and responded that he had
no criminal jurisdiction and, as a judge, had a duty to uphold "what I take to be the law of the
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However, while there were numerous piracies of the first five cantos of Byron's
Don Juan, none were contested, leaving no trail of judicial rulings as to whether
one could legally claim property interests in them.184
To further complicate our interpretation of how Eldon handled the question
of property in Byron's works, Eldon was only directly involved in one copyright
regarding
complaint
them-Murray's
claim involving
infringement
85
unauthorized publication of Byron's Cain.1 In that hearing, the defendant
provided no response or documentation whatsoever and, as there had not been
prior hearings regarding property in the work at law, Eldon was left to
formulate an independent judgment on whether the blasphemous tendency of
86
the work precluded his injunctive interference at that stage.1 Consistent with
his past practice, Eldon refused to grant injunctive relief on the ground that the
work provided to the court could not "beyond a reasonable doubt" be certified
as "innocent," i.e. without an illicit tendency. Yet he invited the plaintiff to

land, settled for a considerable time before I came into this court . .. which opinion I shall abide
by till the legislature says I am wrong in so doing," (as reported in the EXAMINER (London), no.
809, July 27, 1823, at 492). This marked one of several instances in which Eldon referred to the
dictum announced by Eyre in Priestley as "settled law."
184 Murray's publication of Don Juan, Cantos I-I1, which listed only the printer's name, protected
all parties except the printer from criminal prosecution (he was never prosecuted) but thereby
denied the author and his consignee the legal ability to claim property in it. The book was
immediately pirated by both Joseph Onwhyn and William Sherwin, but claims were never filed
for fear of legal reprisals if Byron's authorship, though widely assumed, were publicly divulged.
Katz, supra note 128, at 13-14. Murray's refusal to claim copyright in Cantos I-II signaled to all
potential pirates that the work was fair game, which Eldon critic Nassau William Senior bluntly
anticipated when he wrote "no sooner was it whispered that there was no property in 'Don Juan,'
than ten presses were at work, some publishing it with obscene engravings, others in weekly
numbers, and all in a shape that brought it within the reach of purchasers on whom its poison
Art. I/, supra note 62, at 128. By 1823, Cantos III-V had
would operate without mitigation ....
been pirated by Onwhyn, Sherwin, and Fairburn, and the whole (Cantos I-Vinclusive) had been
pirated by Griffin, Sherwin, Dolby, Benbow, Hodgson, and Jones, but no infringement claims
were filed. ST CLAIR, supranote 49, at 683-85.
185 Murray v. Benbow, C13/1743/26 (Feb. 1822).
186 In Cain, Lucifer presents the Creator's fundamental arbitrariness and amoral insensitivity as
the cause of man's wretched condition, rendering Cain a sympathetic figure whose crime was
understandable, if not justified. See, e.g., Paul Cantor, Byron's 'Cain'.A Romantic Version of the Fall,2
KENYON REV. 50 (1980) (providing a detailed textual analysis of the Biblical references in Cain);
Peter Schock, The 'Satanism'of 'Cain' in Context: Byron's Luafer and the War on Blaphemy, 44 KEATSHELLEYJ. 182 (1995) (describing Byron's iconoclastic handling of Christian mythology as part of
the movement known as "romantic Satanism"). By any conventional understanding, Cain would
have been considered blasphemous, despite its presentation in the classical format of a
speculative dialogue between mythological figures, presented by Byron as "a drama, not a piece of
argument," Letterfrom Lord Byron to Mr. Murray, EXAMINER (London), Mar. 10, 1822, at 152, in an
effort to portray the work as literary, rather than advocacy, in intent.
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petition a court of law for damages and, if successful, to return for equitable
relief as well, indicating that while the work might not be entirely
innocent,
there could still be property in it that might warrant protection by his court.187
But Murray did not pursue his claim at law, most likely because of the long
delays manifest in gaining a judgment, during which the commercial damage to
his property in Cain would have already occurred, rendering any subsequent
injunctive relief useless.' 88
Clearly Byron's reputation as a "Satanist" colored any claims he or his
consignees may have considered filing against piracies of Don Juan.189
Ironically,
after a careful reading and taking questionable passages in context, Cantos I-Il
may well have passed Eldon's "reasonable doubt" standard and qualified for
injunctive relief had they not been immediately blanketed by William Hone's
hyper-satirical publications. His "Don John" or Don Juan Unmasked, was a critical
review with lengthy excerpts exposing Byron as the author and Murray as the
publisher.190 Hone's own Don juan, Canto the Third, an ostensibly London-based
continuation published shortly after the Peterloo massacre, intimated, however
unfairly, that Don Juan might be seen as a veiled radical tract.' 91 When Murray
187 While there was no published nominate report for
Murry v. Benbow, two nominate reporters
of stature, Edward Jacob and John Walker, took notes at the hearing, which became the
only
source for the reasoning behind Eldon's ruling and which were subsequently published
in
Murray's QUARTERLY REVIEW. Art. I/7,supra note 62, at 128-30. Accordingly, while Eldon's
refusal to grant an injunction involved substantive conclusions about the nature of the work,
it
can be interpreted as a procedural judgment that the work was sufficiently questionable to
deny
an injunction at that time, even though Eldon acknowledged that it may lead to wider
dissemination. However, his reasoning was again cautiously structured-Eldon stated that
the
primary remedy for copyright infringement was a suit at law for damages, while maintaining
that
his court could consider the nature of the work independently only if he were satisfied beyond
a
reasonable doubt that the law court would (if asked) find property in the work.
188 Katz, supra note 128, at 19-20; Mortenson, supra
note 183, at 6-10.
189 Schock, supra note 186, at 191-98. Ironically,
Byron's works, especially Don Juan, were
actually a commentary on the decadency of a social and economic order that was in fact already
passing, rendering him somewhat pass6 as a social reformer. See Edward Dudley Hume Johnson,
Don Juan in England, 11 ENG. LITERATURE & HIsT. 135, 140-43 (1944) (discussing the emerging
sentiments of Methodism and Evangelicalism that run contrary to establishment efforts
to
suppress challenges to Anglican doctrine). On the other hand, the free morality construct of
the
harem narratives of Canto III and in places more indelicately in Cantos VI-VIII would have been
considered particularly obnoxious to the rising popularity of evangelical conservatism, which
pressed for a tightening of social moralism in reaction to the unsettling vibrancy
of
socioeconomic change in England and a sentiment with which Eldon sympathized. Id.
190 MARSH, supra note 51, at 101.
191Hone feasted frequently on the works of Byron, including publishing a cheap, unauthorized
but unchallenged issue of LordByron's Poems and The Corsairbefore issuing his satirical review, Don
John and his parody, Canto the Third. See Peter J. Manning, The Hone-ing of Byron's Corsair,
in
READING ROMANTICs: TEXTS AND CONTEXTs 216-37 (1990), and more generally, Donald
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shied away from publishing Cantos 7-VIII, concluding that they would likely
draw criminal prosecution and portended huge financial losses, Byron
92
consigned the rights to John Hunt.1 Hunt published it in three editions at
different prices, the cheapest "common" version designed to co-opt the piracy
93
It was nonetheless also pirated, first by William
market priced at one shilling.
Hodgson and later by William Dugdale, probably in anticipation of healthy
94
On
market demand based on the salacious nature of the previous cantos.1
gained
he
which
behalf of Byron, Hunt filed for an injunction against Hodgson,
from Vice-Chancellor Leach with simple assurances that there was nothing
objectionable in work and that no part of Don Juan had previously been the
95
As anticipated, Hodgson did not
subject of a request for injunctive relief.
his issue.196
withdrew
and
injunction
preliminary
contest the
Three weeks later, Hunt filed a similar claim in Byron's name against
97
Dugdale, anticipating a similarly expeditious withdrawal.1 However, Dugdale
unexpectedly contested the grant of a preliminary injunction with the
affirmative unclean hands defense, even reading numerous passages aloud in
98
the hearing which he claimed were licentious.1 Byron's barrister countered
that not a single passage was illicit in tendency or intent and likened them to
commonly accepted love songs and romantic passages found in established

Thomas, Press Prosecutions of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The Evidence of King's Bench
Indictments, 32 LIBRARIAN 315 (5th ser. 1977), documenting trends in prosecutions for sedition,
blasphemy, obscenity and defamation, in particular through the 1820s.
192 ST CLAIR, supranote 49, at 325-27.
193 Id

194 Id. at 686 (documenting the immediate pirating of Don Juan, Cantos V/-III). All of Hunt's
editions acknowledged him as the publisher but continued to honor Byron's insistence on
authorial anonymity. When the work was pirated by Hodgson within days of Hunt's issue, Byron
abandoned anonymity and initiated a copyright infringement claim against him. Byron v.
Hodgson, (1823) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.).
195 Byron v. Hodgson, as reported in TIMEs (London), no. 11928, July 19, 1823, at 3.
196 Id..

197 Byron v. Dugdale, (1823) 1 L.S. Ch. 239 (Ch.); TIMEs (London), no. 11940, Aug. 2, 1823, at 3.
198 TIMEs (London), no. 11946, Aug. 9, 1823, at 2. Dugdale argued that the work at issue was
"wholly unworthy of the protection of the court, that its tendency was immoral in the highest
sense, most calculated to effect the minds of the public, licentious, in every way dangerous, and
most destructive of the morals of the community." He also argued that the work was more
dangerous than Lawrence's lectures on physiology, litigated before Eldon in Lawrence v. Smith,
style" and
(1822) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.), because "they were written in such a warm poetic
had not
pleaded with the court to "read the work through." Id. That Dugdale a month earlier
that a
expected
he
that
indicate
might
Beppo
Byron's
of
piracy
his
against
contested an injunction
and
standard unclean hands defense would not be applicable to that work. See supra note 183
and
straits
financial
dire
in
was
Dugdale
that
(correctly)
assumed
also
was
It
text.
accompanying
unable to sustain a protracted and costly litigation.
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literary culture.'19 Such a construction, he argued, raised the prospect that only
"a corrupt and profligate mind would turn [those] expressions to an improper
sense, which a pure mind would never discover," and while the work neither
contained nor intended any corrupt meaning, "corrupt meaning could only be
implied by those who were themselves corrupt." 200 After discussing the
authority of Walcot, Southey, and Lawrence,201 Leach directed "that in the
protection of literary property, a court of equity followed a court of law," and
since most of the cases cited as authority were decided nisi, "a trial at law
should be directed to obtain a verdict of a jury." 202 He thereupon dissolved the
injunction, affording Byron "[the] opportunity of proceeding at law to recover
damages," and if he were to succeed, he would be entitled to protection of
equity court by injunction. 203

199
200

TIMES (London), no. 11946, Aug. 9, 1823, at 2.
Id. at 2, and 12 (no. 11948, at 2), 1823; MORNING CHRON. (London), Aug. 9 (no.
16944) and

10 (no. 16945), 1823.
201 Leach had inquired whether the cases the plaintiff had cited had been reported, to which
Byron's barrister replied that Southy had, and the broader point of all three (Wacot, Southy, and
Lawrence) was that the court "would look at the whole scope and tendency of the work, [not
specific passages only] and judge whether it was upon the whole a licentious and immoral book,"
[the true question being] "whether they were criminal at law. . . ." He then noted Form, Gale,
Dubost, and Hime as additional authorities, arguing "that unless the works was [sic] actually
libelous, a court of law would not refuse damages, and a court of equity, consequently, would not
refuse its protection." TIMES (London), no. 11946, Aug. 9, 1823, at 2.
202 Id.
203 Id. The TIMES responded editorially that the case revealed what
at the time was commonly
assumed-that statutory damages were generally insufficient to protect literary property and that
it fell to a court of equity to do so by injunction. Nonetheless, the TIMES countered, injunctions
were being denied "upon collateral grounds," establishing a doctrine [the Clean Hands Doctrine]
that had until then only been insinuated in Wacot and Soutby. The doctrine
derive[d] its origin from no statute, decision, or legal authority, but was founded
on a single passing observation which fell from Lord Chief Justice Eyre (in Dr.
Priestley's action against the hundred), but which was neither applied nor acted
on.
It has, however, revolutionized the state and condition of literary
property....
Id. It also criticized the court foe accepting what it considered to be a common law principle
("[B]ut we humbly desire to ask, where that principle is to be found?...that there can be no
property in a seditious, defamatory or immoral libel"'), rhetorically asking when the courts began
to accept such a charge from the mouth of a defendant who admits his criminality, "setting up his
criminality towards the public as an excuse for his villainy towards the author [] It is nothing to
say that both are libellous: if this be so, let both be prosecuted in a court of criminal law." Id.
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B. SHELLEY'S.pUEENMAB AND OTHER WORKS

The record of how the literary works of Shelley fared at equity is far more
sketchy--only one case was tried, but it did not involve a copyright claim, while
another case heard at law did not even include Shelley as a party. Both,
however, alluded to the nature of his literary work as the deciding point. The
record is further complicated by the fact that most of Shelley's works were not
published commercially in his lifetime, and whatever copies reached the reading
204
public were compliments of pirates working from privately published copies.
It is to these copies that we direct our attention, focusing primarily on Shelley's
Queen Mab; A PhilosophicalPoem; With Notes. The poem was widely pirated in
either full text and lengthy excerpts and, while generally anti-Christian and antigovernment in sentiment, was either so immersed in classic literary style and
verse or considered standard political commentary as might easily have still
passed Eldon's "reasonable doubt" standard had it come before him as an issue
of property.205 But it was Shelley's scandalous marital life and contested
guardianship of his children that brought him before Lord Eldon at chancery,
where Queen Mab and other writings were presented as evidence of his immoral
and atheistic dispositions in a child custody battle between he and his deceased
wife's parents in a manner that would indirectly solidify the acceptance of the
206
Clean Hands Doctrine at equity.

supra note 49, at 165.
Most of Shelley's politically or morally controversial works were distributed privately among
friends and filtered out into the literary world, provoking published reviews of both high praise
and scornful admonition. While they were not published during his lifetime, many were then
pirated and sold commercially, with little success. ST CLAIR, supra note 49, at 320. Besides
QUEEN MAB, one other notable exception was his Shakespearian tragedy, THE CENCI, which was
classical in both narrative and motif but was rejected for staging by numerous London theaters
because its themes of incestual rape and parricide would not pass government censorship.
Instead, it was published in book form in Italy, anticipating that printers in London would balk at
the controversial content, and sold in London without government prosecution, popular enough
to warrant a second edition in 1821. See JAMES BIERI, PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY: A BIOGRAPHY:
EXILE OF UNFULFILLED REKNOWN, 1816-1822, at 136-37 (2005) (describing publication of the
204 ST CLAIR,
205

Cenci and its reviews).
206 Shelley v. Westbrooke, (1817) 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch.) 850-52. The plaintiff, a renowned
poet, sued for permanent guardianship of his children from their maternal grandparents after the
suicide of his estranged wife. See Rousseau Burch, The Case of Shelley v. Westbrooke, 11 AM.
LAW. 339, 339-41 (1903) (describing the marital background leading to Shelley's divorce are filing
for custody). As Chancery Court had temporary guardianship over the welfare of his motherless
children, Shelley's petition came before Lord Eldon and was countered persuasively by what was
becoming a standard ex turpi causa, or unclean hands defense. The defendants argued that the
plaintiff had, by his generally immoral treatment of his wife and an extra-marital liaison that
resulted in a child out of wedlock, demonstrated his unfitness for guardianship. THOMAS
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Written in nine cantos and accompanied by fifteen philosophical (and often
anti-Christian) notes in an appendix but never commercially published, Queen
Mab fantasized a monologue by the fairy queen before a subservient listener
(and thereby the reader) in which she explained the harsh realities of the past,
present, and future. 207 Queen Mab was extravagantly published, structured in this
manner, with lengthy philosophical notes tucked in the back, such that only
persons of position and means would likely buy and display a copy (though they
would hardly be expected to read it). Shelley presumed that the more blatantly
anti-government and anti-Christian sentiments expressed in the notes would be
considered an authorial afterthought, especially as they were so esoterically
written that they would dissuade most readers from attempting to decipher
them, thereby lessening his chances of criminal prosecution for blasphemous
libel. 208 They were written, in essence, for his own select discursive community,
encrypted with coded phraseology to be ignored by all others.
Shelley had privately printed 250 copies of Queen Mab, and circulated about
seventy to friends and literati, including Byron, whose attention he valued.209

MEDWIN, THE LIFE OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY 463-86 (1913) (Appendix III Chancery Papers

related to Shelley's children by Harriett). Added to this was Queen Mab's documentation of
Shelley's publicly expressed atheistic beliefs, as it arguably contained blasphemous passages, and
Shelley's unpublished A Letter to Lord Ellenborough, a pamphlet that argued prejudice by the Chief
Justice in the blasphemous libel conviction of Daniel Isaac Eaton in 1812. Kyle Grimes, Queen
Mab, Libel, and Forms of Sheley's Poitics, 94 J. ENGL. & GERM. PHILOLOGY 1, 5-7 (1995)
(describing Shelley's caution at not publishing works that might jeopardize his paternal rights).
Eldon concluded that the children ought not to be brought up in a blasphemous and amoral
atmosphere; in effect, Shelley had petitioned for equity with "unclean hands," disqualifying him
from succeeding in what was a fairly standard paternal custody claim. Despite Shelley's
assertions, it would be too simplistic to argue bias on Eldon's part. In fact, Eldon ruled that both
parties were unsuitable and deferred to the Master to consider proposals from each of them as to
suitable third parties. Sheley, 37 Eng. Rep. at 850-51. The case ultimately settled in favor of
Shelley's second choice, with both parties contributing annual support. BIERI, supra note 205, at
26-31. After this ruling in 1817, however, writers including Byron, became reticent to claim
authorship, particularly in equity, of works of questionable nature. See Simon, supra note 164, at
244-55.
207 Byron later purposefully mirrored this discursive in CAIN. Grimes, supra note 206,
at 7-8;
Schock, supra note 186, at 186-87.
208 Gary Dyer, Thieves, Boxers, Sodomites, Poets: Being Flash to Byrn's Don Juan, 116 PMLA 562
(2001) (discussing the various discursive communities Byron addressed in different literary
dialects). See generally 2 THE COMPLETE POETRY OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY 605-13, 623-35,
638-48 (Donald H. Reiman & Neil Fraistad eds., 2000) [hereinafter 2 POETRY OF SHELLEY]
(discussing the anti-Christian sentiments in three of the notes).
209 Dyer, supra note 208, at 509-11; ST CLAIR, supra note 49, at 318. Shelley had carefully
removed the publishing information from the copies individually distributed, and the remaining
copies were stored in William Clark's bookshop in London. Assumedly, it was from the latter
storage that Clark secured a copy for pirating, and one of the private circulated copies was
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One of those copies was reviewed at some length in 1815 in The Theological
210
Inquirer, a then-new periodical to which Shelley himself likely contributed.
The next year he reshaped the first two cantos into a more veiled work: The
Daemon of the World.21 When it was submitted as evidence against his moral
character in the 1817 custody hearing, Shelley publicly denounced the work as
naive and "(f)ull of those errors which belong to youth, as far as imagery and
language and a connected plan is concerned. But it was a sincere overflowing
of the heart and mind, and that at a period when they are most uncorrupted and
pure." 212 However, this public confession did little to counter the charge that
his writings gave graphic illustration to his avowed atheistic and free-love views
and lifestyle, as offered against his fitness in the custody hearings regarding his
children by his first wife.213
More critical to the legal consideration of Queen Mab's tendencies was
William Clark's unauthorized publication of the 1813 private issue in two

entered in evidence at the custody hearing by Shelley's father-in-law, John Westbrooke in 1817.
Shelky v. Westbrooke, (1817) 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch.) 850, also as reported as Westbrook v. Shelley, in
TIMES (London), no. 11948, Aug. 12, 1823, at 2.
210 Grimes, supra note 206, at 10-11. Three of the earliest pirated versions of Oueen Mab can
be attributed to manipulations by the radical activist and publisher George Cannon, who had
secured a copy of the work from Shelley in 1815 and had published extensive excerpts of it in The
TheologicalInquirerunder the pseudonym of "Erasmus Perkins" that same year. Grimes, supra note
206, at 10-11. As a review, it would have easily escaped any copyright infringement claim under
the Statute of Anne (though perhaps not as an unpublished manuscript under common law, the
Priestley ruling notwithstanding) and, as it was carefully edited, was not prosecuted for criminal
libel. Cannon then persuaded Benbow, a struggling bookseller, to publish a full version (the socalled "New York edition"), issued in London in the summer of 1821 under a false imprint
reading only "New York, 27 October 1821" in an effort to derail any possible criminal
prosecution as a "foreign publication." See McCALMAN, supra note 151, at 152-77; Grimes, supra
note 206, at 10-11.
211 Privately printed in his ALASTOR; OR, THE SPIRIT OF SOLITUDE: AND OTHER POEMS (1816).

Daemon was still radical, but the protagonist was ostensibly apolitical and areligious Shelley was
careful to cloak his authorship of Queen Mab, but not Alastor, the first work in which he published
his name as author. See MARY QUINN, The Daemon of the World: Shelley's Antidote to the
Skepticism of Alastor, in 25 STUDIES IN ENG. LITERATURE, 1500-1900, at 755 (1985) (describing
Shelley's careful revisions in "Daemon" to avoid prosecution for blasphemous and seditious
libel); The Queen of the Universe: Shelley's Revised 'Queen Mab," in 4 SHELLEY & His CIR. 1773-1822, at
487, 497-514 (Kenneth Neill Cameron ed., 1970) (detailing the compositional reduction of
"Queen Mab" into "Daemon" for publication in Alastor).
212 TIMOTHY WEBB, SHELLEY: A VOICE NOT UNDERSTOOD

86 (1977) (quoting letter from

Percey Shelley to Mr. Waller (Nov. 22, 1817)). This lament has been the primary source of the
parallels drawn between Shelley's Queen Mab and Southey's Wat Tyler. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text. However, only Southey's work became the subject of a copyright claim in
which his earlier intent to publish became an issue.
213 MEDWIN, supra note 206.
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editions, one complete and the other expurgated, both elegant, upscale, and
distributed through the black market in 1821.214 These caused Shelley to
publish his disavowal of his earlier sentiments and to declare his intention to file
a claim at equity for an injunction, which he apparently never filed. 215 At the
same time, Clark himself was prosecuted for publishing a blasphemous libel by
the Society for the Prevention of Vice and was convicted and sentenced in
November 1822 to four months in prison. 216 Shortly thereafter, William
Benbow included extensive stanza excerpts in a review of the Clark piracy in
John Bull's BritishJoumal,after which he published his own complete piracy, the
so-called "New York edition," in October.217 Also from the 1813 copies in
storage, bookseller Richard Carlisle published his own issue in four separate
editions, and dozens of pirated editions flooded the market between 1821 and
1830, mostly after Shelley's untimely death in 1822.218
Ironically, Shelley had been persuaded to not publish Queen Mab, a text that
friends advised him was too dangerously libelous, and certainly not published in
a manner that would qualify it for copyright protection under the Statute of
Anne. 219 Nonetheless, between its small private printing and circulation among
friends in 1813 and the Clark piracy in 1821, Queen Mab developed an extensive
radical following; this was based almost entirely on published reviews and
accounts of the text drawn from testimony at Shelley's custody trial, becoming
an ersatz "Bible for Chartism," especially among radicals and the discontented
214 2 POETRY OF SHELLEY, supra note 208, at 509-10; ST CLAIR, supranote 49, at 680.

215 EXAMINER (London), July 15, 1821, no. 706 ("I regret this publication, not so much from
literary vanity, as because I fear it is better fitted to injure rather than serve the sacred cause of
freedom. I have directed my Solicitor to apply to Chancery for an injunction to restrain the sale;
but after the precedent of Mr. Southey's Wat Tler (a poem written, I believe, at the same age
[nineteen], and with the same unreflecting enthusiasm), with little hopes of success." The
reference to Southey was intentional. There is no evidence in the court record or mention by
those who reviewed court proceedings that such a claim was actually filed.).
216 Queen Mab, TIMES (London), Dec. 11, 1821, at 2. For detail of this and a dozen other
piracies based on the private copies in Clark's possession, see 2 POETRY OF SHELLEY, supra note
208, at 497-513. Less than twenty years later, respected London publisher Edward Moxon
published a four-volume compendium of Shelley's works, including Queen Mab, with the parts
cited in the Clark indictment asterisked out. Moxon's second edition however, published as a
single volume in 1840, included those reputedly illicit parts and private prosecution was brought
against him in R. v. Moxon, (1841) 4 ST. TR. 693 (Q.B.). Illustrative of the increased difficulties
gaining convictions for blasphemous libel in literary works, Moxon was convicted but never
sentenced, the jury unwilling to find illicit intent, effectively marking the end of blasphemous libel
prosecutions based on claims of atheism. See MARSH, supra note 51, at 90-98; Donald Thomas,
The ProsecutionofMoxon's "Shelley," 33 LIBRARIAN 329 (1978).
217 2 POETRY OF SHELLEY, supra note 208, at 508-12.
218 2 id. at 509-10.
219 2 id. at 491-98.
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As with Byron, Shelley's lifestyle, combined with his

professed atheism and satirical rants against governmental tyranny, had become
his public persona even before any of his writings were pirated. Associated
with others known as Satanists, Shelley's reputation alone may have been
sufficient to meet the requirement of "reasonable doubt," which Eldon used to
determine whether writings were illicit enough to be debarred from copyright
protection until property in them had been established in a damages claim at
law. 221
Then why pay any attention to Shelley at all, since he never claimed property
in his works at law or in equity? Certainly the unpublished Queen Mab would
have qualified for copyright protection under common law, notwithstanding
any public policy concerns that may have been raised by its content. More to
the point, both Byron and Shelley represented authors of literary works that
were both satirical and politically and culturally iconoclastic, and either because
of or despite that, they achieved significant popular acclaim. They had cleverly
evaded criminal prosecution by cloaking their coded narratives in sophisticated
metaphorical language and classical poetical forms sufficient to cause any jury to
question whether the works were merely presenting allegories in classical
poetical form or advocating immorality. Such adaptability revealed how
unsettled libel law was with respect to literary works, and it emboldened authors
not only to write but also to seek copyright protection for more marginal
works. 222 The Eldon practice of deferring questions of property to law, which
was previously dissuasive to plaintiffs because of the presumption that juries

220 WILLIAM ST. CLAIR, THE READING NATION IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 336 (Cambridge
U.P. 2004).
221Shelley's most critical writings, while circulated among friends, were only published
posthumously, including his Letter to Lord Ellenborough, which criticized Ellenborough's jury
direction in the 1821 trial of Daniel Eaton for blasphemous libel, while circulated among friends,
were only published posthumously; The Deril's Walk and DeclarationofRights (both in 1812), whose
distribution by hand and by mail led to the arrest of Shulley's servant, Daniel Hill; THE MASQUE
OF ANARCHY, which Shulley wrote in outraged response to the Peterloo Massacre, criticizing
government officials, including Eldon, by name; and a tract sent for publication in the EXAMINER
(London) but which the editor withheld.
n That distributor Clark was convicted does not lessen this point, since his intent to distribute
was "calculated to do harm," whereas an author's intent would be a moot point prior to
publication. The same could be observed of the present-day United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp.
2d 25 (D.D.C. 2010), in which Stagliano, like many in the commercial pornography industry,
worked a niche within the fluid, safe margin of pornographic content and insulated himself from
the distribution of his products, making prosecution unlikely. Richards & Calvert, supra note 4, at
547-60. When the OPTF prosecuted him, he was easily acquitted. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
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would find most such works objectionable, had become less threatening as the
range of acceptability of literary works became more fluid.
VI. THE LEGACY OF CLEAN HANDS IN COPYRIGHT
Reflecting on the case law from the Eldon period and before, we must
conclude that the pedigree of the Clean Hands Doctrine, and more specifically
its application to copyright law via the obscenity defense, is scattered and
ambiguous at best, causing us to reconsider the origins of its basic elements.
Both Pound and Chafee cast doubt upon whether "clean hands" ever rose to
the level of a legal maxim or principle which Pound defined as "an established
rule of the strict law."223 Often, whether a legal maxim was intended to be a
statement of law or simply "moral rules, which do not obtain as positive law,"
could only be determined after a decision had been rendered. 224 However, the
development of the Clean Hands Doctrine seems far less principled than we
might have expected. Instead, at its core appears to be a range of legal decrees
that were then reduced to a set of fixed or strict rules and adapted into equity by
absorbing its traditional obligation to restore an equitable balance among the
parties, tailored to the particulars of the specific case. Based on Francis's
compilation of equitable maxims, assumedly grounded in broader principles he
had discerned from a scattering of discrete rulingS225 and then applied more
systematically by Chancellors Hardwicke and later Eldon, to the point that their
rulings were accepted as authority, equitable doctrines emerged. Arguably,
equity in Eldon's time had already crystallized into settled principles uniformly
applied, signaling Roscoe Pound's lament for "the death of living equity." 226
223 Roscoe Pound, The Maxims of Equity - I, Of Maxims Generally, 34 HARV. L. REv. 809, 830
(1921).
4 Jeremiah Smith, The Use of Maxims in Juriprudence, 9 HARV. L. REv. 13, 22 (1895-1896)
(quotingJ.S. Mill's review of Austin on Jurisprudence, 118 Edinburgh Rev. 161).
2s FRANCIS, supra note 26.
226 Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equio, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20, 25 (1905).

It is no simple
matter to discern when equity moved from seeking judicial consistency by rendering like decisions
in analogous case circumstances to relying on a line of specific case authorities. See Croft, supra
note 157, at 121-55 (describing four stages by which precedent develops in the eighteen and
nineteenth centuries). Both Hardwicke and Eldon found and relied on what they saw as equitable
principles underlying prior rulings and felt obliged to honor those principles unless the result was
grossly inequitable. Id. at 129-37. At no point did either suspend that reliance in favor of a
volume of cases as illustrations or cite a single case as binding, the principles considered selfevident enough to stand on their own. Eldon's consistent referral to Priestley as an illustration or
tag of a self-evident principle is the case in point, as the facts in Priestley are not consistent with
any subsequent Eldon rulings. See Croft, supra note 157, at 133-37. See generally W.H.D. Winder,
Precedentin Equity, 57 L.Q.R. 245, 251-58 (1941); DUXBURY, supra note 52, at 58-110.
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For Pound, the refinement, or modernization, of equity toward mechanistic
application of fixed rules signaled the demise of its original function-restoring
equitable balance-and also allowed parties to manipulate the predictability of
outcomes to their own advantage by using the equity court to legitimize or
support inequitable consequences of not-quite-honest dealings, mostly in
contractual agreements and marital arrangements. In turn, defendants took
advantage by deflecting legitimate equitable actions against them by arguing that
the plaintiffs had not adhered to accepted principles or maxims of moral
behavior, as in patent or copyright claims, in effect having "unclean hands" and
tacitly manipulating the judicial process to their own inequitable ends.
Ironically, the application of systematic equitable rules intermittently produced
or sustained inequitable results regardless, 227 creating an asymmetry between the
mitigating effects of equity on legal decisions and the aggravation that resulted
228
from departing from the rule of law by discretionary judgments.
If we assume that the Clean Hands Doctrine evolved from general principles
rather than discrete rulings, our search for early applications of the clean hands
maxim needs to broaden beyond rulings at equity. That leads us to consider a
wide range of metaphorical references to "clean hands" in cases of fraud and
other forms of misrepresentation in contracts and agreements long before the
vaunted Eyre rulingS229 and raises the prospect that the clean hands metaphor

227 Pound, supra note 226, at 27-29, 33-34.

22 See John Tasioulas, The ParadoxofEquity, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 457-61 (1996).
229 See Bosanquet v. Dashwood, (1738) 25 Eng. Rep. 1104 (Ch.) 1108 ("[T]he Court must do
complete justice, and let the party have no more than is his due in conscience ... ."); Walker v.
Walker, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 461 (Ch.) 462 ("a man who comes into a court of equity ought to
have clean hands," leading Lord Hardwicke to rule, "I am of the opinion that the plaintiff is not
intitled to have the aid of a court of equity, and that it would be contrary to the rules of
justice. . . ."); Henkle v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co., (1749) 27 Eng. Rep. 1055 (Ch.) 1056 ("It is
certainly a general rule, that the plaintiff must come into equity with clean hands; and in several
case at common law and in equity have gone upon this, that if the contract relates to an illicit
subject, the court will not so encourage the action as to give a remedy."); Licence, (1773) 98 Eng.
Rep. 669 (K.B.) 670 ("[hey were very wrong on both sides.... But [the plaintiff] ought to have
come for an information with clean hands. .. ."); Bennet v. Hammond, (1781) 21 Eng. Rep. 400
(Ch.) 401 ("When a person comes into this Court for equity, he must come with clean hands.");
Fitzroy v. Gwillim, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1025 (K.B.) 1026 ("[The] plaintiff] must come therefore
with clean hands, according to the principle laid down in the case of Bosanquet and Dashwood. . . .");
Petrie v. Hannay, (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 652 (K.B.) 654 ("Now it is a rule that those, who come
into a Court of Justice to seek redress, must come with clean hands...."). The reference to
Bosanquet indicates that the court was mindful of a number of cases that had already established
the broader principle at equity as applied to usurious contracts, though they did not explicitly use
the clean hands metaphor, as in Bod# v. Bod4, (1679) 22 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch.) 824 ("Iniquity takes
away Equity."); Anonymous, (1679) 22 Eng. Rep. 825 (Ch.) 825 (denial of equitable relief but
adding "if the Plaintiffs could recover at Law, [the judge] would leave them to that Remedy. . . .");
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adopted by Eldon, if not explicitly by or from Eyre, was an adaptation of a
broader legal principle from contract law to copyright infringement cases.
Whether that rendered it a stand-alone equitable principle or doctrine, or simply
a convenient reference for a discretionary ruling, remains an open question.
Eyre may have applied the clean hands metaphor in Priestly to a plaintiff
seeking damages for lost property value at a time when the principles of
property rights were still somewhat unsettled, especially with regard to the
relatively new concept of literary property. This precipitated a period of legal
adjustments in which common law and statutory interpretations of what
constituted literary property were sorted out by informal sets of equitable
procedures, the formalization of which is usually identified with Eldon.230
Eldon's rulings regarding copyright infringement can be read as
fundamentally procedural, i.e., who decides whether a literary work is immoral
and whether that is sufficient to disqualify a plaintiff from copyright protection
rather than substantive. If he was simply following precedent, as he was often
reputed to do with almost dogged determination, we need to be more
Small v. Brackley, (1707) 23 Eng. Rep. 993 (Ch.) ("[Tlhe Lord Chancellor. .. dismissed the bill;
the plaintiff having been guilty of as great a fraud and breach of trust, as could be, and not be
criminal; and having agreed to make some satisfaction he ought not to be relieved in equity.");
Everet v. Williams, (Ex. 1725), belatedly reported in Note, The Highwayman's Case, 9 L.Q.R. 197,
198 (1893) (plea by one highwayman for equitable distribution of stolen proceeds dismissed "for
scandal and impertinence"); Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.) 100 ("This
court has an undoubted jurisdiction to relieve against every species of fraud."); Monefiori v.
Monetfiori, (1762) 96 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B.) 203 ("[F]or no man shall set up his own iniquity as a
defence, any more than as a cause of action. .. ."); Neville v. Wilkinson, (1782) 28 Eng. Rep. 1289
(Ch.) 1290 (misrepresentation in a contract is fraud, and "A court of justice would make itself
ridiculous . . ." if distinctions as to the degree of fraud were further drawn). In fact, the process
by which equity proceedings became governed by settled principles and rules has more accurately
been identified with Hardwicke, and then later "completed during the two Chancellorships of
Lord Eldon...." William S. Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1
(1929).
230Prior to Priestly,Eyre applied the clean hands metaphor in two cases on the equity side of
the Exchequer, neither involving literary property but both involving the broader principle. In
Scott v. Scott, (1787) 29 Eng. Rep. 1206 (Ex.) 1211, he ruled that misrepresentation based "only on
general tendency, and general immorality of such conduct," did not disqualify the plaintiff from
equitable relief. He followed the same line of argument in Dering v. Earl of Winchester, (1787) 29
Eng. Rep. 1184 (Ex.), when he accepted that the plaintiff had behaved in an immoral manner
prior to litigation but concluded that behavior was insufficiently related to the litigation to spoil
his claim. Ironically, and inappropriately, Dering later became cited as the first equitable
application of the clean hands doctrine. Clearly, Eldon's dictum regarding the compelling nature
of Eyre's ruling in Priestley was consistent with his effort to establish fixed rules by which equity
would become less discretionary, a trend also lamented by Pound ("In the very act of becoming a
system, it becomes legalized, and in becoming merely a competing system of law insures its
ultimate downfall...."). Pound, supranote 226, at 25.
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discerning regarding his particular role in the evolution of the Clean Hands
Doctrine in equity before we can examine more closely the American cases that
built upon what they considered to be established doctrine. Recognizing that
the application of fixed rules and doctrines at law would, on occasion, produce
inequitable consequences, law courts and later equity courts adopted the maxim
"equity cannot create inequity" as a common law principle. After the passage
of the Statute of Anne, application of that principle to copyright infringement
cases necessitated injecting a degree of discretion into statutory interpretation
that itself could lead to inequitable results and questions about the integrity of
the judicial process. To avoid such consequences, equity courts began to
pattern their rulings after lines of authority derived from the more positivist
tradition of law courts, resulting in the development of a set of fixed principles
designed to guide decisions into more predictable and uniformly equitable
directions. 231
Complicating our ability to affix Eldon's role in the Clean Hands legacy is
the ambiguity regarding the ratio decidendi for the procedural imperative reflected
in his rulings. This is particularly noticeable in his consistent referral of
determination of property rights to courts of law before he would consider
equitable relief. This was, in fact, a practice that preceded Eldon's tenure at
chancery and had been frequently applied in the eighteenth century. 232
Regardless of whether Eldon's rulings were compatible with or driven by his
subjective political (or religious) ideology, they were consistent with precedent
regarding the preeminence of the law courts in findings of fact and were
therefore a stabilizing force in equity jurisprudence. 233 Eldon's adherence to

231 For Eldon, it was clear that the continuity of equitable rulings took precedence over
incidental inequities or even challenges to the public welfare, as long as recourse was available
either by appeal to the House of Lords or by legislation. His penchant for avoiding the
appearance of discretionary judgment is illustrated in Gee v. Pritchard,(1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670
(Ch.), where, in reference to the claim that the basis of rulings by successive Chancellors varied as
much as did their foot size, Eldon wrote, "Nothing would inflict on me greater pain, in quitting
this place, than the recollection that I had done any thing to justify the reproach that the equity of
this court varies like the Chancellor's foot."). See also C.J. Rossiter & Margaret Stone, The
Chancellor's New Shoe, 11 U.N.S.W.L.J. 11, 11-16 (1988) (describing criticism of Eldon for
vacillation in ruling on cases regarding questionable material).
232 See Dennis R. Klinck, LordEldon on 'Equity,'20 LEGAL HIST. 51, 52-53 (1999) (documenting
Eldon's adherence to principles and rules established in precedent cases to maintain judicial
consistency, even at the expense of "abstract justice," a practice that can be identified with both
Lord Hardwicke fifty years earlier and with Sir William Grant, who was Master of Rolls during
Eldon's tenure, noting that "[t]he kinds of dicta that we associate with Lord Eldon's characteristic
outlook may, then, have been something more like judicial commonplaces").
233 Id. at 60. Eldon assumed that the interests of justice were best served by establishing facts
beyond a reasonable doubt and then applying maxims of equity to them. The debate lingered as
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precedent has been interpreted as bringing fixed rules to equity, thereby
reducing its capacity to arbitrarily dispense equity. 234
In this light, Eldon's rulings appear essentially jurisdictional, rendering
equitable relief on issues of property when property could be documented by
the plaintiff. Whether a plaintiff had property in a literary work was treated like
all other matters of property-to be determined as a question of subject matter
jurisdiction at law by a jury. The clean hands maxim had evolved as a
mechanism for sorting out property claims at law, and particularly after
enactment of the Statute of Anne, plaintiffs claiming property in literary works
progressively sought more immediate and meaningful relief from copyright
infringement at equity, as damages at law were widely considered inadequate to
protect a copyrights value. 235 It was inevitable that equity would attempt to
standardize the determination of literary property by a procedure for directing
questionable claims regarding literary property to law. That procedure emerged
in the Hardwicke era and was consistently accepted as authority by Eldon, who
cited Eyre's dicta from non-copyright cases, thereby solidifying how the Clean
Hands Doctrine was applied to copyright.
The critical question was whether a plaintiff, who had himself committed
wrongdoing related to his property claim, should be denied a hearing at equity
from the outset or denied relief in a discretionary judgment based on public
policy concerns. For Eldon, referring an issue of property to the law courts was
a standard procedure in cases where any "reasonable doubt" arose as to the
nature of the work at issue. In that manner, he was not precluding equitable

to whether Whig criticism of Eldon's Chancery was sourced in his ideological arbitrariness (and
particularly the presumed societal cost of his rulings) or his court's dallying officiousness. In
most cases, the officiousness was due more to the archaic structure of court procedure than his
personal indecisiveness, as discussed in Michael Lobban, Preparingfor Fusion: Reforming the
Nineteenth-Centuy Court of Chanceg, PartI, 22 LAW & HIsT. REV. 389, 392-97 (2004).
234 Klinck, supra note 232, at 62. Eldon believed that "moral justice"
must be consistent with
the rules and principles which authorize the court action. Id. See, e.g., James Oldham, A Profusion
of Chancey Reform, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 609 (2004) (Eldon's adherence to procedural precedent
may have accounted for his deliberativeness, which was viewed as indecisiveness). There may be
some disagreement over the degree to which Eldon was simply following Hardwicke's
enunciation of governing principles, as Eldon seemed more consistent in deferring all questions
of content to courts at law. See, e.g., William Draper Lewis, InjuneionsAgainst Nuisances and the Rule
Requiring the Plaintiffto Estabhsh His Right at Law, 47 U. PA. L. REV. (new series) 289, 304-06 (1908)
(arguing that Eldon regarded it necessary that plaintiffs with nuisance claims prove their right at
law before being accorded permanent equitable relief).
235 H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, What HistoU Teaches Us
About Copyrght Injuneions and the
Inadequate-Remedy-At-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197 (2008) (describing the inadequacies
of law remedies in protecting the immediate market value of a literary work).
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relief but rather delaying such consideration until property was certified at
law.236
That was not the same as declaring a plaintiff "disqualified" from receiving
equitable relief; while a plaintiff had a legal claim to the property at issue, public
policy precluded relief, allowing the claimed and legally recognized inequity to
remain. This language, found intermittently in early equity rulings resting on
the Clean Hands Doctrine,237 implied a moral structure to the legal doctrine, not
so much that the merits of the plaintiffs claim warranted legal action, but rather
that certain moral conditions must be met before standard equitable doctrines
could be applied. 238 It might be argued that this preserved the court's integrity
because the court did not countenance immoral behavior. Yet, the court still
had to balance the doctrine's deterrence of potential plaintiffs with "unclean
hands" against the public policy of upholding clear legal rights according to
established standards irrespective of moral consequences, which was arguably
239
As legal doctrines
the more traditional core element of the court's integrity.
became the foundation of judicial integrity in courts at law, the role for
discretionary justice increasingly took precedence in courts at equity until
236This use of judicial discretion to withhold even temporary injunctive relief until a plaintiff
could establish a rightful claim for damages at law immediately became controversial from several
vantage points. First, it was largely presumed that the delay mandated by such a sequence of
hearings at law would all but eviscerate the value of a plaintiff's property, even if he were
vindicated in a ruling at law. in that, Eldon assumed he was simply following established
precedent, though the consequence may have been inequitable to the plaintiff in contradistinction
to the avowed purpose of equity court. It was on this basis that Eldon's decisions were criticized
in the Quartery Review (Art. V/, supra note 60) and later by Story (supra note 57). Second, it was
charged that denial of temporary injunctive relief would cause an immediate proliferation of
unauthorized publications of illicit works, a consequence still voiced today.
237 Cadman v. Homer, (1809) 34 Eng. Rep. 1197 (Ch.); Clemont v. Tasbaugh, (1819) 37 Eng.
Rep. 318 (Ch.) 321. Alternatively, the court used the term "disentitled," as in Peyton, (1811) 34
Eng. Rep. 227 (Ch.) 235, and on the law side in Stokes v. Twicken, (1818) 129 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B.)
477; and Wels v. Giring, (1819) 129 Eng. Rep. 795 (K.B.) 797.
238 See Ori J. Herstein, A Normative Theog of the Clean Hands Defense, 17 LEGAL THEORY 171
(2011) (U.K.). This has been identified with the tu quoque ('You too!") maxim, in which the court
does not negate the truth-value of the plaintiff's claim but instead rules that his complaint is not
one the court is obligated to hear because the plaintiff has engaged in wrongful behavior similar
to the wrongdoing by the defendant. Id. at 191-98 (describing the clean hands defense as an issue
of standing). While this seems simply to restate the Clean Hands Doctrine as a "working
proverb," it also implies elements of moral retribution, in that the plaintiff loses access to relief as
a sanction against his own hypocrisy. It also effects a rectification, in that denial of access in
effect annuls any ill-gotten or unfair advantage the plaintiff has acquired through his own
wrongdoing. Both of these reflect onto the plaintiff's behavior as an ad hominen argument and
have little to do with the integrity of the court, which has allowed the plaintiff to "do equity" in
the interim as a method of regaining access.
239 Id. at 183-91 (reflecting on different bases of the concept of court integrity).
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chancery itself began to move in the same direction by establishing rules and
procedures of its own. In effect, the legal doctrine of the clean hands maxim at
law begat the Clean Hands Doctrine at equity.
One might, therefore, conclude that Eldon's embrace of a Clean Hands
Doctrine as a fixed standard directing the determination of property in a work
to the law courts was primarily based on procedural precedent. It was the
province of the law courts, and specifically a jury, to make that final decision on
the nature of the work and whether the plaintiff had property in it. However,
such a legal detour could only be avoided, in Eldon's view, if a work was
"clearly innocent," which was admittedly still a discretionary call. Plaintiffs
claiming property in questionable works first had to successfully plead for
statutory damages at law in order to qualify for equitable consideration. They
were not then "disqualified" from equitable relief by a referral to law as much as
they were being denied standing at equity until their property could be
established at law. That most plaintiffs chose not to pursue that course spoke
to their wariness of being vulnerable to subsequent prosecution or the costs and
delays endemic in the law process. If they succeeded at law and returned to
chancery, they would be eligible to claim equitable relief and probably would
have prevailed. 240
So, Eldon's doctrinal contribution may not have been as moralistically
prejudicial as has often been implied. If Eldon treated Hardwicke's earlier
rulings as binding precedent in determining if a plaintiff had property in a
literary work, with some discretion as to reasonable doubt that the work was
illicit, plaintiffs could be assured that this procedure would be followed in each
subsequent instance. Following that, equity courts were able to ground their
integrity not in the equitability of the results of each case but rather in its
uniform treatment of all claims brought before it. As chancery's use of form
and precedent edged closer to the more doctrinally rigid law courts, any moral
aspect there may have been in the doctrine became more a matter of
considering statutes than fairness, forcing the chancery to wrestle with the
vagaries of statutory language and intent.

240 This occurred very rarely. In Cay v. Longman, (1801) 170 Eng. Rep.
613 (KB.), the plaintiff,
denied an injunction at equity and directed to law, won nominal damages but did not return to
chancery. In Murray v. ElRson, (1822) 106 Eng. Rep. 1331 (KB.), the plaintiff initiated an action
for damages at law after his injunction had expired, but a year after filing, he was denied relief
without explanation and the case did not return to chancery. In Byron v. Dugdale, (1823) 1 L.J. Ch.
239 (Ch.), the court lifted an injunction with the specification that if the plaintiff successfully sued
for damages at law, the injunction would be reinstated. The plaintiff did initiate action at law, but
abandoned it when it became apparent that the defendant Dugdale was destitute.
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VII. ADOPTION OF THE OBSCENITY DEFENSE INTO AMERICAN COPYRIGHT

LAW
English common law was rather haphazardly adopted into American
jurisprudence during the first decades after the ratification of the U.S.
Constitution. 241 Some state courts were reticent to recognize the authority of
English court decrees, preferring instead to establish their own common law
traditions. 242 Uniformity of adoption was further complicated by the sheer
diversity of court structures from state to state, each having developed its own
indigenous legal practices. 243 Also, the virtual absence of legal literature in the
United States, as usually found in law reports, manuscripts, and treatises, made
2
recognition of English or American case authorities nearly impossible. 44 While
an increasing range of English treatises on equity theory and procedures had
been published by the early nineteenth century, few had wide distribution in the
United States. Scarcer still were copies of published nominate reports of
245
English cases, which those treatises portrayed as governing.
The Clean Hands Doctrine of the Eldon period was at first absorbed into
American practice through a general awareness of and reliance upon the
241 See generally Francis R. Aumann, The Influence of Engish and Civil Law Prindles Upon the
American Legal System During the Critical Post-Revolutionary Period, 12 U. CIN. L. REv. 289 (1938)
(discussing the evolving system of law reporting in the U.S. and its ambivalent reliance on English
sources); Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L.
REV. 791 (1950-1951) (historical analysis of the evolution of common law in the American
colonies through the period of the early Republic); Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare
Deasis: The Critical Years, 1800-1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 28 (1959) (describing the early
American practice of citing legal principles from English common law but not specific case
authorities); David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of ForeignLaw, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 1417 (2006) (describing the reticence of American Courts to cite English and other
"foreign" sources after 1776).
242 Having no official judicial status, court reporters in England were not considered authorities,
and the quality of their published reports was known to be uneven. This raised skepticism about
their authority, causing American courts to rely more on reasoning from broadly defined
common law principles from legal treatises.
243 See Seipp, supra note 241, at 1439-40. Early reports of state rulings were scattered at best,
varying from state to state in quality and accessibility, with official state reporters only appointed
beginning in 1824 and becoming more prevalent only by the 1850s. Id.
244 Kempin, supra note 241, at 34-37; Aumann, supra note 241, at 334-43.
245 The absence of English and American case reports inevitably led to an early judicial reliance
on English treatises and texts for explication of principles. 1 ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE
ERA IN AMERICAN LAw 151-53 (Boston 1938); Simpson, supra note 26, at 668-74. That reliance
may not have been formalized as citations in American cases, due in part to the reticence of state
court systems to cite "foreign sources." These included English decisions after independence, as
well as rulings from civil law-based courts from other countries and even decisions from different
U.S. states. Seipp, supra note 241, at 1424-35.
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established principles of equity. Courts probably accessed these through
English treatises and reports on equity which, even before the end of Eldon's
tenure as Chancellor, had begun to gather doctrinal statements from eighteenthand early nineteenth-century English rulings governing copyright cases of
equity. 246 These served as a structural guide, if not the exact content, for the
first American treatises and law texts on equity, which identified fundamental
equitable principles and perhaps the broader maxims from which they were
derived, but offered scant discussion, if any, of the facts of the English cases
cited or whether the rado deddendi in each was consistent with the principles they
were said to reference. 247
Moreover, the principles identified in the English treatises on equity were
largely procedural and not referenced to case authorities, though they were
clearly drawn from the Hardwicke and Eldon rulings. For example, it was
commonly accepted that a right to literary property must initially be determined
at law 248 under the direction of the court of equity to which a copyright
infringement claim had been directed, if and when a claim of a property right
was disputed or a "fair doubt" existed. 249 In the interim, a temporary injunction
could be granted until notice was issued, an answer was received, or a dispute
over the property right was resolved. 250 Furthermore, it was a standard caveat
246 The most notable and frequently cited treatises
included Henry Maddock, A Treatise on the
Princyles and Practiceof the High Court of Chancery (1817); Robert Henley Eden, A Treatise on The Law
of Injunctions (1821); Richard Godson, A PracticalTreatise on the Law of Patentsfor Inventions and of
Copynght (1823); and George Jeremy, A Treatise on the Equiy Jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery
(1828). Maddock, in particular, identified Francis's maxim "He that bath committed Iniquity shall not
have Equity ."
with the imperative that "A Party calling for the aid of a Court of Equity, must
come, as it is said, with clean hands...." I MADDOCK, at 404 (citing Cadman v. Horner, (1810) 34
Eng. Rep. 221 (Ch.)). Arguably, while not designed as a treatise, Petersdorff's Abridgment became
the core source of authority of these principles and provided the most extensive description of
the seminal cases and commentary on their governing principles. PETERSD., supra note 128.
247 The earliest American treatises included George Cooper,
A Treatise of Pleading on the Equity
Side of the High Court of Chancery (1809); Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on the Iw of
Slander, Libel,
Scandalum Magnatum, and False Rumuors (1826), and the dominant American text of the early period
Story's COMMENTARIES, which drew heavily from Eden and Jeremy. See STORY, supra note 57.
248 MADDOCK, supra note 246, at 149-50 (citing Wilkins
v. Aiken, (1810) Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.));
EDEN, supra note 246, at 287-89 (citing Univs. of Oxford & Cambridge v. Richardson, (1802) 31
Eng. Rep. 1260 (Ch.); Walcot v. Walker, (1820) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch.); Platt v. Burton, (1815) 34
Eng. Rep. 583 (Ch.); GODSON, supra note 246, at 212-13 (citing Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1);
Southey v. Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.); Murray v. Benbow, (1822) C13/1743/26;
Lawrence v. Smith, (1822) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.); JEREMY, supra note 246, at
326 (citing Walcot,
32 Eng. Rep. at 1); Platt, 34 Eng. Rep. at 583; Byron v. Johnson, (1816) 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch.);
Bell v. Walker, (1785) 28 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Ch.).
249 See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 247, at 154-55.
250 MADDOCK, supra note 246, at 150 (citing Byron, 35 Eng. Rep.
at 851); GODSON, supra note
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that there could be no property in a published work with an immoral or illicit
tendency calculated to injure public morals or disturb the public peace, the
251
With respect
criminal aspects of which were the province of the law courts.
to those types of works, it was consistently held that a court of equity had no
jurisdiction over criminal matters nor any moral obligation to tailor an equitable
judgment so as to protect the morals of society. In particular, that a court of
equity would not interfere when the plaintiff could file an action for damages at
252
law was staunchly maintained.
English treatises on equity identified as common practice that which had
been established during Hardwicke's tenure and doctrinally fixed by Eldon.
Specifically, they maintained that upon receipt of a bill charging copyright
infringement and requesting both injunctive relief and an account of profits, a
court should first consider the technical matter of the plaintiffs claim of a
property right in the literary work at issue, whether there was sufficient doubt to
direct the matter to a court at law. In normal course, the judge or his designee,
such as the Master of Rolls, would read the work at issue and compare it to the
claimed infringement. 253 He would then form a judgment as to whether the
nature of the work was sufficiently morally suspect such that a right to property
in it might be denied on public policy grounds, a question usually reserved for a

246, at 366-67; and JEREMY, supra note 246, at 321 (citing Wakot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1, Burnett,
Lawrence, Murray).
251 See COOPER, supra note 247, at 157 (citing Wacot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1); MADDOCK, supra note
246, at 149-50 (citing Wacot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1; Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1006); EDEN, supra note
246, at 283, 289 (citing Fores v. Jones, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654 (Ch.)); Dubost v. Beresford,
(180) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B.); Wakot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1; Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1006;
GODSON, supra note 246, at 212 (citing Fores, 170 Eng. Rep. at 654, Dubost, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1235;
PETERSD., supra note 128, at 557 (citing Wacot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1).
252 See PETERSD., supra note 128, at 558n (citing Priestly);EDEN, supra note 246, at 315; STARKIE,
supra note 247, at 142-43 (citing Wacot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1; Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1006; Byron v.
Dugdae, (1823) I.L.J. Ch. 239 (Ch.)). These principles were then replicated in 2 STORY § 937
(supra note 57), which itself referenced Petersdorff.
253 There is clear evidence that Eldon read the works at issue in most of his cases that required
substantive consideration, including Wakot (The Works of PeterPindat), Southey (Wat Tyer), Murry v.
Benbow (Cain), and Lawrence (Lectures in Physiolog). In Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1007, Eldon initially
stated that having not yet read the work, he assumed it was of such a nature as to be criminal, in
which case he could grant no jurisdiction. The next day, however, after he had read the work, all
the affidavits, and precedent cases, and while still embracing Eyre's statement of principle in
Priestley,Eldon argued that he would not consider the nature of the work since it was unnecessary
to its civil dispensation in equity court. Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1008. Alternatively, in Mumray v.
Dugdale, (1823) C13/1754/36 (Ch.), Eldon reiterated the governing principle established in
Priestly and considered reading Byron's Beppo unnecessary, as it had already been published in
multiple editions over a five-year period without criminal challenge. Mortenson, supra note 183,
at 11 n.14.
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jury.254 During Eldon's tenure, such an issue could only be resolved if the
plaintiff first filed for damages under the Statute of Anne, even though damages
at law were universally considered inadequate to protect property in literary
works, and subsequent equitable relief would be required as an appropriate
supplement to an action. 255
By the end of Eldon's tenure, English treatises and other texts defined a
standard set of equitable rulings to be guiding illustrations of established
principles. They centered on his rulings in Walcot and Southey and usually made
reference to the Clean Hand Doctrine as was first stated in Priestley and his
reiteration of it in Lawrence v Smith and Murray v. Benbow. 256 Amongst these, the
seminal ruling was always Walcot, which preceded Southey and its initial
published reference to Priestley by fifteen years. 257 These core cases were often
supplemented with reference to several rulings at law regarding whether there
could be property in works of illicit nature, with Fores, Dubost, and often Hime
considered guiding.258 With these as illustrative guides, it was a simple next step
for commentators to divide the cases by type of works typically excluded from
copyright protection, such as works of seditious, blasphemous, or obscene
tendency, and works that were calculated to discredit the church or the
government.
Such classification schema were characteristic of several
prominent English legal treatises in the early nineteenth century, such as
Godson's Practical Treatise on the Law of Patentsfor Inventions and of Copyright,259
which asserted that a principle that equity provided no protection for that
which was calculated to harm the public had been established, citing virtually all
of the rulings discussed above. 260
254 This was particularly the case after passage of Fox's Libel Act in
1792 ("An Act to Remove
Doubts Respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel'"), which capped a lengthy debate
between judges and juries by authorizing juries at law, not only to determine the fact of publication
but also to rule on the tendency of the work at issue (§ 1), consistent with the evolving practice in
the eighteenth century and arguably with the Constitution. SeeJAMEs OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON
LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 218-35 (Thomas A. Green et al. eds., 2009) (describing trends in
jury consideration leading up to the enactment of Fox's Libel Act).
255 MADDOCK, supra note 246, at 149-50 (citing Hogg v. Kirby, (1803)
32 Eng. Rep. 336 (Ch.)
340, 8 Ves. Jun. 215, 225); Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.) 164, 17 Ves. Jun. 422,
424). See also Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 235, at 1236-37 (describing the common assumption
that statutory damages were inadequate to forestall the injury to plaintiffs proprietary right).
256 Lawrence v. Smith, (1822) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.); Murray
v. Benbow, (1822) C13/1743/26
(Ch.).
257 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; Walcot, 32 Eng.
Rep. at 1.
258 Fores v. Johnes, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654 (K.B.); Dubost v. Beresford,
(1810) 170 Eng.
Rep. 1235 (K.B.); Hime v. Dale, (1803) 170 Eng. Rep. 1070 (K.B.).
259 GODSON, supra note 246, at 212-16.
260 Id. Godson directly cited Eldon's rulings in Walcot,
Southey, Murray v. Benbow, and Lawrence,
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This manner of clustering of illustrative cases found a more systematic
elaboration five years later in Robert Maugham's A Treatise on the Laws ofLiterary
Property, 261 which identified categories of works excluded based on "the nature
of their injurious or illegal character" regarding public morals, religion, public
peace, justice, and libels of private individuals. Maugham based these categories
262
on the same set of cases but relied heavily on Petersdorff's Abridement,
263
published that same year, for its reporting and analysis of those authorities.
Beyond the more detailed treatment of the accepted authorities, Maugham
provided the first doctrinal explanation of Eldon's jurisdictional distinction
between works in which a plaintiffs claim of property was clear, such that
equity could render a judgment, and works for which there was "reasonable
doubt," necessitating an action of law. This was, perhaps, the first open
examination, however brief, of the juxtaposition of broad equitable maxims and
established equitable doctrines in copyright infringement with the notion of
264
"clean hands" in the consideration of copyright claims.
The categories of works excluded from copyright protection became a staple
in subsequent treatises and other texts on equity, many built directly on
265
Maugham, including George Tickner Curtis's Treatise on the Law of Copyright,
supplemented by law rulings in Priestley, Fores, Hime, Dubost, Gale, and, characteristic of earlier but
not later treatises, Burnet. Ironically, Godson later argued that an author retained full power over
his unpublished manuscripts and could maintain an action when they were trespassed, noting that
"with only the dissentient voice of Mr. Baron Eyre," presumably referring to Eyre's ruling in
Piestley, that there could be no property in illicit writings. Id. at 222.
261 ROBERT MAUGHAM, A TREATISE ON THE LAws OF LITERARY PROPERTY (London 1828).
262 PETERSD., supranote 128, at 558-59.
263 MAUGHAM, supra note 261, at 88-98. Maugham noted, "The question of the protection
claimed for illegal works is one of general importance, and has been productive of much
litigation. It has been ably discussed by MR. PETERSDORFF, in his comprehensive abridgment,
and we subjoin the substance of his observations thereon." Id at 95, n.1. More specifically,
Maugham drew extensively from Petersdorffs detailed reports of those cases. PETERSD., supra
note 128, at 521-76, 557, 561. More critically, Maugham classified literary works at issue in these
cases by the nature of their potentially injurious character: works injurious to morals (considered
potentially obscene libel) (citing Gale v. Leckie, (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 588 (K.B.); Fores v. Johnes,
(1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654 (K.B.); Burnett v. Chetwood, (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.)); works
injurious to religion (potentially blasphemous libel) (citing Murray v. Benbow, (1822)
C13/1743/26 (Ch.), and Lawrence v. Smith, (1822) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.)); works injurious to
peace and justice (potentially seditious libel) (citing Priestley, Hime v. Dale (1803) 170 Eng. Rep.
1070 (K.B.); Southey v. Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006)); and works injurious to private
individuals (potentially tortious or criminal libel) (citing Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1; Dubost v.
Beresford, (1810) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B.)).
264 For example, with respect to the plaintiff in Lawrence, (1822) 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch.),
Maugham queried, "Was this 'coming into court with clean hands?' Was it consistent with the
principle which maintains that a man shallnot availhimself of his own wrong?" Id. at 91, n.2.
265 GEORGE TICKNER CURTIS, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT (Boston 1847).
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the first major American legal treatise on copyright in which the soundness of
English precedent cases was sorted out for discussion and critique. 266
Following the lead of Story's Commentaie, 267 Curtis took issue with Eldon's
presumption that a work's tendency could compromise a plaintiffs property in
it, preferring instead to give the benefit of the doubt always to the petitioner as
a matter of property right.268 Reliance on Maugham continued in Copinger, 269

266 In particular, Curtis examined whether the technical
determination of property in a work,
and hence its protection under the Statute of Anne, could legitimately be suspended based on an
estimation of its moral nature and effect upon the public morals, stating that in England,
the prima facie right of property is the same in all publications; and the rule of
public policy merely withholds that protection to which the publication, but for
its character and tendency, would be entitled .... In America, there has been no
decision involving this question; but the English authorities have established
certain general principles, some of which are sound while others are open to
objection ....
Id. at 149.
267 Story dutifully reported the established principle that, on public policy grounds, no copyright
could exist in works that were "clearly irreligious, immoral, libelous, or obscene" and repeated the
caveat that the court only withheld its aid, rather than acting as a censor morum regarding "the
circulation of offensive and mischievous books." STORY, supra note 57, §§936-937 (citing EDEN,
supra note 246; COOPER, supra note 247; and PETERSD., supra note 128; and citing generally Walcot,
32 Eng. Rep. at 1; Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1006; Lawrence, 37 Eng. Rep. at 928). However, Story
pointedly took issue with the degree of discretion exercised by Eldon, who was apparently ready
to deny "the protection of an injunction in matters of property upon mere doubts," whereas in
principle, "prima facie the copy-right confers title; and the onus is on the other side to show
clearly, that, notwithstanding the copy there is an inherent defect in the title." STORY, supra note
57, §936 n.1 (citing Larence,37 Eng. Rep. at 928).
[T]o decide dogmatically upon the character and bearing of such discussions,
and the rights of authors growing out of them" [in such an absolute manner],
Story argued, "may sap the very foundations, on which [equity relief]
rests . .. [so as to] retard, if not entirely suppress, the means of arriving at
physical, as well as metaphysical truths.
Id. 5 938.
268 CURTIS, supra note 265, at 159-60. With regard to Priestley specifically, in which Eldon was
seen as over-reaching, Curtis differentiated between the right of property defined as profits lost to
piracy and the right of property as exclusive control over the work itself. He then maintained that
only in the circumstance of a plaintiff arguing lost profits does the work's tendency become
germane, specifically if there was some doubt whether it could be legally sold, which was
essentially Abbott's argument in Stockdak v. Onwhyn, (1826) 176 Eng. Rep. 75 (K.B.). Id. In
claims regarding works of questionable tendency, Curtis, like Story, leaned toward protecting a
plaintiffs legitimate claim to property, regardless of its nature, arguing that injunctive relief should
be granted unless the work's illegality was clear. Id. at 165.

269 WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART

49-50 (Stevens & Haynes 1870) (identifying the doctrinal source as Priestley and likewise quoting
extensively from Petersdorfo. Copinger also derived the nature of property in literary works
from its profits, based on its legal right to sell, and its core ideas, based on Locke theory of labor
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Shortt, 270 and Drone, 271 the standard texts in copyright law in both English and
272
Each of
American legal practice in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
those described in varying detail the basic equitable principles outlined in earlier
273
Yet, none
treatises and focused on the Eldon rulings in Walcot and Southey.
doctrinal
of
its
versions
any
or
maxim
hands
specifically mentioned the clean
of
accepted
application in copyright, conservatively focusing on the listing
274
doctrinal principles and acknowledgment of seminal illustrative rulings.

invested. Id. at 26-27.
270 JOHN SHoRTT, THE LAW RELATING TO WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART (Horace Cox
1871) (adhering to the principles and English case citations contained in earlier treatises, while
acknowledging the abandonment of holdings related to moral content, such as Burnel). Shortt
also stated that the fundamental standard remained whether or not an action could be sustained at
law. Id. at 3-9. All works excluded thereby would be labeled criminal libels. Id. at 297-344.
271 EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 181-82 (Little, Brown, & Co.
1879). Following Maugham, Drone stated what had become the established doctrine ("In
refusing protection to publications having an injurious moral or political tendency, the court does
not act as the guardian of public morals, or as a censor of the press. On the contrary, in declining
to interfere with the piratical publication and sale of an obnoxious book, it removes an obstacle
to its wider circulation. For this evil there are other remedies ... The publication of a seditious,
blasphemous, immoral, or libellous production is a violation of law, and therefore such a work is
not entitled to protection as property. The court simply refuses to grant remedies to which the
author is not entitled by reason of the objectionable nature of his property."). Drone also
differentiated areas of criminal libel in which a plaintiff could not claim property, but like Curtis
and, implicitly, Story, he criticized Eldon's willingness to render judgments based on his own,
rather than a jury's, conclusions about the nature of a work, referencing only Lord Campbell's
contemporaneous critique of Eldon in his Lives of the Chancellors Id. at 183 n.1.
272 See Ronan Deazley, Commentay on Maugham's Treatise on the Laws of Literary Property
(1828), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds.,
2008), http://www.copyrighthistory.org.
273 This was also characteristic of two other dominant texts after mid-century: John Paxton
Norman, The Law and Practice of the Copyright, Registration and Provisional Registration of
Designs (S. Sweet 1851) ("No copyright can exist in a design having a tendency contrary to public
morality or order, as if it were indecent or libelous."); id. at 88 (citing Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1;
Hime, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1070; Dubost, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1235; Fores, 120 Eng. Rep. at 654; Lawrence,
27 L.Q.R. at 123; Stockdale, 176 Eng. Rep. at 75); and Charles Palmer Phillips, The Law of Copjright
in Works offLiterature and Art (V. & R. Stevens, Sons & Haynes 1863) (the "dictum of Lord Chief
Justice Eyre [in Priestley] is also often quoted and properly so, to show that, in his opinion, the
criminality of a work deprived it of the character of property."); id. at 21.
274 Clearly, the issue lurking beneath the Curtis and Drone critiques of Eldon-that Eldon had
overreached his authority in forming conclusions about the nature of the works involved-could
be varyingly interpreted as either Eldon supplanting the authority of Statute of Anne, and thus the
legal sanctity of copyright, or Eldon allowing criminal violations to go unpunished. The latter
became the basis of consequentialist critiques found selectively in several earlier American rulings
and in criticisms of more recent rulings such as MitchellBrothers and jartech.
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The first explicit textual reference to the Clean Hands Doctrine in equity
appears to have been in Spence's Equitable Jurisdictionof the Court of Chancey.275
Spence acknowledged that the general principle, that "[t]he principle of this
Court is not to give relief to those who will not do equity," had been extended to
include broader moral duties consistent with the court's traditional role of
adding conscience to justice, and its "modem acceptation of a doctrine nearly
allied to, and a descendant of the above, namely, 'that a person must come into
court with clean hands.' "276 Spence then referenced Eyre's dictum in Dering
that there must be "an immediate and necessary relation [of alleged inequitable behaviorby
the plaintiff' to the equity sued for," as a condition to the general maxim. 277 This
trend in treatise construction was subsequently formalized in Snell's more
theoretical The Principles of Equity, a text designed for training law students that
prefaced its basic description of accepted doctrinal positions with an outline of
the general maxims of equity, one of which was explicitly phrased, "He who
comes into equity must come with clean hands." 278
Over a decade later, these general maxims were more elaborately described
in Pomeroy's A Treatise on Equity Juriprudence,27 9 which is considered the first
treatise to substantively acknowledge the clean hands maxim. 280 However,
Pomeroy clarified that the maxim was not a doctrine derived from rulings but
"rather a universal principle, and broadly regulate[d] the action of equity
courts ... in their administration of any and every species of relief' 281 regarding
the conduct of a plaintiff, as long as it is related to the matter in litigation and
275 1 SPENCE, supra note 33. See MADDOCK, supra note 247, at 404 (probably the first treatise
mention Francis' maxims, though without systematic treatment).

276 1 SPENCE, supra note 33, at 423.

277 Id. While Chafee identified Spence as the first real doctrinal compilation on equity, he
dismissed its reference to clean hands as "a single uninformative sentence to be all that the clean
hands maxim deserved." Chaffee I, supra note 28, at 884.
278 EDMUND HENRY TURNER SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 34 (Stevens & Haynes 1868).
See id. (referencing the Eyre dictum in Dering that a plaintiffs claim would be compromised by
"willful misconduct in regard to the matter in litigation, and not to any misconduct, however
gross, which is unconnected with the matter in litigation, and with which the opposite party in the
cause has no concern.").
279 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (A.L. Bancroft
& Co.
1881).
280 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
281 1 POMEROY, supra note 279, § 397. Pomeroy identifies this equitable principle as
"established from the earliest days" that the court would
never thus interfere on behalf of a plaintiff whose own conduct in connection
with the same matter or transaction had been unconscientious, or unjust, or
marked by a want of good faith, or had violated any of the principles of equity
or righteous dealing which it is the purpose of the jurisdiction to sustain.
Id. 5 398.
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with which the opposite party had a concern.282 If it were found that the
plaintiff who brought the action had in some manner acted against conscience,
good faith, or any other equitable principle, "then the doors of the court will be
shut against him [and the court would] refuse to interfere on his behalf, to
acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy." 283
The connection between the clean hands maxim and the piecemeal
evolution of doctrinal principles from the Eldon rulings in Walcot and Southey
was fused with the publication of Corpus juri. 284 This was an encyclopedic
American work whose section on copyright identified as standard an affirmative
defense to copyright infringement based on the clean hands maxim, stating
authoritatively:
An immoral work will not be protected; but general immorality or
illegal acts not affecting the particular right asserted in the suit is
no defense . . . Where plaintiffs work is itself a piracy, plaintiff

does not come into court with clean hands, and equity will afford
285
him no relief, although the infringement is clearly established.

282 Id.

399.

283 Id. § 397. Interestingly, Pomeroy only references very early English cases such as Bodly's Case
when focusing on courts' refusal to enforce illegal contracts as a form of prior criminal conduct
that might violate a plaintiffs obligation to act in good conscience. Pomeroy mentions none of
the Hardwicke or Eldon rulings on the civil side, nor the several standard treatises based on them.
Id. § 402 n.1.
284 13 C.J. COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 12 (William Mack & William Benjamin Hale
eds., 1917) (stating "Literary matter must be innocent in order to be the subject of property. No
protection will be accorded by the courts to what is illegal, immoral, or against public policy.").
See id. § 12 nn.81-83 (citing Wacot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1; Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1006; Gale, 171
Eng. Rep. at 588, and several American cases, and stipulating that this doctrine has been criticized
by Drone, Shortt, and Story). Consistent with the earlier classifications of works excluded from
protection, it maintained that
on the ground that the law will not lend its aid to protect the author or the
owner of an unlawful production, no copyright can be acquired in a work which
is of an indecent or immoral character, or which is otherwise illegal, as a libel, a
blasphemy, or a mere gambling device or instrumentality. But the illegality or
immorality must be inherent in the work.
Id. § 99 (citing Walot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1; Southey, 35 Eng. Rep. at 1006; Fores, 170 Eng. Rep. 654;
Dubost, 170 Eng. Rep. 1235, lawrence, 37 Eng. Rep. at 928; Byron v. Dugdale, (1823) 1 L.J. Ch.
239 (Ch.); Stockdale, 172 Eng. Rep. at 75, as well as American cases decided on the same
principle).
285 13 C.J., supra note 284, § 390.
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Most critical was its formal recognition that the "equitable doctrine of unclean
hands [w]as a defense in a copyright infringement action," specified explicitly as
the "unclean hands defense." 286
VIII. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE VAGARIES OF OBSCENITY
Because of the amorphous nature of the English legacy, the inclusion of the
Clean Hands Doctrine into American jurisprudence provides more than a few
twists and turns. Similar to the English patterns discussed above, the only
equity principles in early American case law were commonly accepted maxims
attributed directly to the Clean Hands Doctrine itself, mostly as applied to
contract performance and marital agreements. 287 The earliest cases regarding
literary property also depended on the authority of general equity principles and
established the practice of citing legal treatises. These cases followed the rubric
286 Id. § 13.09B. However, the equitable doctrine of unclean hands as a defense was noted as
seldom used and only when transgressions were serious and related to the subject matter of the
infringement action, such as misusing court process, falsifying evidence, or misrepresenting the
scope of copyright.
287 See, e.g., Mattox v. Mattox, 2 Ohio 233, 234 (1826) (regarding divorce proceedings: "This
application is to the equitable jurisdiction of the court, and must be decided by the principles
which prevail in courts of equity. The complainant must come with clean hands and a chaste
character, not stained with the same infamy and crime of which she complains. These parties are
in pari deicto, and to grant relief to either of them would be offering a bounty to guilt," citing
"prevailing principles."); Bank of the U.S. v. Owens, 27 U.S. 527, 538, 539 (1829) ("[N]o court of
justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity . .. There can be no civil right where
there can be no legal remedy, and there can be no legal remedy for that which is itself illegal.
That this is true of contracts violating the laws of morality, is recognized in the familiar maxim,
'ex turpi causa non oitur actio....'); Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. 264, 276 (1831) (regarding
specific performance: "The difference between that degree of unfairness which will induce a
court of equity to interfere actively by setting aside a contract, and that which will induce a court
to withhold its aid, is well settled . .. It is said that the plaintiff must come into court with clean
hands"; citing Maddock's reference to Francis' Maxims.); Tufts v. Tufts, 24 F. Cas. 288 (C.C.
Mass. 1847) (regarding specific performance: "When a trust or agreement is desired to be
enforced in chancery, under its extraordinary powers over trusts and specific performances, it is a
settled principle that it is to be done only in favor of those who have themselves acted legally, if
not equitably, in respect to the subject."); Creath's Adm'r v. Sims, 46 U.S. 192, 204 (1847)
(regarding specific performance: "Mhe following principles of equity jurisprudence, which may
be affirmed to be without exception;-that whosoever would seek admission into a court of
equity must come with clean hands; that such a court will never interfere in opposition to
conscience or good faith," alluding only to the authority of "general principles"); Bein v. Heath,
47 U.S. 228, 247 (1848) (regarding a surety: "It is a principle in chancery, that he who asks relief
must have acted in good faith. The equitable powers of this court can never be exerted [o]n
behalf of one who has acted fraudulently, or who by deceit or any unfair means has gained an
advantage. To aid a party in such a case would make this court the abettor of iniquity," termed a
"principle" in chancery.).
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of "clean hands," rather than delving deeply into the case law of the Hardwicke
or Eldon eras. 288
Unlike their English antecedents, however, American applications of the
Clean Hands Doctrine were complicated by the authorizing language of the
U.S. Constitution: "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." 289
That federal authorization followed the adoption of copyright statutes in twelve
of the thirteen original states between 1783 and 1786, which were adjudicated
according to the disparate judicial structures and customs in each state.290
Nonetheless, those state statutes were all geared toward advancing science and
knowledge to the public benefit, coinciding with Congress's legislative
purpose. 291 To conjoin English common law principles with that constitutional
language, American courts focused primarily on the original intent of the
constitutional empowerment itself. In practice, courts discerned whether a
particular literary work conformed with the statutory requirements for copyright
registration but also, and more importantly, with the broader constitutional
purpose of contributing materially to the promotion of progress. 292
288 The first case to establish the constitutional and statutory basis for copyright protection was
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834), which denied any common law authority other than that
embodied in the Constitution or federal statutes. Id. at 658. The opinion focused on whether
rights created by the Copyright Act of 1790, and the preconditions established therein, were
within congressional empowerment. Id. at 660-67. Like many of the cases heard by Eldon,
Wheaton involved a petition for injunction in a copyright matter, such that the district needed first
to establish that right at law. Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862 (case no. 17,486) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1832), overruled by Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) (as to whether the works at issue were
the subject of literary property, "Let the complainants go to the law side of the court, and if they
shall establish their right there, they may return and claim the aid of this court to protect that
right."). See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundadon of American Copyrnght Law.- Exploding the
Myth of Common Law Copynght, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1178-85 (1983) (discussing common law
copyright in England and colonial and early Republic America).
289 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 reads: "The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries," with the selection of means at its
(limited) discretion under art. 1, S 8, cl.18. That Congress has chosen to protect copyright,
patents and trademarks in different ways by statute under this empowerment has led to a rich and
complicated case law and secondary literature, especially since both patent and trademark laws
specify exclusion of certain types of works, while copyright law has, since 1909, purposely
avoided such specification, presuming to promote the broadest range of literary creativity thereby,
as discussed in Mitchel/Brothers,604 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1979).
290 Kempin, supra note 241, at 47 (discussing the difficulty in discerning patterns of how state
jurisdictions followed previous case rulings).
291 Abrams, supra note 288, at 1171-77.
292 See Michael Birnhack, The Idea ofProgressin Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 (2001)
(tracing contemporaneous notions of "progress" in English law and early American state
copyright laws); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Properiy Clause: Promotions of Progrerssas a
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Critical to understanding the federal empowerment was the founders' intent
behind the words "progress" and "science" and the latitude with which
Congress could legislate toward those ends. In its eighteenth century meaning,
"science" encompassed the broadest range of learning and knowledge.293 With
few exceptions, the courts eschewed narrowing copyright protection to only
specifically scientific or useful works and resisted the temptation to evaluate the
contributory worth of any particular work. 294 However, the core notion of
"progress" presented a somewhat more complex interpretive issue.
In
particular, courts grappled with whether "progress" constituted a constraint on
the direction and latitude of congressional action or a precondition on which any
discrete work could be disqualified for copyright protection. In the end,
American jurisprudence tended to view Congress's latitude very liberally and
assumed that if Congress wished to impose content restrictions on copyright
eligibility, it would do so. 295
For example, in the American case of Keene v. Kimbal 296 the court initiated
the practice of interpreting the intent of the constitutional prescription in the
Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Propery Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771 (2006) (examining a record of
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to discern contemporaneous meanings of draft language
of the copyright clause).
293 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 47, § 3 (describing the Constitutional grant of authority
regarding "progress" in "science").
294 The view that the copyright clause narrowed copyright eligibility to works that demonstrably
and positively contributed to basic knowledge within certain prescribed parameters was largely
abandoned in Bleistein v. Donaldson, 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Justice Holmes declared with regard to
copyright of circus posters:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation .. . At the other end, copyright would
be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial valueit would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value,
and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
Id. at 251-52. Holmes thus countered Harlan's narrower and dismissive view that "a pictorial
illustration designed and useful only as an advertisement, and having no intrinsic value other than
its function as an advertisement, must be equally without the obvious meaning of the
Constitution." Id. at 252. See 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, sapra note 47, %§3.7, 3.9 (describing the
Court's adoption of a nondiscrimination principle regarding determination of a work's copyright
claim derived from Bleistein and thereafter focusing copyright eligibility on minimalist definitions
of originality).
295 See 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 47, § 3 (examining the historical evidence regarding
the original intent of section eight as both a grant and a limitation).
296 82 Mass. 545 (1860), overruledin partby Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882). This was
one of at least three suits brought by Laura Keene against proprietors of other theatres that were
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context of subsequent copyright statutory language. The court concluded
implicitly that the protection of illicit or immoral materials was not reasonably
consistent with that purpose, yet it recognized that social mores would
inevitably change over time. 297 Similarly, in what is commonly considered the
benchmark American copyright case regarding works of questionable nature, in
Martinetti v. Maguire,298 the court upheld the defendant's legal claim to property
in a theatrical play but simultaneously denied him copyright protection because
the play was deemed immoral and not the kind of material originally intended
for protection. 299 Neither Keene nor Martinetti held that the copyright of the
staging Tom Taylor's comedic "Our American Cousin." Keene had purchased the American
production rights in 1858 but had not published it in a traditional manner to claim copyright
under statute, instead claiming copyright under common law. In Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180
(1860) (C.C.E.D. Pa.), defense counsel countered persuasively that the play had been presented to
an indiscriminate audience night after night, in effect rendering it "public" to the degree that
those who could remember it could easily produce a rendition without infringement, an argument
then repeated in Keene v. Kimbal. However, both rulings turned on whether Keene had property in
the play under the language of the Copyright Act of 1856 and only in passing mentioned its ribald
or satirical (and perhaps libelous) parts of the script. In other words, no unclean hands defense
was claimed or needed as Keene was denied exclusive use since she had presented the play
publicly. In the later Keene ruling, the Court revisited many English and American case rulings
(including Southey v. Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.) and Murmay v. Elliston, (1821) 166
Eng. Rep. 1331 (K.B.)) and treatises (especially CURTIs, supra note 265 and EDEN, supra note 246)
and considered it well settled that an author of a play relinquished common law copyright by its
first performance in public. Keene, 82 Mass. at 545.
297 Keene, 82 Mass. at 548-49 ("Courts will not interfere to vindicate the claims of any party to
the exclusive enjoyment or disposal of an immoral or licentious production; but the particular
application once made of this rule of the common law, in conformity with the peculiar opinions,
sentiments or prejudices of one generation of men, will not control its application in a state of
society where different views prevail."). As to strictly informational works, statutory intent had
been the basis of an earlier ruling that newspaper copy was ineligible for copyright protection
because a newspaper was not considered a book and was not suited by its nature to promote
science within the meaning and intent of the Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. Clayton v.
Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (1829). The statute's protection was "not intended for the encouragement of
mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences," id. at 1003, supported by Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879).
298 Martinetti v. McGuire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867). The "Black Crook," the musical
song and dance extravaganza featuring semi-nude women, was initially staged in New York, then
licensed by the author to theater owners around the country. 2 RUSSELL SANJEK, AMERICAN
POPULAR MUSIC AND ITS BUSINESS: THE FIRST FOUR HUNDRED YEARS 304-07 (1988). It became
the subject of litigation when staged by an unlicensed entrepreneur in San Francisco.
299 Martineli, 16 F. Cas. at 922-23 (the play was "a mere spectacle ... an exhibition of women
'lying about loose' or otherwise, [and was] not a dramatic composition, and, therefore, not
entitled to the protection of the copyright act. ... [It was] grossly indecent, and calculated to
corrupt the morals of the people ... [and not] 'suited for public presentation' . . . [not]
promot[ing] the progress of science or useful arts."). Although the court dawdled momentarily
on whether the play was a "dramatic composition" as specified by the Copyright Act of 1856, its
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literary property at issue was illegal or inappropriate but only that the immoral
nature of the works at issue was inconsistent with the constitutional purpose of
protecting copyrights, thereby disentitling these works to court protection.300
Martinetti seemed to countenance denial of copyright protection on policy
grounds related to obscene content, and in the process, it presaged how
ambiguities regarding the immorality and the prevailing social mores of one age
might be considered differently years later, anticipating an inevitable easing in
permissiveness.
The fluidity of moral standards was graphically illustrated in two cases that
seemingly came to contrary conclusions. The court in Broder v. Zeno Mauvis
Music Co.301 denied copyright protection to song lyrics considered to have "an
indelicate and vulgar meaning," even though testimony attributed to a unique
cultural context. 302 Yet in Simonton v. Gordon,303 twenty-seven years later and in a
different state's court, the plaintiff author, whose novel depicted the conditions
of life in rural West Africa, won injunctive relief despite its inclusion nof crude
and shocking content.304 In these and other American cases, the purported
obscene content was challenged rather than the legality of the copyright itself,
and yet the very subjectivity of the doctrines defining obscenity rendered
ruling was primarily predicated on the statutory language that confined copyright protection to
compositions "designed or suited for public presentation." Id. This language was subsequently
removed in 1870, as noted by the Fifth Circuit in MitchellBros., 604 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1979).
In Martineifi, it was the staging of the performance, rather than its scripted or unscripted
book,
that spawned charges of immorality.
300 Marlineuiwas the first American case to set aside the pure common law argument that there
can be no property in obscene works and to argue that works for which a copyright was
legitimately registered under law could still be denied copyright protection because of public
policy and the purpose of constitutional provisions and statutes establishing copyright
protections. Problematically, it did so without citing authority from previous English or
American cases, or from treatises or other works on equity.
30188 F. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898). The copyright to a "coon song" entitled "Dora Dean,
the
Hottest Thing You Ever Seen," written and performed by Bert Williams in New York in
1897,
was subsequently sold to Zeno Mauvis and then challenged as plagiarized a year later by another
performer in California. See 2 SANJEK, supra note 298, at 286-87. While Williams' copyright on
the melody was sustained, his copyright on the lyrics was questioned on moral grounds-the
same grounds that dissuaded the publisher from sending printed copies of the sheet music
through the mails until Williams changed the lyric from "hottest" to "sweetest." Id.
302 Broder, 88 F. at 78 ("[M]usical compositions of an immoral character not being protected
by
copyright.").
303 Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
3 Id. at 124 ("[N]either the book not the [plagiarizing] play is elevating ... [b]oth
are
unnecessarily coarse and highly sensual. They nonetheless purport to deal with actual conditions
as they are known to exist in tropical countries, and, if such conditions be dealt with in a manner
that is not calculated to arouse lust in those who read the book or see the play, it is doubtful if a
charge of immorality may successfully be maintained."); see also Rogers, supra note 57, at 398.
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uniform application more and more unsustainable as moral standards inevitably
305
changed over time, as Keene anticipated.
Over time, the conflation of cultural regulation of immorality and statutory
regulation of obscenity came to dominate the legal debate over whether
materials of questionable content could be registered for copyright at all and, if
so, whether registration might in some manner require their equitable
protection regardless of content. In England, questions of evil tendency in
literary works initially focused on whether mainstream political or religious
values were being publicly challenged. But by the 1840s, criminal prosecution
for seditious or blasphemous libel had become sporadic, in part yielding to the
difficulty of persuading juries of the eminent evil tendencies of any given
literary work.30 6 Following the passage of the Obscene Publications Act of
1857,3o7 which provided no operative definition of obscene tendency, the
English courts were pressed to develop their own notion of obscene tendency
in order to guide juries hearing prosecutions of allegedly illicit literary works.
That process was complicated by long-standing jurisdictional precedent
dictating which courts oversaw protection of public morality under common
law. The result was a juxtaposition of two centuries of scattered common law
precedent onto statutory language that provided no definition of the criminal
offense.308 Moreover, debate continued over whether juries had authority to
render findings of fact regarding a work's tendency, or even to consider an
author's intent. 309 While these issues might have been considered resolved by

305 See supra text accompanying note 296.

6 MARSH, supra note 51. Even before the passage of Fox's Libel Act, juries had become
disenchanted with being charged only with determining whether or not a defendant published the
work in question and had begun to openly consider a defendant's intent, despite bench directives
to the contrary. This produced in some cases "mixed" verdicts, where the jury found the
defendant guilty of publishing the work as a question of fact but not guilty of an intent to
undermine public morals. See Alexander, stpra note 53, at 420-23 (discussing the degree to which
juries could consider a defendant's motive rather than intuiting it from his alleged action).
307 See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also M.J.D. Roberts, Morals,Art, and the Law: The
Passing of the Obscene PubicationsAct, 1857, 28 VIcrORIAN STUD. 609 (1985) (discussing the debates
surrounding passage of the Act); Harling, supra note 158, at 110 (discussing the difficulties in
attaching subversive meanings to radical language, especially in lyrics or parodies, as writers
learned evasive styles of writing; after the 1792 Fox Libel Act, juries returned verdicts of "guilty
of publishing" after the government failed to prove malicious intent); Manchester, Lord Campbell's
Act, supra note 56.
308 See Roberts, supra note 307, at 615-20 (discussing the debates surrounding the passage of the
Act).
309 See general# Alexander supra note 53, at 420-25 (discussing the jury's role in applying the
Obscene Publication Act of 1857).
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Fox's Libel Act in 1792,310 they remained very much at play in the English
courts, where judges were reticent to concede that prerogative. 311
All of these issues reached a loggerhead in R v. Hicklin,312 a simple obscene
libel prosecution of a defendant who had distributed pamphlets critical of the
Catholic Church. For the first time, the jury was directed to use a specific
definition of the criminal obscenity-literary works of illicit tendency were
those which tended to "deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall." 313 At that point, the statutory vacuum was filled by a doctrinal "test" for
whether a literary work had an illegal obscene tendency. It was utilized
consistently for the next seventy-five yearS31 4 and additionally allowed courts to
deny copyright protection on substantive grounds. 315
See OLDHAM, supra note 254, at 230-35 (describing the enactment of Fox's Libel Act).
See supra text accompanying note 309.
312 (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360. See general# Alexander, supra note 53,
at 414-26 (analyzing the
Hicklin ruling in doctrinal context of obscenity law at the time).
313 Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371. The "Hicklin test" was doctrinally established
by its use in Steele
v. Brannan, (1872) 7 P.C. 261, 266-67 (Eng.) ("The book is one which would manifestly tend to
deprave and corrupt the morals, more especially of the young and inexperienced ... and ... is
consequently obscene within the meaning of the statute . . . ."). It was followed in R v. Bradlaugh,
(1877) 2 Q.B.D. 569, and was then doctrinally confirmed in W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF
THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 404 (1881). The Hicklin Test also arguably followed a line of
earlier common law precedents reflected in STARKIE, which maintained that "[i]t is now fully
established, that any immodest and immoral publication, tending to corrupt the mind, and destroy
the love of decency, morality, and good order, is punishable in the temporal Courts...
STARKIE, supra note 247, at 447.
314 The Hickin test was amalgamated into American jurisprudence after the
Supreme Court
ruled in ExparteJackson,96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877), that Congress was empowered to refuse the use
of the U.S. Postal Service to distribute matter "injurious to the public morals." See Alexander,
supra note 53, at 426-27. See generaly Donna Dennis, Obscenity Law and Its Consequences in MidNineteenth Centuy America, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 43 (2007). The Hicklin test was first held
governing in United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1879) and United States v.
Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733-34 (1889). But it was later tempered by rulings that took into
consideration the positive societal value contributed by the literary work at question, such as
United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Judge Learned Hand cautioning that
strict adherence to the Hicklin test would "reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of a child's
library in the supposed interest of the salacious few"). See also United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d
564, 568-69 (2d Cir. 1930); Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318 (1930) (finding Theodore
Dreier's American Tragedy, which was considered an important literary work criminally obscene);
Stephen Gillers, A Tendemy to Deprave and Corrupt-The Transformation ofAmer ican Obscenity Law from
Hicklin to Ulysses II, 85 WASH. L. REv. 215, 232-59 (2007) (discussing Hicklin's effect on
American jurisprudence).
315 Ironically, as the issue of the publisher's intent came within the purview
of the jury's
consideration, focus tended to shift to the anticipated negative effect of distributing the work in
public-whether it could or did undermine social mores and, in particular, whether that effect
310

311

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2013

89

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2

298

J.

NTEILL PROP.L

[Vol. 20:209

Likewise, defining illicit sexual tendency in literary works became a recurring
consideration in the latter half of the nineteenth century in American
jurisprudence. While a number of states passed anti-obscenity statutes after
1820, few cases were actually prosecuted, and those focused on procedural
316
The few
questions or the exact statutory language regarding prohibition.
earlier cases that broached the issue of constitutional interpretation treated
Hicklin as singularly governing.317 In later cases, however, the judicial landscape
came to be dominated by federal prosecution under the Comstock Act of
318
defendants who sent allegedly obscene publications through the mail.
The watershed in the evolution of American obscenity doctrine undoubtedly
was the litigation surrounding James Joyce's Ulysses, which had been serialized in
over twenty installments in The Lttle Review between March 1918 and its
prosecution in October 1920. The book was only prosecuted when the
publishers began mailing copies to potential subscribers, inadvertently sending
319
Only the first four
one to the daughter of a prominent New York attorney.

could be produced by a reader's exposure to isolated passages or the underlying narrative of the
entire work, and whether negative effects could be mitigated by or even become supportive of
social mores. This opened the prospect that a work, while including questionable passages or a
narrative that challenged social mores, might serve some broader purpose consistent with the
Statute of Anne ("the encouragement of learning") and the U.S. Constitution ("to promote
progress").
316 While earlier state prosecutions were based on common law, such as Commonwealth v.
Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (1815) (display of lewd paintings) and Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17
Mass. 336 (1821) (publication of an obscene book including lewd prints), later prosecutions were
largely directed at violations of state laws prohibiting publishing, selling, or distributing immoral
or indecent pictures, newspapers, and magazines, which arguably offered little literary value. See
FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 9-14 (1976) (detailing the historical evolution
of American obscenity law and its doctrinal facets).
317 In United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.N.Y. 1879), the court relied entirely on
Hickln, which focused on the illicit effect of parts of a literary work on any subset of the possible
audience and its presumption of illicit intent drawn from the work itself, rather than on
protestations of benign or even good intent. See Alexander, supra note 53, at 426-30 (discussing
how basic regimes of criminal law of obscene libel carried over into Bennet/) and Gillers, supra note
314, at 225-46 (describing the basic tenets of Hickln and Bennett as the first American case to cite
it).
318 38 Cong. Ch. 90, March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 507 (Mar. 3, 1873) (prohibiting the mailing of
obscene publications and strengthening 13 Stat. 507 § 16 (1865), the first federal criminal
obscenity statute prohibiting such use of the mails, which was subsequently upheld in Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877)). The Act also precipitated a wave of obscenity prosecutions
associated with Anthony Comstock.). See SCHAUER, supra note 316, at 12-22. During the same
period, customs officers attempted to develop operative definitions of obscenity consistent with
enforcement of the Custom Law of 1842, 5 Stat. 566 § 28, which called for the seizure and
destruction of any obscene materials attempting to enter the United States.
319 See Gillers, supra note 314, at 251-62 (describing the prosecution of the serialization of
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issues were registered with the Copyright Office under the publisher's name
under the Copyright Act of 1909, after which postal authorities began to
suppress issues and revoked the magazine's second-class postage privileges.
The publishers were subsequently fined $100 and enjoined from publishing the
work further, as the court found that parts of the work, in their "frank
expression," were harmful to the morals of the community.320 Effectively
ostracized from publishing his work in book form in America, Joyce agreed to
its full text publication in English under French imprint in 1922 and later to its
importation to test its legality under relatively unsettled Customs obscenity
standards. 321 Its admission, if allowed, would signal that American publishers
might safely consider issuing their own editions and would render the work
immediately vulnerable to piracy, depriving the author of the argument that it

Ulysses in THE LIrLE REVIEW in 1920); Robert Spoo, Copyright Protectionismand Its Discontents: The
Case ofJamesJoyce's Usses'inAmerica, 108 YALE L.J. 633, 636-38 (1998) (describing the revocation
of mailing privileges for THE LiT=1E REVIEW as probable cause for it not seeking copyright
registration for its issues after 1918). Suppressive actions by the Post Office may have dissuaded
the publishers from registering later installments, presuming the Copyright Office was implicitly
authorized to deny registration by the dictum enunciated in Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379
(N.D.N.Y. 1913), that "to be entitled to be copyrighted, the composition
must be 'original,
meritorious, and free from illegality or immorality.' " This phraseology of the dictum was likely
quoted from 9 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROC. 907-10 (William Mack & Howard
Nash eds., 1903),
which cited Bkistein, Bmder, Martinetti,Stockdak, Southy, Lawrence, Walcot, and indirectly Shook, and
was subsequently published in digests, treatises, and cases as the accepted interpretation of
section five of the Copyright Act of 1909, which, in fact, contained no reference at all to
exceptions based on content and was clearly included in the Act to caution against any such
interpretation.
320 People v. Anderson & Heap (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 22, 1921). The publishers
chose not to
appeal, assuming a loss at the appellate level would compromise Joyce's ability to publish the
unexpurgated work as a book in the United States, see Gillers, supra note 314, at 264 (describing
the legal implications of losing at the appellate level). Yet, there is some question as to whether
an appeal would have lost, given the changes in how courts treated obscenity
in literary works,
particularly moving away from the presumptive harm of the Hicklin test. Id. at 268. Justice
Learned Hand presaged this shift in UnitedStates v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1913),
by dissenting that obscenity must be gauged against an author's "honestly relevant" effort to
explore ideas, speculating that a time could come "when men think innocent all that which is
honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it may mince its words." Successful countersuits against the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice for malicious prosecution also
changed the trend, as in Halsey v. N.Y. Socy for the Suppression of Vice, 185 N.Y.S. 931 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1920). See Gillers, supra note 314, at 265-74 (detailing a sequence of prosecution losses
between 1918 and 1922).
321Spoo, supra note 314, at 639-41 (describing the importation of the French
edition of Uysses
and its immediate piracy by Samuel Roth). See also Jay A. Gertzman, Not Quite Honest: Samuel
Roth's "Unauthoriked" 'Ulysses' and the 1927 InternationalProtest,2009 JOYCE STUD. ANN. 34 (2009)
(describing Roth's visualization of Ulysses in his Two Worlds Monthy).
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was yet unpublished or that he could secure a valid copyright in the United
States.3 "
When the Paris edition succeeded in gaining entry into the United States,
freed from Customs impoundment by the now-seminal ruling of John
Woolsey 323 Random House rushed an American edition into print and filed for
copyright registration, touching off decades of legal debate over whether the
324
Most germane to the
American edition could be copyrighted at all.
substantive issues regarding the work's copyrightability was Woolsey's finding
325
that, while the author's narrative contained some dicey language, the work did
not (on balance) convey the impression of one calculated to elicit lustful
thoughts. 326 More critical to our discussion was the ruling by the second circuit
affirming Woolsey, finding in part:
Art certainly cannot advance under compulsion to traditional
forms, and nothing in such a field is more stifling to progress
than limitation of the right to experiment with a new technique.
The foolish judgments of Lord Eldon about one hundred years
ago, proscribing the works of Byron and Southey, and the finding

322 Even if Joyce had succeeded in importing copies of Ulysses, he was precluded from
registering it for copyright (and from claiming infringement) as a full text publication in the
United States based on 5 15 of the 1909 Act. This provision that copyright eligibility was
preconditioned on first or simultaneous publication in the United States, which had been
impossible in 1922 following the conviction of The Little Review. See Spoo, supra note 266, at 64447 (explaining the foreign language exception in the 1909 Act and how it applied to Ulysses).
Shortly after Customs's seizure of 500 copies of Ulysses in late 1922, New York publisher Samuel
Roth, without authorization, began to print expurgated installments of the work Two Worlds
Monthly. Joyce's only legal recourse was to sue Roth for unauthorized use of his name as author
in 1927, gaining an injunction in Joyce v. Roth (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 29, 1927), which the court
ordered unreported but reprinted in Transition, no. 16-17 (Paris, June 1929), at 205-06. By that
time, however, the Monthly had gone out of production due to sagging sales. A year later, Roth
published the first unauthorized book-length version of Ulysses and was jailed again for parole
violation from a previous obscenity conviction. See Gertzman, supra note 321, at 39-40.
323 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (ruling that
Customs seizure of the book was inappropriate as it was not obscene). This was subsequently
sustained by United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulsses" by James Joyce, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cit. 1934)
(rejecting the Hickkn precedent because it precluded consideration of intent or relied solely on
isolated passages, which was considered an inaccurate reading of Hickin).
324 Spoo, supra note 319, at 654-67.
325 Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 184 (though considered "dirty" and perhaps shocking to some, the
colloquially descriptive language used by Joyce was admittedly known "to almost all men,
and . .. to many women, and are such words as would be naturally and habitually used").
was
326 In fact, this mirrored the jury's finding in Hicktin and other cases in which the defendant
found guilty of the act of publication but not guilty of any intention to harm the public.
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by the jury under a charge by Lord Denman that the publication
of Shelley's "Queen Mab" was an indictable offense are a warning
to all who have to determine the limits of the field within which
authors may exercise themselves. We think that Ulysses is a book
of originality and sincerity of treatment and that it has not the
effect of promoting lust.327
As testament to the durability of the Clean Hands Doctrine, even in its apparent
abandonment of the Hicklin test, the Court continued to rely on the
interpretation of Eldon's equity rulings as substantive rather than procedural
and his ratio as the bellwether for the paternalistic protection of traditionalist
values. 328
The effect was a progressive judicial balancing of the anticipated evil effect
of such an appeal to sensual curiosity on the behavior of some against the
potential broader public good served by the work's overall literary value, which
the courts had recognized could not be measured contemporaneously. There
were simply too many instances in which one generation's literary transgression
could easily become the next generation's literary classic. It was this type of
balancing that became established, again by dictum, in Roth in 1957, with
subsequent refinements attempting to recalibrate how the court could evaluate
social value, estimate imminent effect of illicit tendency, and doctrinally accept
the elements. 329 That works of social value could overcome suspicion of illicit
327One Book Entitled "Ulsses," 72 F.2d at 708. That the court was compelled by whether the
work was a "sincere treatment" seemed to follow Learned Hand's "honest relevancy" test
introduced in United States v. Kennery, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). Woolsey's reference to Lord
Chief justice Denman's charge to the jury was from his hearing, during the blasphemy
prosecution of Edward Moxon for publication of a complete volume of Shelley's works,
including, for the first time, an unexpurgated Queen Mab, in R v. Moxon, (1841) 4 ST. TR. 693
(Q.B.). See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
328Chief Justice Denman's charge reflected his view that while it was up to each man of
learning to judge for himself arguments regarding Christian faith, the prosecution had placed
before the jury the obligation to decide whether the indicted lines were "calculated to shock the
feelings of any Christian reader ... [and, if not] neutralized by any remarks in the margin, by any
note of explanation or apology .. . they were libels on God, and indictable." R. v. Moxon, (1841)
4 St. Tr. at 721. At no point could one argue that Eldon "proscribed" the works of Byron or
Southey beyond his sustaining the doctrinal practice of directing questionable works to law to
determine whether an author could claim property in them at equity. Ironically, as even Eldon
himself realized, rather than proscribing Southey's Wat Tyler, his ruling precipitated its immediate
wider distribution. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. As stated above, Byron's claims to
property in his works were mostly sustained at equity, except for those regarding Cain and Don
Juan VI-VII, which were directed to law.
329See smpra note 10 and accompanying text. That the enforceable definition of obscenity remains
an unsettled area of law is commonly understood. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 53, at 393-97.
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nature and impact reopened the question of the general copyrightability of
330
questionable works, which had been only of peripheral concern in Uysses.
Inevitably, the rush to copyright such materials, which was a prerequisite to
filing claims for copyright infringement, was dramatic, placing pressure on the
Office of the Attorney General to rule on whether such materials could under
copyright law be denied registration. Predictably, but to the dismay of those
concerned with the proliferation of pornographic materials in society, the
Attorney General advised that while the law did not preclude denial of
registration of materials that met all formal requirements on grounds of public
policy, it also did not mandate administrative screening of such materials nor
331
The lack of statutorilyprovide standards that might be used to do so.
prescribed standards for exclusion of works from copyright eligibility,
combined with court rulings that reflected that standards "vary from time to
time," 332 effectively made it impossible for the Register to screen works with
appropriate due process and raised the broader policy question of whether it
was "appropriate for the Register to undertake to be a conservator of public
morals." 333
In a sense, then, it may be more apropos to assert that the Clean Hands
Doctrine was established by the authors of legal treatises on equity in the later
part of the nineteenth century rather than by Eldon or even Hardwicke. That
those treatises invested little effort in deciphering the ratio behind the cases they
rather routinely cited as governing insured that the Doctrine would be widely
cited and little understood based on its nuanced application. Moreover, despite

330 Random House understood that Uysses was legally unprotectable under the ad interim
requirements of the 1909 Copyright Act as a foreign work published in English and effectively
already in the public domain. See Spoo, supranote 319, at 643-47. Beyond that, Random House
could only rely upon the trade's practice of "courtesy copyright," an informal agreement of other
publishers not to publish a work already published by one of their own, as a means of avoiding
unauthorized publication. Id. at 656-59.
33141 Op. Att'y Gen. 395 (Dec. 18, 1958). While acknowledging that copyright law does not
restrict eligibility for registration based on "content which is or might be illegal," id. at 399, the
report nonetheless noted the common law assumption "that seditious, libelous, obscene or
immoral works are not entitled to copyright," id. (citing DRONE) and arguing that such judicial
authority existed because no rulings had been found to the contrary, and in fact, such authority
had already been exercised in a range of American cases, including Martinetii, Broder, Barnes v.
Miner, 122 F. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1903), Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947), and
Hoffman. The basis of that authority "[wa]s not spelled out in the opinions with either precision
or uniformity." 41 Op. Att'y Gen. at 399.
332 41 Op. Att'y Gen. at 401 (citing Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1925)).
333 Id at 402. In fact, the report acknowledged that copyright protection had, in the past, been
denied to otherwise duly-registered works more as "an exercise of equity discretion rather than
upon copyright law." Id. at 400 n.4.
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variations in how rulings distinguished between a work's content and its
potential immoral or illicit tendency,334 the application of the Clean Hands
Doctrine to literary property began to shift. The doctrine began to focus not
on the battles over proprietary rights but instead, however implicitly, on the
right of the public as a third party to be insulated from the evil tendencies of
immoral or illicit published works.335 Whether that line of legal argument added
up to a doctrine is questionable, given that Mitchell Brothers seemed to abandon it
so easily.

334 In later American cases, courts differentiated carefully between works (particularly "art"
works) that had intrinsically immoral content (as had apparently been ruled earlier in Fares v.
Johnes, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 654 (K.B.), from those that portended immoral consequence (such as
in Priestly, supra note 58, and Dubost v. Beresford, (1810) 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (K.B.)). For example,
in Richardson v. Miller, 20 F. Cas. 722, 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1877), regarding an affirmative obscenity
defense of an unauthorized replication of the plaintiffs playing card design, the court found
"there is nothing immoral or improper in the prints themselves, the fact that they may be used by
persons to violate laws against gambling, does not, of itself, deprive them of the protection of the
law." Similarly, in Egbert v. Greenberg, 100 F. 447 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900), the court turned aside
defense arguments that plaintiff's copyrighted racing forms, though "expressly and exclusively
designed to facilitate [legal] gambling operations ... [and] in no sense [contributed] to human
knowledge," had legitimate uses sufficient to provide copyright protection. Id at 449.
335 This point was made explicitly in Shook P.Da#, 49 How. Pr. 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875), which
initially enjoined the defendant from producing a variation of a play. That the plaintiff had
purchased the production rights in the United States arguably merited common law copyright.
Ironically, on rehearing, the defendant's variation of the play was found to be sufficiently
different from the plaintiffs work, and his own claim to property was then upheld. However, the
court continued the injunction because it considered the play immoral:
If this play, or any literary production, is of that [immoral] character, it is no part
of the office of this court to protect it by injunction or otherwise. The rights of
the author are secondary to the right of the public, to be protected from what is
subversive of good morals.
Shook, 19 How. Pr. at 368. That protection of an author's rights should be of secondary
importance to the broader public interest was later supported in UnitedStates P.ParamountPictures,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). The Paramountcourt sustained the extension of copyright protection to
all works regardless of their respective quality in order to fulfill the broader purpose of promoting
creative genius in some of them, citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,286 U.S. 123 (1932). As the Court
stated in Fox
the copyright is the creature of the Federal statute passed in the exercise of the
power vested in the Congress. As this Court has repeatedly said, the Congress
did not sanction an existing right but created a new one .. . The sole interest of
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.
Id. at 127. More to the point, a general grant of copyright protection would more fully benefit the
public than would extending copyright to a discrete work. Id. at 130.
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IX. DEATH KNELL
The Clean Hands Doctrine remains a significant common law basis for
affirmative defenses in many areas of American jurisprudence; the question is
whether it has doctrinal weight in American copyright law beyond procedural
From its English antecedents emerged an awkward
considerations. 336
juxtaposition of statutory prescriptions onto established common law
precedent.337 This created an apparent doctrinal exclusion of property in
immoral works whereby a court could not extend copyright protection to such
works as a matter of public policy. This was drawn into the earliest American
copyright infringement cases involving such works,338 with little statutory

33 T. Leigh Anenson argues that because the merger of equity and law in the 1930s was widely
considered procedural and that an affirmative defense based on the Clean Hands Doctrine was
considered fundamentally substantive in that it focused on the content of works as related to
plaintiff's behavior, practitioners and courts assumed that an unclean hands defense did not
involve procedural considerations. Anenson found, instead, that since the merger, courts have
focused principally on the degree to which a plaintiffs conduct might have biased the legal
proceeding-basically a procedural consideration. Ironically, the substantive outcome initially
sought through the Clean Hands Doctrine was the protection of the integrity of the judicial
system. Anenson, supra note 46. See also T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A PostMergerJustificationof UncleanHands, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 455 (2008).
337 In the English circumstance, the purpose served by the Statute of Anne was described in its
preface: "for the encouragement of learned men," 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, a purpose alluded to as
governing in early English case law but which was abandoned in subsequent statutory language
while still being retained as a governing principle in case precedent. In American jurisprudence,
the purpose of copyright legislation was drawn from the explicit language of the Copyright
Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Subsequent statutory language built upon it, interpreted
through the filter of common law precedent.
338 Keene v. Kimbal, 82 Mass. 545, 548-49 (Mass. 1860) ("Courts will not interfere to vindicate
the claims of any party to the exclusive enjoyment or disposal of an immoral or licentious
production" as an application of "this rule of the common law"); Shook v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366,
368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875); Richardson v. Miller, 20 F. Cas. 723 (C.C. Mass. 1877) (the works were
"not the fit subject of copyright [since] Courts of justice will not lend their aid to protect the
authors of immoral works"); Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 78-79 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1898) (the work containing lyrics that had "an indelicate and vulgar meaning," rendering the song
"morally objectionable, musical compositions of an immoral character not being protected by
copyright"); Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913) (stating in dictum that to
be entitled to copyright, a work must be "original, meritorious, and free from illegality or
immorality"); Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) ("The rule that there can
be no copyright in any blasphemous, seditious, immoral, or libelous work rests in sound
principles of public policy." (citing ARTHUR W. WELL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 195-96
(1917)). All of these authorities were then summarized (but accurately portrayed as "scattered")
by the Office of the Attorney General:
It has been generally accepted for years that seditious, libellous, obscene or
immoral works are not entitled to copyright . .Judicial authority to support this
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guidance on specific types of works that were intended for protection beyond
mixed views of the imperatives of the copyright clause itself.339 The purpose of
the Clean Hands Doctrine itself, however, remained unequivocal, consistent
with earlier chancery rulings:
The governing principle has long been settled. It is that a court
will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean

view exists; none has been found to the contrary. While the basis for the
conclusion is not spelled out .. . with either precision or uniformity, copyright
protection has been denied in a number of cases at least in part because of the
obscene or immoral content of the work involved.
41 Op. Att'y Gen. 395, 399 (Dec. 18, 1958).
It was, in effect, a doctrinal authority by inertia and to some degree default, soon thereafter
reflected in Dane v. M. & H. Co., 1963 WL 8060 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) ("[The work, while
entertaining and amusing, was not copyrightable.").
Dane was based on several doctrines
subsequently criticized as "vestiges of a bygone era... that judges should act as conservators of
the public morality," MitchellBrothersH, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
339 Martinettiv. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) was the first ruling in which a court
found a work ineligible for statutory protection because it did not promote progress as the
Copyright Clause directed and because it did not comply with statutory specification as neither a
dramatic composition nor suitable for presentation in public. Id. at 922. Later, in Barnes v. Miner,
122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903), the court argued by implication that while the Constitution
precluded obscenity from the realm of copyright protection, a work that was shocking and
depraved in part could still be protected if the overall narrative was morally contrite. Yet the
court did not extend constitutional authority to the Register of Copyrights to deny registration to
such works. See also Schneider, supra note 66, at 702 (arguing that even if obscenity is not
copyrightable subject matter, "it is a long, and perhaps unfounded, step to the principle that the
Registrar has authority to deny registration of a claim to copyright where the claimant tenders
obscene material"). Other cases alluding to statutory purpose or language as governing were Cain
v. UniversalPictures, 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (stating that the legal definition of
obscenity was a matter of statutory language); and Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex.
1947) ("Copyright provisions ... were never intended to protect illegality, or immorality. They
are for the purpose of promoting the 'progress of science and the useful arts.' "); Khan v. Feist, 70
F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), af'd 165 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947) (finding the plaintiffs work
"salacious, immoral and lewd," and "not subject to copyright protection").
These were
substantively and persuasively contradicted by United States v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 334 U.S.
131, 158 (1948) (the purpose of copyright protection is served by providing support for all works
or potential works, not simply those of any one author); and culminating in Belcher v. Tarbox, 486
F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973) ("There is nothing in the Copyright Act to suggest that the courts
are to pass upon the truth or falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views embodied in a
copyrighted work ... It is surely not a task lightly to be assumed, and we decline the invitation to
assume it."). See also Jean S. Perwin, Copyrght - Infringement- FraudulentMaterials Copynghtable Belcher v. Tarbox, 16 BOSTON COL. L. REv. 132, 138-39 (1974) (discussing the court's distinction
between material that was the proper subject of copyright, yet substantively undefined in statutory
language, and duly copyrighted material that should not be assisted in equity because of its
consequence).
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hands . .. The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has
violated the law in connection with the very transaction as to
which he seeks legal redress. Then aid is denied despite the
defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for
law; in order to promote confidence in the administration of
justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from
contamination.34
The court was often forced to equivocate when it became clear that standards
of morality shifted with succeeding generations and changes in cultural
values, 341 or when the statutory language on which cases had been decided
earlier was changed or abandoned in subsequent statutes, 342 or when the court
adopted new standards for judging the obscene nature of works.343
The weak link was that standing at equity initially required a legal finding of
property in the work, an issue that arguably had currency only until the merger
of equity and law. Whether chancery felt that to find a work illicit as a matter of
fact was a prerequisite for standing, rather than deferring the issue to action at
law if any doubt existed, was a short-lived consideration. The concept passed
into obscurity beginning with the court's abandonment of Burnett and was
replaced with the doctrine of deferring to action at law, which was already
considered governing by Eldon's time. While the Clean Hands Doctrine clearly
called for equitable relief only for those who behaved in an equitable manner,
34

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-84 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
341 See, e.g., Keene v. Kimball, 82 Mass. 545, 548 (1860); Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1925) ("Since, however, this principle rests in public policy, cases decided in one age
are not a safe guide, on their facts, in subsequent times, and the present tendency ... is to allow
much more latitude than formerly to free speech .....
342 In Mitchell Brothers, 604 F.2d at 855, the Fifth Circuit interpreted an explicit intent not to
place content restrictions on copyright eligibility from Congress's removal of previously added
statutory phraseology. Congress first removed reference to works "designed or suited for public
representation," initially added in the 1856 Amendment from the Omnibus Copyright Act of
1870; second, Congress removed language that works should be "connected to the fine arts,"
added in the 1874 Amendment but deleted from the Omnibus Copyright Act of 1909. See
Ronald L. Green, The Obscenity Defense to Copynght Revisited, 69 KY. L.J. 161 (1980-1981) (discussing
the degree to which Mitchell Bmthers was portrayed as a "radical departure" from pre-existing
doctrine).
343 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 13 (1973). Arguably, United States v. One Book Called
"U sses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) and United States v. One Book Entitled "U sses," 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934), following previous court attempts to balance benefits and harms back to
United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) and United States v. Kennerky, 209 F. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) and even R. v. Hick/in, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, presaged more formalized
balancing in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and later in Miller. See Alexander, supra note
53 and accompanying text.
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the determination of that relief was reserved for courts at law to decide whether
the work was criminally libelous. Even if the work were libelous, the issue
remained as to whether copyright protection, as provided and specified by
statute, was accorded to all works that were original and that fulfilled the
procedural prescriptions, or whether it only applied to those which, at law, had
been adjudged of innocent tendency.
MitchellBrothersraised, and to a large extent seemed to resolve, most of these
issues. It was an almost delightfully arcane case, by contemporary copyright
standards, in which a film was pirated in a similar manner as were books and
plays in the eighteenth century. 344 The defendant had secured and shown
copies of the plaintiffs copyrighted film without permission in his own theater.
When advised that the showings were unauthorized publications and ordered to
desist, the defendant refused, and the Mitchell Brothers filed suit, seeking an
injunction and damages under the Copyright Act of 1909.345 The federal
district court refused relief, accepting the affirmative defense that copyright
protection has not been and cannot be provided for obscene works, 346
specifically citing the Clean Hands Doctrine 347 and the general inconsistency of
344 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing the factual situation in Mitchell
Brothers and the changing nature of copyright claims). In Mitchell Brothers, the theft of the
plaintiffs' film property and its copying by public performance harkened back to the early
twentieth century when films were shown in downtown public theaters by operators in reel-toreel projection booths, and the property was tangible, distributed in large canisters. See stpra note
12 and accompanying text. Stagliano's film property, on the other hand, was copied from stolen
digital glass masters and distributed commercially by mail as DVD forgeries, targeting a homeviewing consumer. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Most contemporary copyright
infringement cases relating to film products involve producer/distributor claims of product theft
by unauthorized file-sharing of an intangible digital product, allowing anyone to find, download,
and view copyrighted films. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
35 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-216 (1970) (current version at 17 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-810 (2011)).
346 In rather standard fashion, the district court referenced, without discussion, Martinetti,Barnes,
Bullard, Khan, Broder, Simonton, and Cain, stating that while there were few cases from which to
draw authority and none very recent, "the judicial rule proscribing protection to an obscene work
remains unchallenged and in the opinion of the court should be followed in deciding this case."
Mitchell Bros., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1976). In fact, the 1976 Mitchell Brothers
was the first copyright infringement case in over three decades in which the obscenity defense
had been raised, and the defense's first mention since the Attorney General's opinion memo in
1958. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 395 (Dec. 18, 1958). Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 1041. Following this
successful use of the obscenity defense, it was procedurally accepted a year later in Argos Films v.
Barr InternationalProperfies, 77 Civ. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), again relying on Martinetti, Barnes, and
Bullard, even though the film at issue, Oshima's L' Empire des Sens (1976), was then held not
obscene. Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 1041 n.34.
347 Mitchell Bros., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 142 (citing Stone & McCarick v. Dugan Piano, 220 F. 837
(5th Cir. 1915)) (recognizing that the court in Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d at 1087 had disagreed,
ruling that materials which might be fraudulent or false were still entitled to copyright protection).
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pornographic works with the purpose and language of the Copyright Clause.3 8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, pointing out that the history and language
of the Copyright Act indicated a clear legislative intent that copyright protection
be content-neutral. 9 With regard to whether copyright protection could
include obscene works, the court recognized that the purpose of the
constitutional grant was expansive-to promote creativity-and that it was for
Congress to decide if restraints on content were consistent with that purpose.350
While the district and appeals courts both discussed the applicability of national
obscenity standards, neither applied those standards substantively.35'
Most critically, the Fifth Circuit resolved the issue of whether the Copyright
Clause itself set a precondition that works statutorily protected by copyright
must actually promote science and the useful arts. It found that Congress was
empowered to promote such ends generally and to choose the appropriate
choices, which it acknowledged might result in "the protection of a great deal of
chaff."352 In so doing, the court dismissed judicially-created affirmative
defenses as "largely vestiges of a bygone era"353 and ruled that any defense not
authorized by Congress would frustrate the purpose of copyright protection.3m
The court also ruled that the maxim of unclean hands was essentially irrelevant
348 Id. at 142-43 ("Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the service rendered" (citing Ma.Zer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))).
349 Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d 852, 854 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1979). The court explicitly rejected "the
underlying judicial moral conclusion that the work is not worthy of protection [because of its
content]," noting that the doctrine "has not been adopted in this country. . . and should not be."
Id at 861. The position is supported by the elimination of wording implying content-based
restrictions from previous copyright acts, supra note 342 and accompanying text, and sustained
further by Holmes' rejection of the role of judges as arbiters of public taste in Bleistein v. Donaldson,
188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) and in Belcher, 486 F.2d at 1087.
350 The appeals court stated further that moral standards change over time, as had been
acknowledged in Martinetti, and that "[m]any works that are today held in high regard have been
adjudged obscene in previous eras. English courts of the nineteenth century found the works of
Byron, Southey and Shelley to be immoral." MitchellBros., 604 F.2d at 857.
351 The fundamental issue was whether the film at issue should be adjudged under Roth
standards or the more recent Miller standards that emphasized local values, and both courts
ultimately decided that the more lenient would be appropriate, with the district court then,
without benefit of expert testimony from either party, viewing the film and declaring it obscene.
The appeals court, having declared the film's content irrelevant to its warranting copyright
protection, did not rule on its obscenity.
352 Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 860. This was, essentially, the same conclusion the Bleistein court
reached in 1903.
353 Id at 861 ("[I]t is evident to us that it is inappropriate for a court, in the absence of some
guidance or authorization from the legislature, to interpose its moral views between an author and
his willing audience," specifically contradicting Dane v. M & H Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963)).
3" MitchellBros., 604 F.2d at 861-62.
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to the case at hand since the maxim required a direct relation between the
plaintiffs conduct, as well as an injury to the defendant, in essence, the Eyre
position in Dering almost two hundred years earlier. While one might argue that
distributing the film would cause harm to a third party, namely the general
public, the film had not in fact been distributed, and the plaintiff was left to
argue that it was the production of the film, rather than its distribution, that
caused harm, clearly a vacuous point.355
Around the same period, the Mitchell Brothers were showing their
pornographic films in adult movie theaters they owned in California, causing
the Santa Ana City Council to declare the showings a public nuisance and
revoking Mitchell Brothers's license to operate. 356 As evidence toward that end,
the city commissioned its counsel, James Clancy, to make recordings during
showings of the films. 357 Through their distributor, Jartech, Mitchell Brothers
sued for copyright infringement but lost when the jury accepted the affirmative
defense of fair use since no profits were secured by the recording and the
content was obscene.358 The city then counterclaimed that since the films were
obscene, the court should order them seized as contraband. However, the
court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to make a declaratory judgment of law and
that seizure was not warranted because federal copyright law did not include a
provision for excluding material from its protection because of content. 35 9 In a
third action, the trial court assessed Mitchell Brothers all attorney's fees,
accepting the city's argument that the infringement suit was vexatious and
harassing since the plaintiff had lost a similar suit in Texas in 1976.360 Mitchell
Brothers appealed all three trial court actions. 361
On appeal, the city maintained that Congress could not grant copyright
protection to obscene material in defiance of the constitutional mandate to

35 Id. at 863-64. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court had erroneously conflated the
narrower unclean hands requirement that a third party be somehow directly injured by fraudulent
representation (consistent with Deing)with the broader argument that the public was harmed in a
substantive manner by publication of obscene material. This was, not, however, at issue in the
copyright claim since the plaintiff had not yet distributed the film and no general public harm
could be argued. Id.at 865 n.25.
356 Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982).
357 Id.
358 Id. at 405. As the court deemed the copying to be a fair use, its finding that the film was

obscene was not germane, especially since the defendants had not raised an obscenity defense in
the trial.
359 Id.

360 Id. (referring to the 1976 district court ruling in Mitchell Brthers, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138
(N.D. Tex. 1976)).
361 Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (1979).
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promote the progress of science and the useful arts. 362 The court dismissed this
argument by maintaining that Congress had statutory discretion under the
Copyright Clause to effectuate that mandate in a content-neutral manner and
had done so historically. 363 The court upheld the district court's ruling that
defendant's copies were a fair use, but it nonetheless denied the sustainability of
the obscenity defense. 364 The court also held that the Copyright Act did not
empower it to seize and destroy the films as obscene, for settled law would first
require a factual determination. 365
In most subsequent rulings, the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Mitchell Brothers,
supported by Jartech and Nimmer, has been accepted as authority,366 with its
Jartech, 666 F.2d at 403.
Id. at 406.
364 Id. In rejecting the Council's obscenity defense, the Second Circuit found authoritative the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Belcher that the statutory history of the Copyright Act did not authorize
the court to sort out eligibility based on content. This was also supported by the Fifth Circuit's
ruling in Mitchell Brothers, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), overturning the district court and
sustaining enforcement of their copyright. The court also cited Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copynght § 2.17 (1980), which recognized the Fifth Circuit's ruling as "the most thoughtful and
comprehensive analysis of the issue" and as representing the "prevailing view on the issue." Id.
The court further argued that by sheer judicial pragmatism, to accept the obscenity defense
would, in practice, necessarily fragment and thus thwart uniform enforcement of a national policy
of copyright protection, hinging copyright enforcement on widely varying local community
standards. Id.
365 Id. at 408.
366 See Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171, at 11-14
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying the defendant's request for summary judgment and ruling in part that a
subsequent finding of obscenity in the works at issue would not be an adequate defense against
copyright infringement (citing MitchellBros., 604 F.2d at 852 and Jartech, 666 F.2d at 403)); Dream
Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2009) (ruling that illegal use or
operation of a work does not preclude damages for copyright infringement (citing Belcher, 486
F.2d at 1087 and Nimmer's interpretation of Mitchell Brothers and Jartech)); Flava Works, Inc. v.
Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that while the films at issue involved black
men in homosexual acts, there was no suggestion raised that they were in any manner illegal, "and
anyway the prevailing view is that even illegality is not a bar to copyrightability" (citing Jartech,666
F.2d at 403; Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 860; Belcher, 486 F.2d at 1087; 1 NIMMER, supra note 47,
§ 2.17)); see also Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Congress need not
'require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote the useful arts,'" and "neither the old
nor the new copyright law" proscribed congressional discretion to protect copyright as it deems
appropriate (citing Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 860)). Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d
174 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) has been a frequently cited exception, at times accorded equal authority. In
a preliminary hearing, the district court judge, after viewing three films representative of the over
200 titles at issue, declared them obscene and held that a "probable cause exist[ed] to believe that
the plaintiff [wa]s violating 18 U.S.C. 1466" by shipping obscene materials in interstate
commerce. As the plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction, scrutiny of content was technically
unnecessary, as was the issue whether films of certain content could still be copyright protected.
Nonetheless, the district court summarily declared "the clearly criminal nature of the plaintiffs
362
363
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reasoning focusing not on content of the works at issue but rather on
congressional discretion under the Copyright Clause. Perhaps more telling,
however, is that rulings regarding infringement of allegedly, or even admittedly,
obscene works have been infrequent, mostly because defendants have not
raised the obscenity defense at all. 367 Whether defendants have failed to argue
obscenity defenses because they considered these fruitless after the Fifth
Circuit's Mitchell Brothers opinion and its subsequent acceptance by copyright
treatises is an open question. But in a large range of recent copyright
infringement cases involving hardcore pornographic and arguably obscene
films, the issue of noncopyrightable content has not been substantively raised
and has become, in essence, a non-issue. The obscenity defense, largely
dormant and perhaps considered arcane throughout much of the twentieth
century, was raised in Mitchell Brothers in the district court, dismissed by the Fifth
Circuit, and has since returned to dormancy.368

operation," then cited the Clean Hands Doctrine as the basis for refusing a preliminary
injunction. Id. at 175. This argument was wholly dismissed in Nova as a conclusion that "must be
left to a jury." Nova, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171 at 12. Perhaps erring on the side of caution,
Liberly Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 n.2 (D. Mass.
2011) offered that while the films at issue were hardcore, albeit legal, pornography and because
the defendants did not raise the issue of obscene content in their motion to quash the plaintiffs
requested subpoenas, the question of whether such a nature disqualified them from copyright
protection was still "unsettled in many circuits," including its own.
367 See Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 754 (involving works that were clearly pornographic but faced
no affirmative defense as to their illegality); Straughter v. Raymond, No. CV08-2170 CAS (CWx),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068 (Aug. 19, 2011) (involving a defendant who invoked the Unclean
Hands Doctrine not to claim content exceptionality but rather to argue that the plaintiff had overstated the reach of his copyright); Liberty Media Holdings, L.L.C. v. Vinigay.com, No. CV-11280-PHX-LO4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153615 (Dec. 28, 2011) (involving a magistrate judge who
acknowledged the pornographic nature of the films at issue and sustained their eligibility for
damages, injunctive relief, or an order for impoundment). That other appellate courts have not
reconsidered the Fifth Circuit's Mitchell Brothers opinion in virtually any copyright infringement
cases over the past forty years probably reflects that no defendants have seriously introduced the
obscenity defense, including Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., No. 12-CV-469-Y612, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52551 (2012), a swarm case in which an identified defendant mentioned in passing that
the absence of subsequent supporting Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court rulings rendered Mitchell
Brothers non-binding.
368 It is fair to question whether Nimmer's acceptance of Mitchell Brothers as "well-reasoned"
foreclosed discussion among scholars and practitioners. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the
Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 581 (2004) (arguing that Nimmer's interpretations expound
normative positions on how copyright law should be interpreted). However, prior to 1979,
Nimmer reported but did not take issue with doctrinal acceptance of the obscenity defense.
Mitchell Brothers was arguable well-reasoned from a constitutional standpoint, but it did not delve
into the contextual weakness of the commonly-cited precedent cases, as this Article has done.
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Arguably, Mitchell Brothers was not the fatal blow to the obscenity defense in
Instead, the defense had already been rendered
copyright infringement.
twentieth century 69 and had not been raised even
the
of
start
the
by
moribund
incidentally in over three decades. 370 Like the murder victim on the Orient
Express, 37' the obscenity defense absorbed numerous blows, some less overt
than others, none definitive but all contributing. Many of these originated in
the Constitution's explicit empowerment of Congress to protect copyright in
any manner and by whatever means it chose in order to promote progress in
science and the useful arts, however it chose to define those. The result was a
juxtaposition of that empowerment and its statutory manifestations onto a fairly
unsettled collection of equitable doctrines arising from eighteenth-century
English common law. This created a moralistic but impractical foundation for
considering both the process and the consequences of copyright protection for
illicit or at least questionable works.
The tension between procedural and substantive review stemmed from the
separation of law and equity in the English courts and became manifest during
the Eldon period in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. The
solution to this tension lay in the procedural doctrines established by Hardwicke
more than a half century before. By Eldon's time, the moralistically arbitrary
standard set by Burnett v. Chetwood,372 which might have been a watershed
copyright ruling after Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne, was clearly
untenable and largely abandoned. It was replaced by procedural rules that
deemed issues of morality to be factual in nature and therefore appropriate for
courts of law rather than for courts of equity.
The Eldon period was important for establishing procedural doctrines for
considering copyright infringement. But its primary legacy was its initiation of
369 See Bleistein v. Donaldson, 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (establishing that any material with a
modicum of originality would be eligible for copyright protection "unless there is a restriction in
the words of the act"); see also Oren Bracha, Commentary on Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co. (1903), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds.),
http://www.copyrighthistory.org. It was a relatively straightforward matter to find the absence
of content-based exception in current statutory language, which, combined with the broader
interpretation of congressional empowerment under the Copyright Clause, rendered the obscenity
defense irrelevant in copyright infringement cases. One could as easily argue that, to the degree
that an explicit congressional effort to support creativity under the Copyright Clause requires
uniform enforcement, any application of content-based exceptions based on local definitions of
obscenity under Miller would have to yield until or unless Congress established a uniform national
standard for criminal obscenity or amended copyright statutes to provide for an explicit contentbased exception, thereby creating an obscenity defense.
370 See Willdnson, supra note 57.
371AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPREss (1934).
372 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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the consequentialist critique of copyright protection. Coming out of a decade
of political upheaval filled with fear of sedition and governmental collapse,
England turned its moral concern to normative cultural and religious values,
which were challenged by the libelous satires of Peter Pindar, the republican
adulations of a younger Robert Southey, the scientific interpretations of
scripture in Lawrence's lectures on physiology, and most of all, the swooning
romanticism of sexual liberation, incest, and exotic temptations embodied in the
works (and lives) of Shelley and Byron. These fears, combined with the vast
expansion and voracious appetite of England's reading public, exerted pressure
for passage of the first obscenity law in England, which clearly focused on the
social consequence of bringing moralistically challenging works to the masses.
A similar pattern emerged about the same time in America, resulting in the
passage of the Comstock laws.
The paradox of encouraging knowledge and learning while fearing its
consequence at the social margins was anticipated by Lord Eldon, by Chief
Justice Cockburn, by numerous American judges in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, and finally by Judge Woolsey and his judicial progeny. The
succession of court decisions, from Roth to Miller and beyond, endeavored to
achieve a public good by balancing social value with social contamination. In
the process, the obscenity defense, a latent application of the Clean Hands
Doctrine in an affirmative defense against copyright infringement, attained a
level of notoriety far beyond its warrant. The deferral of a question of fact to
the law courts, a standard doctrinal practice in English, and later in American,
common law, became a pariah-a judicial countenancing of challenges to the
values underlying the stability of society. The consequence, then as now, was
considered far more threatening than any question regarding the integrity of the
process.
Of course, the bellwether of this trend was Lord Eldon, who, by even
temporarily denying injunctive relief to publishers of illicit works, virtually
guaranteed the massive proliferation of those venomous works throughout
society. By following a procedural discipline he knew to be integral to the
legitimacy of judicial rulings and an orderly society, Eldon became pilloried
then, and to a certain extent still, for hastening the moral decay of society.
When the legislature did not then move to protect morality, it seemed only
natural that judges should fill the breach. Ironically, it would appear that to do
so, judges would have to accept the obscenity defense and thereby accelerate
the distribution of questionable works at cheaper prices.
That the Stagliano copyright infringement suit should constitute any form of
capstone on the long, slow, and very quiet passing of the obscenity defense may
seem ironic to some, appalling to others, and to most, perhaps, merely an
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amusing afterthought. In American jurisprudence, the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Mitchell Brothers made clear that Congress has avoided restrictive language
regarding the content of works eligible for copyright protection and has
stripped language interpreted as being restrictive. Congress certainly has the
capacity to restrict content eligibility but, however interpreted, has chosen not
to do so. To that extent, the films of John Stagliano and other commercial
pornographers remain equally eligible for copyright protection, as are any other
literary, artistic, photographic or cinematic works, be they wheat or chaff.
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